This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000785 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL IZ VM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAQ, RELATIONS WITH U.S. 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
REF: A.  02 Hanoi 3023   B. Hanoi 702   C. Hanoi 0567 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  Over an informal dinner on March 27, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Le Van Bang and the Ambassador discussed 
differences over Iraq and their effect on the bilateral 
relationship.  They also explored ways to move the relationship 
forward, including a series of high level visits, a possible 
government/private sector conference in August, and GVN outreach 
efforts within the U.S. overseas Vietnamese communities.  A long- 
time proponent of improving U.S.-Vietnam relations, Bang was ever 
the optimist about the future of the relationship and the need to 
separate policy disagreements from a thriving trade relationship. 
Bang and the Ambassador agreed, however, that continued harsh GVN 
rhetoric on Iraq and a long war there could well slow down the 
growth of relations.  Given the enduring "special" Vietnam-Iraq 
relationship, however, it is unlikely that the GVN will temper 
its criticism over Iraq any time soon.  Assistant Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Duc Hung and the DCM also attended the dinner. 
End summary. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Candid discussion on GVN statements on Iraq dominated 
much of the conversation.  The Ambassador informed Bang that 
Washington was concerned about the harsh and sometimes insulting 
language of GVN statements and editorials on Iraq.  He warned 
Bang that if it continued much beyond this week, it would 
inevitably affect the nature of the bilateral relationship. 
Vietnam could even be grouped with countries in disfavor with the 
USG, and that could affect USG programs here. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Ambassador also noted a series of actions by GVN 
officials to limit or postpone contact with American officials 
and programs.  One of the most disturbing, he noted, was the 
possible snubbing of the American Chamber of Commerce at a major 
business conference organized by the Office of the Prime Minister 
in HCMC this week.  There, a senior GVN official apparently told 
the president of AmCham HCMC that he needed to at least mention 
the Iraq situation in his speech, since many in the audience "did 
not think AmCham or an American should speak" because of the war. 
The private citizen American was understandably confused about a 
political quid pro quo at a speaking engagement.  The Ambassador 
noted how foolish it was for the GVN to mix disagreement over 
Iraq policy with business in ways that could discourage Americans 
from investing and trading here. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Citing other examples of recent official GVN coolness 
toward us, the Ambassador told Bang that previously confirmed 
appointments with the Justice Minister and with provincial 
officials in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai had been cancelled at the 
last minute, apparently because of U.S. policy toward Iraq.  The 
DCM noted that a group of GVN environmental officials cancelled 
their IVG visit to the States at the last minute, apparently 
because of Iraq. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Bang recalled that he had informed the Ambassador 
several weeks ago that the GVN would cancel visits for a short 
time if the U.S. started military operations in Iraq.  He 
admitted that he was aware of the Ambassador's planned trip to 
Quang Ngai and Quang Nam, and that the GVN had decided it was not 
appropriate for provincial officials to meet with the Ambassador 
at this time because of Iraq.  Bang also agreed that it was 
unwise to let disagreement on Iraq affect the overall 
business/commercial relationship, and stressed that both 
countries should continue efforts to make it grow.   He stressed 
that in the long run Iraq should not negatively affect the 
expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In a stretch of logic that neither the Ambassador nor 
DCM could understand, Bang then attempted to explain why GVN 
statements on Iraq were actually milder than they could have 
been.  He claimed that GVN statements had referred to "U.S. 
authorities" (meaning a group of people) rather than the U.S. 
government as a whole, which would be considered much worse in a 
Vietnamese context.  (The actual translation is "powerholders," 
not "authorities -- ref b.)  He stated several times that there 
were those in the government who did not want Iraq to affect the 
relationship, but that veterans in senior positions were calling 
for tough statements.   Some people even wanted to go to Iraq to 
fight.  They were the ones driving the policy at the moment. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Another concern for the GVN, according to Bang, were 
the demonstrators who spontaneously formed in front of the 
embassy every day.  They were, he claimed, "not under control" 
and were reflecting popular opinion.  Assistant Minister Hung 
asserted that the GVN could not control them and was worried that 
they might resort to violence at some point. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Without quite saying, "Let's get real, folks," the 
Ambassador pointed out that government television trucks appeared 
well before the demonstrators did, that demonstrators told the 
embassy they had received about $1 to participate, and that the 
GVN had proved itself quite adept at arresting those who were 
peacefully expressing their views on human rights or democracy. 
The Ambassador said that in any event he was not concerned about 
the demonstrators because the U.S. believed in the peaceful 
expression of opinion.  The concern of the USG, he emphasized, 
was over the harsh tone of the official commentaries -- by Party 
organs or the Government -- on the war, the cancelled meetings, 
and their potential for affecting the relationship if they 
continued much beyond this week.  Later in the conversation, Bang 
acknowledged that universities and veteran groups had organized 
many of the demonstrations. 
 
Moving the Relationship Forward - Visits and the Human Rights Act 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The Deputy Minister and the Ambassador talked at length 
about ways to move the relationship forward.  Bang raised the 
timing of upcoming visits to the U.S. by Deputy Prime Minister 
Vu Khoan and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai.   He proposed 
June/July for Khoan, but observed that the war in Iraq would have 
to be over by then.  The Ambassador suggested informally that 
September/October might be a good time for the Prime Minister to 
visit (since it was more than a year before the next U.S. general 
election).  The Ambassador also noted that both sides needed to 
pin down a date for the visit of the Defense Minister. 
 
¶10.  (U) Bang suggested a new idea to highlight the developing 
relationship.  He proposed holding a symposium on the bilateral 
relationship in Hai Phong or Ha Long Bay in the first week of 
August, which would be attended by government officials (Bang 
suggested DAS Matt Daley and the Ambassador from the U.S. side), 
businesspeople and NGO representatives.  The Ford Foundation had 
agreed to fund the symposium and it would be co-organized by the 
Foreign Ministry's Institute for International Relations (IIR) 
and an American counterpart, possibly the Asia Foundation. 
 
¶11. (SBU) To no one's surprise, Bang raised the likelihood of the 
introduction of a Vietnam Human Rights Act in Congress, a move 
that "would again affect the bilateral relationship in a very 
negative way."  With that as his cue, the Ambassador spelled out 
for Bang the recent series of unhelpful GVN actions to arrest or 
detain a number of prominent Vietnamese for doing nothing more 
than peacefully expressing their views on human rights and other 
topics.  Among those he mentioned were Nguyen Dan Que, Le Chi 
Quang, Tran Khue, Phan Que Duong, and Father Ly.  With shrugs of 
apparent frustration, both Bang and Hung lamely asserted that 
they had violated the law and, in case of Que, had been 
communicating with U.S.-based groups to "oppose" the GVN. 
Bang did agree that the timing of Que's arrest could not have 
been worse. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The Ambassador informed Bang that the U.S. Mission in 
Vietnam would grow as the relationship broadened and expanded. 
He reminded Bang that the Embassy had been waiting more than a 
month for an appointment to discuss pending visas for staff 
assigned to new positions in Hanoi and HCMC.  While agreeing in 
principle that the U.S. Mission should and could grow, Bang said 
that that was not likely to happen until the Department 
considered the longstanding GVN request for its UN Mission to 
issue visas.  Bang said he wanted two employees at Vietnam's UN 
Mission to be authorized to issue visas.  The Ambassador pointed 
out that the USG also had a longstanding, unanswered consular 
issue concerning its request for the GVN to broaden ConGen HCMC's 
consular district in the south.  (Topic covered in full septel.) 
 
Outreach to the Viet Kieu - Will Reconciliation Take Generations? 
----- --------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The discussion then turned to national reconciliation 
and to the overseas Vietnamese communities in the U.S. (the Viet 
Kieu).  Bang observed that while the Viet Kieu who actively 
opposed the GVN were few in number, they had considerable 
influence with certain Members of Congress.  As a former 
ambassador to the U.S., he admitted that the Vietnamese Embassy 
in Washington lacked an effective outreach program to the Viet 
Kieu, a situation that, he said, stemmed from a lack of depth, 
training and experience within the Vietnamese Foreign Service. 
He agreed that the GVN needed to do more to promote 
reconciliation with the overseas Vietnamese and said that he 
would explore ways to assign someone to Washington with the right 
mix of experience, language, interpersonal, and cultural skills. 
He joked that he might go back for a tour to see his "old 
friends" in the Vietnamese community in the U.S. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized to Bang the importance of 
reconciling with the GVN's overseas Vietnamese detractors.  He 
pointed out that many are very influential and told Bang that Dr. 
Que's brother was present during his call on Virginia Senator 
George Allen before he arrived in Vietnam.  The Ambassador 
recounted a rather unpleasant exchange with Deputy Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung a few weeks ago when he suggested to Dung that it 
would help reconciliation if the GVN invited former South 
Vietnamese leaders like ex-president Nguyen Cao Ky to return for 
a visit (ref c).  At the suggestion, Dung's face, he said, 
suddenly grew serious and the DPM almos exploded with anger. 
With this attitude, the Ambassador told Bang (and Dung), 
reconciliation would take generations.  Bang replied that the 
Ambassador might have better luck in raising the suggestion with 
Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien, 
former Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Man Cam, than with former 
military or security men like DPM Dung. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Despite Bang's continuing optimism and proactive 
approach to U.S. policy, the GVN is unlikely to heed our warning 
to temper its troublesome language on Iraq any time soon.  The 
GVN frequently highlights its pre-1975 "special" relationship 
with Iraq, and those in the GVN and party leadership with wartime 
experience and suspicion of the U.S. remain influential. 
Nonetheless, the fact that two senior MFA officials agreed to 
meet and talk with us informally and candidly is encouraging. 
The dinner meeting, which Bang hosted, was obviously intended to 
show that Vietnam's relationship with the U.S. remains important. 
Despite deep disagreement over Iraq, we will continue to pursue 
our programs here and our efforts to expand the relationship in 
areas that serve our interests. 
BURGHARDT