This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR INL, EUR/SE 
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS, AND NDDS 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PREL SNAR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  2002 END USE MONITORING REPORT 
 
 
Summary: 
--------- 
 
 
¶1.  Turkey is a major transit route for Southwest Asian 
heroin moving to European markets. Turkish law enforcement 
agencies attach a high priority to interdiction, although 
they face serious resource constraints in keeping up with the 
technology traffickers use in their operations and 
communications.  Turkish agencies continue to use INL-funded 
equipment.  This equipment and INL-funded training furthers 
the mission of DEA, which relies on close cooperation with 
Turkish counterparts but lacks operational assistance 
funding.  INL has not provided assistance to Turkey beyond FY 
1999, since the GOT did not accept language regarding human 
rights in the FY 2000 Letter of Agreement.  Remaining INL 
funds in the amount of $50,000 should be exhausted in 2003. 
Mission officers conducted several End Use Monitoring (EUM) 
trips in 2002, to ensure that equipment provided under our 
annual USD $500,000 (appropriations given until 1999) 
counter-narcotics program was properly used and maintained. 
Post successfully worked with Turkish agencies in 2002 to 
disburse funds from previous years.  In 2002, Post procured 
$825,000 in equipment and training for GOT agencies. 
 
 
Strategic Overview: 
------------------- 
 
 
¶2.    Turkey, largely as a result of its geographical 
position, is a major transshipment point for Southwest Asian 
opiates to European markets.  European governments estimate 
that 75 percent of the heroin coming into Europe either 
transits Turkey or is handled by Turkish criminal 
organizations in Central Europe.  Turkish law enforcement 
agencies focus their efforts on stemming this traffic, by 
stopping it at Turkey,s eastern and western border gates, 
and by destroying illicit laboratories within Turkey which 
process smuggled raw materials into heroin. In March 2002, 
Turkish authorities seized 7,454 kilos of morphine base as a 
result of a DEA-Turkish Jandarma joint investigation.  This 
was the largest seizure of morphine base ever in Turkey. 
 
 
¶3.    Turkey is one of the two traditional producers of opium 
authorized by the UN to provide raw material for the 
international pharmaceutical market. Licit opium is produced 
by the Turkish Grain Board (TMO), which has taken significant 
steps since 2000 to improve opium yields in its crop. There 
is no appreciable cultivation of illicit narcotics in Turkey. 
 
 
¶4. Given these strategic conditions, bilateral 
counter-narcotics cooperation plays an important part in our 
overall relationship with Turkey.  Turkey did not sign a new 
Letter of Agreement (LOI) in 2000 to extend further 
counter-narcotics assistance, due to language regarding human 
rights in the draft LOI.  Narcor is working to complete 
disbursement of funds remaining from previous years, and 
estimates that all INL funding will be exhausted in 2003. 
 
 
¶5. The Embassy provided $825,000 in anti-narcotics commodity 
assistance and training to Turkish law enforcement and drug 
authorities in 2002.  Post extended this assistance and 
related training to: 
 
 
     Turkish Grain Board (TMO) - $420,000 for  equipment to 
test poppy seeds in producing new drugs for its licit poppy 
program; $234,000 for a seed processing/cleaning and 
packaging machine. 
     Turkish Customs Border Guards - $157,000 for ion 
scanners; $2,000 for digital cameras. 
     Turkish Jandarma - $1,600 for video cameras; $1,600 for 
digital cameras; $3,500 for undercover transmitters and 
communications systems. 
     Turkish National Police (TNP) & Turkish Customs Boarder 
Guards - $5,100 for the continued English language courses. 
     ANATEM Drug Research and Treatment Center ) located in 
Istanbul, this center has received INL funds in past years 
but did not receive any procurements in 2002. 
 
 
EUM Trips: 
--------- 
 
 
¶6. Embassy officials conducted several monitoring trips in 
¶2002.  Embassy officials conducted one end use monitoring 
trip to Istanbul, as well as several visits to TNP 
headquarters. 
 
 
Istanbul 
-------- 
 
 
¶7.  Econoff conducted an end-use monitoring trip to Istanbul 
in August 2002, visiting Nihat Kubus, the Chief of the 
Technical Unit for the Turkish National Police (TNP) in 
Istanbul.  Kubus provided econoff and accompanying DEA 
officer a tour of the facilities, including the storage room 
for equipment.  He said all of the U.S.-provided equipment 
was accounted for, and the Istanbul TNP still used some of 
this equipment.  For example, still in use were radios 
provided from 1988-2002, telescopic cameras provided in 1989, 
GPS equipment provided in 2002, actuators provided in 1992, 
and a fiberscope provided in 1989.  Kubus said some of the 
equipment supplied by INL, such as the bullet proof vests 
which the U.S. provided in 1990, were no longer usable either 
because the shelf life had expired or it was no longer 
technically adequate. 
 
 
¶8.  Kubus said he believed the INL program had been valuable, 
as it allowed the TNP to purchase high-tech equipment it 
would not otherwise be able to purchase.  However, he 
complained, he felt that TNP Ankara needed to coordinate more 
closely with TNP Istanbul before it ordered equipment.  Kubus 
said it would be useful if he had more input into the 
decision-making process, as his equipment needs were 
sometimes different than those in Ankara. 
 
 
Ankara 
------ 
 
 
¶9.    Econoff and DEA officer visited Mustafa Gokcimen, 
Director of the TNP,s Technical Unit in Ankara, on August 
14, 2002.  Gokcimen and his technical staff provided a 
demonstration of how the TNP were utilizing the GPS system, 
which was funded by INL in 2000.  Gokcimen said the TNP were 
making good use of the system, using it to track suspected 
drug traffickers.  The system had now been extended to ten 
different cities in Turkey, including Istanbul.  They were 
now working on &mapping8 other cities and on some technical 
modifications to make the GPS system compatible with some of 
the TNP,s other tracking systems. 
 
 
 
 
Impact 
------ 
 
 
¶10.   Though the direct impact is difficult to calculate, 
Turkish anti-narcotics authorities had several operational 
successes in 2002: 
 
 
In March, the Turkish Jandarma, working with the DEA Istanbul 
Resident Office and based on intelligence developed by DEA, 
seized 7.5 metric tons of morphine base.  This seizure led to 
the arrest of a DEA priority target. 
DEA and Turkish Counterparts continue to focus on acetic 
anhydride (AA) which is smuggled into Turkey and used to 
convert morphine base into heroin in illicit laboratories 
located in Turkey.   In January 2002, the TNP seized 10,000 
kilograms of AA in Bursa, Turkey. 
In April, the TNP seized 2 tons of AA from a TIR 
truck/trailer in Istanbul.  The AA arrived in Samsun, Turkey 
from the Ukraine. 
In December, DEA,s Ankara Regional Office,  Moscow, Russia 
Country Office,  the TNP and Russian officials successfully 
conducted an international controlled delivery of 3.5 tons of 
AA from Russia to Turkey.  This investigation led to the 
identification of the AA source of supply in Russia as well 
as the arrest of the transporters, brokers, and end users in 
Turkey. 
In May, as the result of DEA, TNP and Turkish Customs 
cooperative efforts, Turkish Customs seized 93.6 kilograms of 
heroin and arrested a Macedonian national at the Ipsala 
border crossing on the Turkish/Greek border.  The heroin was 
secreted inside the refrigeration compartment of a truck 
 
SIPDIS 
transporting 17 tons of tomatoes from Turkey. 
During 2002, several operational captagon laboratories were 
seized in Turkey.   Fenethylline, which is commonly called 
captagon, is a stimulant traditionally produced in Bulgaria 
and trafficked through Turkey to countries on the Arabian 
Peninsula.  The first seizure of Turkish-produced captagon 
occurred in July 2002, when Turkish authorities seized a 
captagon laboratory and approximately 5-6 million captagon 
tablets.  The Turkish Jandarma seized another two operational 
captagon laboratories in Istanbul in January 2003. 
PEARSON