This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000472 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF 
CONDUCT 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 408 
 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 427 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) At a press conference on March 13, Government of Nepal 
(GON) and Maoist representatives released a long-awaited code 
of conduct to govern behavior during the ongoing ceasefire. 
The 22-point program contains language that is ambiguous in 
parts, but which defines some clear ground rules for the two 
sides as they enter negotiations on a political settlement. 
The code also provides for a monitoring team to resolve 
disputes.  Political parties were generally positive about 
the code.  Omission of several Maoist demands, including 
their insistence that the army return to its barracks, may 
indicate that the insurgents are sincerely interested in 
purusing a peaceful solution. End summary. 
 
CODE CALLS FOR END TO EXTORTION AND STRIKES; 
SOME LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) After more than a month of negotiations, drafting and 
debate, the Government of Nepal (GON) and leaders of the 
Maoist insurgency have agreed on a code of conduct to 
regulate the behavior of both sides during the ongoing 
ceasefire.  The 22-point code was released at a 
late-afternoon press conference on March 13, signed by 
Minister for Physical Planning and Works Narayan Singh Pun, 
and the Maoists' second-ranking leader Baburam Bhattarai.  It 
will be considered fully in force within three weeks.  Though 
Bhattarai signed the document, he did not appear at the press 
conference.  The Maoists were represented by Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara, a senior spokesman. 
 
¶3. (U) The code of conduct reaffirms the commitment of both 
parties to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, and 
calls on both sides to "try to find a consensus... while 
remaining sensitive to the country's interest."  Several 
points promise relief to Nepal's beleaguered populace, 
calling for an end to extortion; forbidding restrictions on 
the transportation of food, medicines and other consumer 
goods; and promising that both parties to the agreement will 
help displaced people to return to their homes to be 
resettled peacefully.  The code also stipulates there can be 
no "bandhs" (general or targeted strikes that close 
businesses and schools for a specified timeframe) during 
peace talks. 
 
¶4.  (U) Two points seek to prevent statements in the media 
from derailing the peace process.  In support of the code's 
stated goal to "create a conducive environment for dialogue," 
the code requires that government-owned media outlets must 
carry views of both parties objectively and neutrally.  A 
second clause calls for representatives from both parties to 
take care to express their political views "in a courteous 
and ethical manner" when dealing with the media. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On several of the issues, the language of the code 
is ambiguous.  One point calls for a cessation of 
"provocative activities" in "sensitive areas," phrases which 
are open to interpretation.  Another point requires both 
parties to stop "unnecessary searches, arrests and 
kidnappings," vague language likely to spark debate about 
which arrests are necessary, and what sort of kidnappings 
could be so considered.  The spokesman for the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party (NSP), for example, interpreted the clause 
as evidence that the GON had given Maoists legal authority to 
search, arrest and kidnap in some circumstances. 
Disagreements about interpretation of the code and adherence 
to its provisions will be monitored by a team of observers to 
be established by both sides. 
 
 
MAOISTS COMPROMISE ON ISSUES OF RNA DEPLOYMENT AND 
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF PRISONERS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (U) The code of conduct does not set any time schedule 
for the release of prisoners, one of the Maoists' key 
pre-conditions to talks (ref A).  The relevant provision 
merely specifies that both parties will "gradually release" 
their captives.  (Note: At the March 13 press conference, 
Maoist spokesman Mahara stated that to the best of his 
knowledge, the Maoists do not currently have any prisoners. 
However, the Maoist leadership reportedly had instructed 
their local commanders to release immediately any prisoners 
unknown to the leadership. End note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Language addressing the movement of security forces 
is imprecise, but clearly indicates that the Maoists have 
backed down on their prior demand that Royal Nepal Army (RNA) 
forces be confined to their barracks for the duration of the 
talks.  The demand was wholly unacceptable to the Palace, and 
the issue had proved to be a stumbling block for at least one 
prior draft of the code (ref B).  According to the 
watered-down language released on the 13th: "Both sides will 
stop violence and the use of force.  Both sides will stop 
mobilization and the use of armed force which might terrorize 
the common people." 
 
¶8.  (C) What this means in terms of RNA operations is not 
immediately clear.  A local brigade commander in Kathmandu 
told DATT on March 14 that he is still conducting normal 
patrols, and is planning to put up checkpoints in the city as 
usual after dark.  His troops will continue to carry their 
weapons and will continue to safeguard law and order in the 
city.  He has not received any new orders relating to the 
conditions of the code of conduct.  However, the commander 
also stated that a meeting was in progress to determine if 
any changes would have to be made in order to meet the 
requirements of the code. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES REACT 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Though entreating "both sides" to "stop the use of 
force" is a far cry from requiring the RNA to sit idle in its 
barracks, not all observers see the clause as a victory for 
the GON.  Spokesmen from the Nepali Congress (NC) and Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party (NSP) told PolOff that by calling on both 
parties to stop mobilization of their armed forces, the GON 
has accepted the legitimacy of the Maoist insurgents.  The 
term "mobilization" is also a matter of some confusion. 
According to the NSP, the term "implies that the armies of 
both sides have control over certain areas, and both armies 
should not cross over into one another's territory."   A 
spokesman for the United Marxist Leninists (UML) said that 
the language was unclear and that his party would have to ask 
coordinators Pun and Mahara for clarification. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Other responses from the major parties have been 
mixed.  The most positive initial reaction comes from the 
Nepali Congress, whose spokesman told PolOff that "points 
mentioned in the code of conduct are ambiguous and unclear, 
but the party takes it positively, as a beginning to the 
peace process."  A spokesman for the UML was less satisfied. 
"We are not happy that the government has undermined the 
major political parties," he told PolOff. "We take the code 
of conduct positively, but with certain reservations. 
Lasting peace can only be achieved if a responsible and 
accountable government is put in place with the support of 
the people and the international community." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) While some points in the code of conduct are 
unclear, the sincerity of the GON and the Maoists in adhering 
to its terms will determine its usefulness.  The most 
ambiguous points are those that deal with the most 
contentious issues, and the diluted language is likely the 
only form weak enough to make it to consensus.  While the 
vague language might represent a possible "trap door" for any 
party looking for a way out of peace talks, the requirement 
that both sides work toward a solution of any disputes within 
the framework of the code of conduct will make it more 
difficult for either side to walk away unilaterally. 
Including a restriction on negative commentary in the media 
might make it harder for the Maoists to play the game of 
flagging GON "failures" in the media as possible reasons for 
a breakdown in talks. 
 
¶12.  (C) It is highly significant that several Maoist demands 
have been omitted from the final text.  Previously 
"non-negotiable" pre-conditions for talks, including the 
repeal of anti-terrorism legislation, the immediate release 
of all Maoist prisoners with weapons, and the return of the 
RNA to its barracks are conspicuously absent in the 
agreed-upon version of the code.  The Maoists clearly have 
backed down on several key issues in order to achieve 
consensus on the code and to move ahead toward peace 
negotiations.  This willingness to compromise may be a signal 
that the Maoists are concerned about their inability to 
combat increasing RNA capabilities, it may be a sign of 
fatigue among their cadre after seven years of jungle 
warfare, or it may be simply the best indication yet that the 
Maoists are more serious about getting to the dialogue table. 
MALINOWSKI