This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

201326Z May 03

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SADC REGIONAL COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KHANDAGLE, BORNS, HALMRAST-SANCHEZ 
AFR FOR COPSON, FORT, BAKER, MACNAIRN 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR, DELISI 
PRETORIA FOR DIJKERMAN, HELM, DISKIN 
NAIROBI FOR DEPREZ, RILEY, HALE 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS 
MASERU FOR BELLEGARDE 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
GABORONE FOR FLEURET, MULLINS AND DORMAN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  ZIMBABWE FOOD SECURITY PROJECTIONS FOR 2003/04: 
THE CRISIS ISN'T OVER YET 
 
 
¶1. ACTION: THIS CABLE IS FOR AMBASSADOR J. SULLIVAN'S 
IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS TDY 
CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2.  Summary: The final Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee (ZIMVAC) April (2003) update and joint U.N. World 
Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) report 
have not yet been released, despite promises of release for 
the past several weeks.  According to highly reliable 
sources, Zimbabwe's total maize production for the 
recent/current (2002/03) harvest is estimated at 820,000 
Metric Tons (MT), an approximately 65 percent (%) increase 
over last year's result.  When combined with the estimated 
production levels of other cereal crops (wheat, millets), 
total cereals production in 2002/03 is estimated at 
1,035,000 MT.  Adding various modest amounts of estimated 
carryover stocks, winter maize production, remaining food 
aid (pipeline) stocks and other miscellaneous on-farm stocks 
results in an estimated 950,000 MT of total available maize 
and 1,200,000 MT of all cereals for the 2003/04 
marketing/consumption year. 
 
¶3. Applying the new reduced population estimate from the 
latest census in 2002, Zimbabwe's projected food needs in 
2003/04 are estimated at 1,675,000 MT for maize only, and 
2,205,000 MT for all cereals.  If one reduces these figures 
to human consumption requirements only, total national 
requirements for maize are estimated at 1,425,000 MT, and 
human requirements for all cereals are estimated at 
1,955,000 MT. 
 
¶4. Based on these figures, Zimbabwe's estimated food gap 
amounts to 725,000 MT for maize only, and about 1 million MT 
for all cereals for the 2003-04 marketing/consumption year 
(through April 2004).  Similarly, if one removes the non- 
human (livestock/other) portion of these amounts, the 2003- 
04 maize gap is reduced to about 485,000 MT, and the total 
cereals gap to about 725,000 MT.  Finally, accounting for 
approximately 275,000 MT of already confirmed/planned food 
imports from various sources, the final projected Zimbabwe 
maize deficit would be 485,000 MT (235,000 MT without 
livestock/other non-human requirements), and 725,000 MT for 
all cereals (475,000 MT without livestock/other non-human 
requirements). 
 
¶5. At current international market rates, these imports will 
cost approximately US$100 million for maize, and $150 
million for all cereals.  Given the current sorry state of 
GOZ finances, it remains highly questionable how much of 
this food import requirement the government will be able to 
meet.  The Mission hopes to have preliminary estimates of 
this amount shortly.  Until we receive this information, it 
will remain difficult to determine projected international 
and USG food assistance requirements for this year. 
However, although clearly less than last year's 
requirements, the magnitude and localized geographic and 
socio-economic distribution of the need, in combination with 
failed local markets, suggest that food aid will continue to 
be required in 2003/04.  If one assumes that a 50/50 split 
between government and international donors might be a 
reasonable estimate for meeting this food gap, international 
donor food aid requirements would amount to approximately 
250,000 MT for maize, and 375,000 MT for all cereals. 
Assuming the USG maintains its contribution at its current 
40% share of the total requirements, USG food assistance to 
Zimbabwe would amount to between 100,000 and 150,000 MT of 
food, valued at between approximately US$55 and $82 million. 
The emphasis for such assistance would be on the southern 
and western areas of the country, which experienced large- 
scale or total crop failures this year, and on specific 
highly vulnerable groups. 
 
¶6. The Mission will provide more details on these subjects 
as soon as the aforementioned final ZIMVAC and CFSAM reports 
are released.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
THE 2002/03 CROP HARVEST FORECAST 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. Although the final ZIMVAC April 2003 update and the 
WFP/FAO CFSAM report are not yet officially released, the 
2003/04 crop production and vulnerability estimates for 
Zimbabwe are close to final.  According to highly reliable 
sources, the projected 2002/03 production figure for maize 
will be about 820,000 MT.  Although 65% higher than last 
year's dismal production (498,500 MT), this total remains 
only 55% of production in 2000/01 (1,476,240 MT) and less 
than half (48%) of Zimbabwe's 1990s average maize production 
(1,705,825 MT), signifying the continuing negative impact of 
erratic weather, the government's chaotic land 
redistribution program and its gross policy failures over 
the past several years affecting all aspects of the 
agricultural production system including on-farm operations, 
producer incentives and shortages of essential agricultural 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and draught power (fuel). 
Other cereals' production (wheat, millet) is expected to be 
similar to last year's levels (150,000 MT and 65,000 MT, 
respectively).  This yields a total projected cereal 
production for 2002/03 in Zimbabwe of 1,034,500 MT (over 40% 
higher than last year's 726,000 MT, but also less than half 
of normal/average cereal production in Zimbabwe).  When one 
adds modest amounts of estimated carryover stocks (maize - 
26,000 MT, all cereals - 62,000 MT), an estimated 10,000 MT 
of winter maize production, about 93,000 MT of available 
food aid (pipeline) stocks and a small amount (3,000 MT) of 
unmonitored on-farm stocks to these totals, total maize 
availability for 2003/04 in Zimbabwe rises to about 950,000 
MT, and the availability of all cereals increases to 
1,202,000 MT. 
 
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THE PROJECTED 2003/04 FOOD AID NEEDS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. Applying the new reduced population estimate from the 
latest (2002) census of 11,770,000 people (reduced from 
13,600,000 population figure used last year), Zimbabwe's 
projected food needs in 2003/04 are estimated at 1,675,000 
MT for maize only, and 2,205,000 MT for all cereals, 
including 177,000 MT of millet and 341,000 MT of wheat, as 
well as 250,000 MT of maize for livestock and other non- 
human purposes.  If one reduces these figures to human 
consumption requirements only, total national maize 
requirements are estimated at 1,425,000 MT, and all cereals 
human requirements are estimated at 1,955,000 MT.  Note: 
Although some have questioned the methodology of the census 
and, hence, the accuracy of the reduced population figures, 
these reduced numbers are widely accepted by donors in light 
of the rapid increase in outward migration and increased 
deaths from HIV/AIDS.  End Note. 
 
¶9. Based on these figures, Zimbabwe's estimated food gap 
amounts to 725,000 MT for maize only, and about 1 million MT 
for all cereals for the 2003-04 marketing/consumption year 
(through April 2004).  Similarly, if one removes the non- 
human (livestock/other) portion of these amounts, the 2003- 
04 maize gap is estimated at 485,000 MT, and the total 
cereals gap at 725,000 MT.  Note: While this gap compares 
favourably to last year's estimated deficit of approximately 
1.3 million MT for maize and approximately 1.5 million MT 
for all cereals, a large proportion of this reduction is 
attributable to the reduced national consumption requirement 
due to the revised population figure noted above.  Hence, 
the significant reduction in the estimated 2003/04 food gap 
is attributable both to increased supply, through the 
increased production (+65%) in the 2002/03 growing season, 
as well as reduced demand, through the decreased national 
consumption requirement (-17%) for the 2003/04 
marketing/consumption year.  End Note. 
 
¶10. Best available estimates indicate that approximately 
275,000 MT of imports have already been purchased/programmed 
for Zimbabwe for arrival over the coming months.  This total 
projected import figure includes approximately 95,000 MT of 
food aid (including 80,000 MT of maize and 15,000 MT of 
millets) and 180,000 MT of commercial imports (including 
160,000 MT of maize and 20,000 MT of wheat).  Note: 
Reliable figures are not yet available for wheat due to the 
later timing and increased uncertainty regarding this winter 
crop, grown primarily by Zimbabwe's former white commercial 
farmers.  However, preliminary figures estimate an 
approximate 163,000 MT deficit for this critical urban 
market commodity this marketing/consumption year.  End Note. 
Taking these confirmed import plans into account yields a 
final projected Zimbabwe maize deficit of 485,000 MT (or 
235,000 MT without livestock/other non-human requirements), 
and 725,000 MT for all cereals (or 475,000 MT without 
livestock/other non-human requirements).  Note:  The 
projected food aid imports appear to be reasonable on the 
basis of available country information.  However, the 
commercial import numbers remain to be verified, principally 
with the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) parastatal Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB).  Also, these figures include no 
provision for any strategic food reserve or buffer/carryover 
stocks at the end of the marketing/consumption year in April 
¶2004.  End Note. 
 
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VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶11. According to reliable sources, the April ZIMVAC update 
will indicate that a total estimated maximum of 3.9 million 
rural Zimbabweans would be at severe risk due to food 
insecurity by the end of the 2003/04 marketing/consumption 
year.  Note:  The ZIMVAC did not explicitly assess urban 
population needs, which, according to reasonable estimates, 
could add as many as 1 million additional people to this 
figure.  End Note.  As might be expected, given local 
planting/harvest seasons, the total estimated numbers of 
vulnerable people increase throughout the year, from a low 
of 600,000 people in April/May 2003 to the 3.9 million 
maximum starting in January 2004.  Geographically, these 
people are primarily situated in the poorer, drier and 
chronically food insecure regions of southern and western 
Zimbabwe, including Matebeleland North and South and some of 
the central and southern parts of Midlands, Masvingo, and 
Manicaland Provinces.  However, "pockets" of severe 
vulnerability also exist within other similarly poor areas 
of the country that experienced major/total crop failures 
this year (e.g., northern areas of the Mashonaland, Midlands 
and Manicaland Provinces), as well as within specific socio- 
economic groups, such as ex-commercial farm workers, "fast- 
track" resettlers and the urban poor. 
 
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EXISTING COUNTRY CONSTRAINTS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. GOZ Finances: The above estimates suggest that Zimbabwe 
will require a total of 725,000 MT of maize imports in the 
2003/04 marketing consumption year, including 485,000 MT of 
new/additional imports (including 250,000 MT of 
livestock/other non-human requirements).  Similarly, the 
country will require a total of about 1 million MT of all 
cereals imports this year, including about 725,000 MT of 
new/additional imports (including 250,000 MT of 
livestock/non-human requirements).  At current international 
market rates, these additional food imports will cost 
approximately US$100 million for maize (@ US$ 200/MT), and 
$150 million for all cereals (applying the current estimated 
commercial market cost of wheat for Zimbabwe of US$ 200/MT 
for the additional "other cereal" amounts, as wheat will 
comprise the bulk of these additional requirements).  Given 
the current sorry state of GOZ finances, it remains highly 
questionable how much of this additional FX food import 
requirement the government will be able to meet.  The 
Mission hopes to have preliminary estimates of this amount 
shortly. 
 
¶13. Domestic Markets: Given the significant remaining 
numbers of vulnerable populations and their localized 
geographic and socio-economic situation, it remains highly 
doubtful that significant quantities of grain from surplus- 
producing areas in the north will be effectively 
redistributed at affordable prices to those most in need in 
the southern and western grain-deficit areas of the country. 
This doubt stems from several factors.  First, although the 
GOZ has raised producer prices for the major cereals to more 
attractive levels, these new prices still fall well short of 
international/regional market parity.  Hence, it remains 
questionable how much "surplus" grain will actually be sold 
to/purchased by the GMB for redistribution through market 
channels (as opposed to being retained for own/family use 
and/or sold through illicit black market or cross-border 
channels).  Second, the significant "distortions" observed 
in last year's food markets, through such practices as 
hoarding, corruption, black marketeering and 
biased/selective sales/distributions, raise serious doubts 
regarding whether this year's markets will function any more 
effectively under even more localized conditions of 
continuing food scarcity.  As a result, the reduced gap 
cited above may not necessarily translate into increased 
access for Zimbabwe's most vulnerable populations.  Third, 
any limited quantities of food which do become available for 
sale through local normal (or black) markets will likely be 
unaffordable for the vulnerable target population, who have 
already depleted most of their limited assets and exhausted 
most other coping mechanisms.  And, finally, 
continued/increasing FX and fuel shortages are expected to 
place continuing severe constraints on government efforts to 
transport food to where it is required.  For these reasons, 
continued, more targeted food assistance will be required to 
help address these market failures and ensure that those 
particular vulnerable groups and areas that truly need help 
can get it. 
 
¶14. Urban Requirements:  Wheat - a primary food staple of 
the urban poor - is already in extremely short supply in 
Zimbabwe (with formal opening stocks estimated at about 
28,000 MT or about one month's supply).  With no significant 
harvest expected for this winter crop until October (2003), 
this situation is only expected to worsen over the coming 
months.  In the absence of affordable wheat, urban consumers 
will have no choice but to continue to substitute available 
maize meal to meet their daily food requirements.  This 
additional demand (estimated as high as 15,000 MT/month) 
will place significant pressure on the limited maize stocks 
that do manage to make it into local markets. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
PROJECTED DONOR FOOD RELIEF REQUIREMENTS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. In the absence of stated government plans for projected 
additional commercial food imports, it is difficult to 
determine what the total international food relief 
requirements will be over the 2003/04 marketing/consumption 
year.  However, although clearly less than last year's 
requirements, the magnitude and localized geographic and 
socio-economic distribution of the need, in combination with 
failed local markets, suggest that food aid will continue to 
be required in 2003/04, especially during the "hungry" 
season when this year's harvests run out.  If one assumes a 
reduced government capacity to meet these continuing 
substantial food import requirements this year, a 50/50 
split between government and international donors might be a 
reasonable estimate for meeting this food gap (as opposed to 
the approximate 3/1 split which occurred last year). 
According to this "ballpark" estimate, international donor 
food aid requirements would amount to approximately 250,000 
MT for maize, and 375,000 MT for all cereals.  Assuming 
further that the USG maintains its contribution at its 
current 40% share of total requirements, USG food assistance 
to Zimbabwe would amount to between 100,000 and 150,000 MT 
of food, valued at between approximately US$55 and $82 
million.  Note:  The increased cost of this USG assistance 
relative to the global commercial estimates cited above 
results from the additional international transport, 
shipping and handling/management (ITSH) costs associated 
with official USG assistance.  End Note.  For comparative 
purposes, these estimated requirements are approximately 
between 50% and 75% of total USG contributions to Zimbabwe 
over the past year. 
 
¶16. The emphasis of food assistance over the coming year 
should be on the southern and western areas of the country 
which experienced large-scale or total crop failures this 
year, and on specific highly vulnerable groups, such as 
children (especially, but not exclusively under five years 
of age), pregnant and/or lactating mothers, the elderly, 
chronically ill and disabled, female and child-headed 
households, those affected and infected by HIV/AIDS, and 
special socio-economic groups such as ex-commercial farm 
workers and the urban poor.  Based primarily on the ZIMVAC 
results noted above, revised eligibility criteria and 
targeting procedures are now being developed in accordance 
with these more selective food aid targeting requirements. 
Note:  The controversial issue of international assistance 
for newly resettled "fast-track" farmers remains a subject 
which needs to be addressed; however, it is significant to 
note that needs appear to be minimal among this group with 
only 20% of the population reported to require external 
assistance.  End Note. 
 
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MISSION COMMENT 
--------------- 
 
¶17. While the country's food security situation is certainly 
much improved over this time last year, the magnitude and 
nature of the needs suggests that food assistance will 
continue to be required over the next marketing/consumption 
year, especially during the "hungry" season when this year's 
harvests run out.  The major outstanding question is what 
proportion of the estimated food gap/import requirements 
will government be able to cover through its own means, 
given the deplorable state of the country's finances and 
credit, and the many critical competing demands on scarce 
available FX.  Government is currently reviewing these 
figures, and we hope to receive a response to this question 
in the near future.  The Mission will advise on this 
information as soon as it is received. 
 
¶18. Note: The Mission has just learned that government is 
disputing some of the figures in ZIMVAC cited above.  While 
it is unclear exactly which numbers the government is 
contesting, given the politics surrounding the current 
country situation, the Mission expects that the basic 
(maize) production figures cited above are at the center of 
this dispute.  While this predictable development will 
probably serve to delay the release of the final ZIMVAC 
update report, it is not/not expected to significantly alter 
the estimates provided herein (which are also well supported 
by the anticipated WFP/FAO CFSAM results).  Hence, the 
Mission recommends that, at least for the time being, these 
numbers remain the focus of future USG planning discussions 
for the on-going food security crisis in Zimbabwe.  End 
Note.  #Whitehead