This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 001361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W 
STATE PLEASE REPEAT TO IO COLLECTIVE 
STATE FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, IO AND SA/PAB 
NSC FOR EABRAMS, SMCCORMICK, STAHIR-KHELI, JDWORKEN 
USAID FOR USAID/A, DCHA/AA, DCHA/RMT, DCHA/FFP 
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI, DCHA/DG, ANE/AA 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:WGARVELINK, BMCCONNELL, KFARNSWORTH 
USAID FOR ANE/AA:WCHAMBERLIN 
ROME FOR FODAG 
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH 
DOHA FOR MSHIRLEY 
ANKARA FOR AMB WRPEARSON, ECON AJSIROTIC AND DART 
AMMAN FOR USAID AND DART 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF IZ WFP
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01: DART UMM QASR TRIP REPORT 9 APRIL 2003 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  On 5 April, the DART made a third assessment trip to Umm 
Qasr.  The DART joined up with two members positioned in Umm 
Qasr and met Coalition force representatives and five 
community leaders, who have assumed the role of the civilian 
leadership of the town following the departure of most Baath 
party officials.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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SECURITY 
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¶2.  Although less looting is reported, Coalition forces are 
concerned about the security of port facilities.  According 
to Coalition forces, the port's basic infrastructure is 
sound, but it has not received proper maintenance for years. 
Coalition forces stressed that maintenance would be a key 
factor in any plans to re-establish proper port management. 
If there is not currently a maintenance component in the 
Stevedore Services of America's current contract with USAID, 
it is suggested that the contract be revisited to include 
such a component. 
 
¶3.  Concerns were expressed about the stability of Umm Qasr 
once Coalition forces begin to move out.  There is a great 
need for police enforcement and patrolling.  Concerning 
potential reprisals against Baathist party members, 
Coalition forces stated that the best they can do is to 
mitigate retribution as Coalition forces lack a police force 
as well as adequate capacity and resources. 
 
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CIVIL AFFAIRS 
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¶4.  Coalition forces are very concerned that international 
organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) will bypass Umm Qasr because they do not see a 
widespread need for humanitarian assistance.  If this 
occurs, the Coalition forces feel that they will be expected 
to assume this role, but caution that they lack the capacity 
to fill this vacuum.  Coalition forces are eager to hand 
over humanitarian assistance such as water distribution to 
appropriate U.N. agencies, IOs, or NGOs. 
 
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WATER 
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¶5.  The water distribution continues to be an issue of 
concern in Umm Qasr.  While the Coalition forces intended 
that water would be provided free of charge to the local 
population, a system was not put in place to monitor the 
water truck drivers.  On 5 April, Coalition forces announced 
that they will pay the drivers and ensure that water will be 
free of charge.  As 7 April, 26 private trucks were 
providing water to Umm Qasr.  However, while 14 drivers are 
providing water in town at no cost, 12 are selling it in 
outlying villages.  Coalition forces do not have the staff 
to monitor the distributions and have requested UNICEF or 
another organization assume this role. Civil Affairs 
representatives also requested that the DART assist with 
water and food coordination. 
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FOOD 
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¶6.  Community leaders who met with the DART stated that 
there were 45 food agents in Umm Qasr.  The majority were 
shop owners and old women.  There are currently 33 agents 
who are willing to restart food distribution.  The remaining 
12 are either too afraid to come forward or are in Basrah. 
The leaders showed the DART a list with the names of food 
agents and beneficiaries.  The DART will facilitate a 
meeting with the World Food Program to re-organize the food 
distribution network.  Community leaders have contacted 
these agents and say that they will also be able to absorb 
the distribution previously handled by agents that have 
fled. 
 
¶7.  The DART asked if it would be possible to identify the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Basrah presently 
living in Umm Qasr. The community leaders pulled out a list 
and replied that they had already taken the initiative to 
identify the IDPs from Basrah and they had come with their 
ration cards.  . The DART suggested that the food 
distribution be prioritized for the most vulnerable and that 
dairy, meat, and vegetables could be added to the first 
distribution.  Coalition forces have offered to facilitate 
the movement of the commodities from the warehouse for 
distribution. 
 
 
¶8.  Umm Qasr residents have expressed frustration over the 
numerous assessment trips by international organizations, 
without tangible results.  The residents repeatedly 
expressed the need for foods rich in protein, such as meat, 
eggs, and dairy products as well as the need for propane gas 
for cooking. 
 
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ELECTRICITY 
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¶9.  Coalition forces have once again repaired and restored 
electricity to three-quarters of the town.  The electricity 
plant was recently sabotaged by six persons; one is in 
custody.  While the electricity to the town is functioning, 
the system has become more vulnerable due to the sabotage. 
 
MAPPING 
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¶10.  The community leaders mapped off the principal housing 
and commercial sections of Umm Qasr.  In total, the town is 
comprised of 82 streets; each street has 72 houses.  Up to 
three to four families live in each house.  The North 
Section is the North Indian Camp ("Hindi Court").  It 
consists of 37 streets and has 6,600 inhabitants.  To the 
west of this is the South Indian Camp.  People living in 
South Indian Camp worked at the Port and were forcibly 
relocated by the regime from their homes near the port to 
this area.  Houses around the Customs Office are associated 
with the Ministry of Industry.  Resident of this sector 
worked at the pipe, steel, and cement factories. 
 
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EMPLOYMENT 
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¶11.  According to community leaders, the lack of employment 
and income are critical problems in Umm Qasr.  Nearly 
everyone worked for the government and the last salary 
received was prior to the start of the war.  In addition, 
residents have spent all their money to prepare for the war 
and in fear that the money would be worthless once the 
regime changed.  It is especially urgent that the port 
begins to function since 10,000 people were previously 
employed there.  The leaders stated that the quick 
development of jobs will be crucial to keep stability in Umm 
Qasr. 
 
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VULNERABILITY/REPRISALS 
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¶12.  Community leaders reported that a few nights before the 
meeting with the DART, a mob of over 1,000 people torched 
the house of a Baathist member in North Indian Camp, and 
attempted to burn other Baathist houses. However, one of the 
community leaders prevented further reprisals by telling the 
mob, "We've had many rivers of blood and destruction. We 
should let bygones be bygones and rebuild our country."  The 
leaders expressed concern that great physical destruction 
will take place on 14 April, the Shi'a Day of Martyrdom. 
 
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TOWN COUNCIL 
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¶13.  Community leaders have identified a building located 
near the police station that could be used for office 
premises.  It is a bare shell and would require 
rehabilitation and equipment.  Capacity building and 
training in forming a town council, democracy, and elections 
was requested by the community leaders.  They also expressed 
interest in media messaging (print, radio, television) in 
order to promote a climate of reconciliation and to prevent 
lawlessness, looting, and reprisals.  Community leaders 
offered to organize a volunteer police corps. 
 
JONES