This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ABUJA 000159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR INL 
 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: 2002 INCSR SUBMISSION 
 
The following is Post's submission of the 2002 Nigeria 
INCSR Chapter. 
 
 
¶I. Summary 
 
 
Nigeria remains a hub of narcotics trafficking and money 
laundering activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups 
dominate the African drug trade and transport narcotics to 
markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
Some of these criminal organizations are engaged in 
advance-fee fraud, commonly referred to in Nigeria as "419 
Fraud," and other forms of defrauding U.S. citizens and 
businesses. Years of military rule and an associated 
economic decline contributed significantly to the expansion 
of drug trafficking and criminality in Nigeria. The 
resulting severe unemployment and widespread corruption 
provided both an incentive and a mechanism for Nigerian 
criminal groups to capitalize on Nigeria's central location 
along the major drug routes and access to global narcotics 
markets. Nigeria remains one of the world's most corrupt 
nations, according to Transparency International, a well 
respected international NGO.  The democratically elected 
government of President Olusegun Obasanjo has faced steep 
challenges in checking organized crime emanating from 
Nigeria.  Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled via 
Nigeria accounts for a significant portion of the heroin 
imported into the United States. Nigerian criminal elements 
operating in South America trans-ship cocaine through 
Nigeria to Europe, Asia, and Africa. South Africa is a 
major destination for Nigerian-trafficked cocaine within 
Africa.  Nigerian-grown marijuana is exported to 
neighboring West African countries and to Europe, but not 
in significant quantities to the United States. Aside from 
marijuana, Nigeria does not produce any of the drugs that 
its nationals traffic. 
 
 
Commitments to confronting organized crime and drug 
trafficking made by the Administration of President 
Obasanjo led to several watershed events in 2002 including 
the first extradition of a U.S. fugitive in August and the 
passage of crucial money laundering legislation in 
December.  On January 14, 2003, the instruments of 
ratification of the U.S.-Nigerian Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) were formally exchanged and the Treaty was 
entered into force. 
 
 
However, throughout the year, the looming April 2003 
elections demanded increasing attention by senior elected 
GON officials.  As a result, the fulfillment of previous 
law enforcement commitments diminished.  A 2002 budget 
battle between the executive and legislative branch -- 
provoked largely by the looming elections -- resulted in an 
impasse and caused funding shortfalls for key law 
enforcement agencies such as the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) and 
the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).  The 
former, Nigeria's fledgling agency charged with addressing 
the country's image as the world's most corrupt nation, 
received far less funding that it had requested to build a 
dedicated staff and bring high-level corrupt officials to 
justice.  Similarly, the NDLEA, Nigeria's sole anti-drug 
agency, suffered from far below-normal operational funding 
through most of the year, though it was given a special 
allocation by President Obasanjo in the final quarter of 
the year.  Nigeria's drug enforcement performance has not 
advanced significantly from past years, in part due to this 
funding problem.  Major traffickers remain difficult to 
reach by the GON's investigative and prosecution efforts. 
 
 
Kanu Agabi became Attorney General in March 2002, filling a 
void in the top law enforcement position created by the 
December 2001 assassination of the late Bola Ige.  Strong 
law enforcement cooperation begun under Ige's tenure 
continued and is expanding under Attorney General Agabi's 
strong leadership.   We are concerned, however, about the 
Nigerian Government's inability to solve the murder of its 
top law enforcement official, who was killed over a year 
ago. 
 
 
Despite budgetary shortfalls and challenges to its 
authority from legislative members under investigation for 
corruption, Nigeria's anti-corruption commission -- the 
ICPC -- produced significant gains in 2002.  Nigeria 
instituted a campaign to root out corruption that started 
shortly after President Obasanjo's inauguration in May 
1999, a campaign that was sustained and strengthened in 
¶2001. In late 2001, the ICPC hired 93 investigators, 
prosecutors, and administrators, its first contingent of 
personnel not detailed from other agencies. The Obasanjo 
administration supports the domestically controversial 1990 
NDLEA Act Number 33. This law dictates that Nigerians 
convicted of drug offenses abroad will be arrested upon 
their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if convicted, will 
be liable for a maximum of five years additional 
imprisonment for harming the reputation of Nigeria.  Use of 
this law, however, has diminished; only one conviction was 
handed down in 2002.  Corruption embedded over 16 years of 
continuous military rule continues to be a problem for the 
Obasanjo government, with the administration itself having 
suffered from a number of corruption scandals. 
 
 
In 2002, the NDLEA encountered limited success in combating 
the various elements of the drug trade.  Typically, street 
pushers and trafficker "mules" were apprehended; the effort 
against large-scale traffickers, however, was less 
effective. While operational efforts against the drug trade 
remain modest, the Obasanjo government in 2002 made good on 
previous commitments to create a structure to identify and 
interdict the proceeds of crime -- a major criminal issue 
in Nigeria, as highlighted by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF).    This body, the Financial Crimes 
Commission, will be established through the December 14, 
2002 enactment of the Terrorism, Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission Act.  Moreover, the Obasanjo government 
introduced, and the National Assembly in December passed, 
legislation to improve the existing 1995 Money Laundering 
Act that had previously only criminalized money laundering 
related to drug trafficking. Asset forfeiture has not been 
a successful deterrent against money laundering or drug 
trafficking activities. Corruption among enforcement 
officials and the judiciary raises serious questions about 
whether this particular sanction can be applied 
consistently enough to have a salutary effect, quite apart 
from the technical difficulty of putting together a 
particular case. 
 
 
Interdiction and enforcement efforts are complicated by an 
absence of inter-agency cooperation and a serious lack of 
resources. Years of neglect by successive military regimes 
left the law enforcement community demoralized and ill- 
equipped to deal with sophisticated international criminal 
networks. This problem is compounded by pervasive 
corruption throughout all levels of government. There have 
been a few arrests of major traffickers; however, it can 
take years for a case to come to trial and no mechanism 
exists to track cases. Cases are often "systematically 
lost" within Nigeria's judicial system. 
 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
 
Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have 
a significant effect on the United States, but it remains a 
major drug-transit country. In addition, Nigerian criminal 
elements operate global trafficking/criminal networks. 
 
 
The NLDEA is the law enforcement agency with sole 
responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking and drug 
abuse. It was established in 1989, and works alongside 
Nigerian Customs, the State Security Service, the National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
(NAFDAC), the National Police, and the Nigerian Immigration 
Service at various ports of entry. The NDLEA's most 
successful interdictions have taken place at Nigeria's 
international airports, with over 50 percent of  hard drug 
seizures (e.g. cocaine and heroin) at the Lagos 
international airport.  The agency has successfully 
apprehended individual drug couriers transiting these 
airports and some of the drug traffickers sponsoring these 
couriers. An improved interdiction effort at the Lagos 
international airport during 2001 has forced some smugglers 
to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's five 
major seaports or to neighboring countries. 
 
 
NDLEA seizures of hard drugs in 2002 were modest; no one 
seizure exceeded 15 kilograms, unlike its success in 2001 
in seizing a shipment of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the 
Lagos port and despite continuing evidence of large drug 
shipments transiting Nigeria en route to the United States 
and Europe.  Prosecutions of drug couriers -- those 
carrying small amounts of hard drugs in baggage or 
internally ingested -- remained strong, while  prosecution 
of major drug barons evidenced little progress. The 
improved access of the NDLEA to Nigeria's major seaports, 
as granted by Presidential decree in 2001, has not resulted 
in  any significant improvement in drug enforcement at 
these key interdiction points, in part due to the under- 
funding of the NDLEA and resistance to NDLEA operations by 
the Nigerian Customs Service. 
 
 
Nigerian criminal organizations, sophisticated specialists 
in moving narcotics and other contraband,  are heavily 
involved in corollary criminal activities such as document 
fabrication, illegal immigration, and financial fraud. 
Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South 
America, Asia, and South Africa are well documented. 
Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant 
financial and societal costs, especially among West African 
states with limited resources for countering these 
organizations. 
 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2002 
 
 
Policy Initiatives. In 2002, the democratically elected 
Obasanjo Administration pushed forward a number of new 
legislative and executive initiatives to combat narcotics 
trafficking and organized crime. These initiatives 
included: the passage of new money laundering legislation 
and the creation of an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission to coordinate government-wide 
efforts against money laundering and financial crimes. 
The draft bill to create an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission shows the government's 
commitment to meeting its international obligations, 
particularly the criteria of the FATF. Nigeria's counter- 
narcotics policy is based on the National Drug Control 
Master Plan (NDCMP), which has been in place since 1998. 
This plan assigns responsibilities to various government 
Ministries and agencies as well as NGOs and other interest 
groups. The Master Plan also outlines basic resource 
requirements and time-frames for the completion of 
objectives. Many of these goals have not yet been met. 
 
 
Both chambers in the National Assembly have Narcotics 
Affairs Committees, which monitor the performance of the 
NDLEA and implementation of Nigeria's counter-narcotics 
strategy. While frequent leadership changes at the NDLEA 
impaired the agency's effectiveness in the past, the 
current NDLEA Chairman, Alhaji Bello Lafiaji, who assumed 
office in October 2000, has given the agency new life and 
much greater direction. Chairman Lafiaji has declared an 
all-out offensive against drug trafficking and has 
instituted a number of internal reforms to improve the 
professionalism of NDLEA staff, including the retirement of 
officials suspected of corruption and improved training and 
benefits for NDLEA personnel. Chairman Lafiaji also has 
called for harmonization of Nigeria's narcotics legislation 
and has sought increased international assistance for his 
agency. The NDLEA has also embarked upon a publicity 
campaign to combat narcotics trafficking and drug abuse by 
staging various contraband destruction events around the 
country. 
 
 
Accomplishments.  The increased level of drug enforcement 
begun in 2001 was sustained but not improved in 2002.  With 
assistance from the Department of State's Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the NDLEA 
was given enhanced capacity to launch more aggressive drug 
interdiction campaigns and investigative efforts against 
drug barons. 
 
 
The Nigerian government also improved its record of drug- 
related prosecutions. Using special drug courts, a more 
energetic effort by the NDLEA to prosecute drug traffickers 
efficiently and successfully produced over 2,000 
convictions in 2001.  The NDLEA also demonstrated stronger 
efforts to enforce Nigeria's money laundering law; by the 
end of 2002, five banks were under NDLEA investigation for 
alleged complicity in the laundering of drug proceeds. 
 
 
The NDLEA has also proven itself as an effective drug 
enforcement leader in the region.  With DEA assistance, the 
NDLEA created the West African Joint Operation (WAJO) 
initiative, bringing together drug enforcement personnel 
from 15 countries in the region to improve regional 
cooperation.  Several WAJO meetings organized by the NDLEA 
and DEA during 2002 culminated in a month-long joint 
interdiction operation in ten countries, leading to 
cumulative seizures of hard drugs totaling more than 50 
kilograms.  The NDLEA remains committed to continued 
regional cooperation and also has expanded counter- 
narcotics cooperation with the police in South Africa, 
where Nigerian criminal organizations are responsible for 
the bulk of drug trafficking.  In 2002, NDLEA attended the 
International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia and became the first African permanent member 
of this forum. 
 
 
The Government of Nigeria also pledged to design a 
mechanism to process U.S. extradition requests 
expeditiously while observing due process under Nigerian 
law, in accordance with the Nigerian constitution. This 
mechanism will include the creation of an exclusive 
extradition team of public prosecutors and the designation 
of a High Court judge dedicated to extradition cases. In 
December 2001, the (late) Attorney General designated a 
High Court judge exclusively to hear extradition cases. 
While extradition requests were formerly heard in any 
court, including lower magistrates courts, the government 
has now centralized the handling of all U.S. extradition 
requests in the Federal High Court of Abuja.  In late 2002, 
Gabriel Umoh was extradited to the United States to serve a 
prison sentence for financial fraud.  This marked the first 
judicial extradition of a U.S. fugitive from Nigeria in 
over 10 years. 
 
 
At Nigeria's initiative, a high level U.S.-Nigeria law 
enforcement dialogue began in 2001. The first meeting of 
this semi-annual forum, the Bilateral Law Enforcement 
Committee, took place on November 9 in Washington, D.C. and 
was followed by a second meeting in Abuja in December 2002. 
These meetings covered the full range of U.S. and Nigerian 
law enforcement interests: drug control; financial fraud; 
trafficking in persons; corruption; immigration crimes; 
police reform; extradition; and money laundering. The 
dialogue has already led to commitments by Nigeria to take 
significant steps toward mutually agreed goals by March 
¶2002. 
 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts. Nigerian counter-narcotics efforts 
primarily focus on the interdiction of couriers transiting 
Nigeria's air and seaports as well as a public campaign 
focused on destroying plots of cultivated marijuana 
throughout the country.  Improved drug interdiction efforts 
at the Lagos airport and seaports led to a 40 percent 
increase in total drug seizures over 2000.  91.79 kilograms 
of heroin and 24.04 kilograms of cocaine were seized during 
2002, as compared with 43 kilograms of heroin and 98 
kilograms of cocaine seized in 2001.  Combined hard drug 
seizures declined 20 percent in 2002. The number of drug- 
related arrests fell to 1,960 from 3,592 in 2001, and 915 
drug convictions were handed down during 2002, compared to 
2,041 in 2001.  Major narcotics smugglers and their 
networks continue to elude arrest and prosecution, despite 
a NDLEA commitment to  launch an intensified effort to 
investigate major international drug traffickers operating 
in Nigeria.  Attempts by the NDLEA to arrest and prosecute 
major traffickers and their associates often fail in 
Nigeria's courts, which are subject to intimidation and 
corruption. Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and 
money launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have 
never been systematically utilized as an enforcement tool, 
but some convicted traffickers have had their assets 
forfeited over the years. The number of traffickers so far 
penalized, however, remains small. 
 
 
Corruption. Corruption is pervasive in Nigerian society and 
a systemic problem in Nigeria's government. Estimated 
unemployment is over 25 percent. Civil servants' salaries 
are low. In addition, salaries are frequently months in 
arrears, compounding the corruption problem. After its 
inauguration, the Obasanjo Administration embarked on a 
public anti-corruption campaign. Legislation was enacted 
and the ICPC was formed. This commission began prosecution 
of several minor officials on corruption charges, and 
initiated investigations into allegations of high-level 
corruption, but has been stymied by slow recruitment, 
inadequate federal funding, and a series of court 
challenges questioning the legitimacy legality of the 
Commission.  The ICPC hired its first non-seconded staff of 
prosecutors, investigators, and administrators in 2001 but 
has been unable to expand its staff further in 2002.. The 
U.S. Department of Justice, with INL funding, is providing 
the ICPC with training and technical assistance for its new 
staff. 
 
 
The Obasanjo Administration, unfortunately, has made 
limited progress toward transparency and openness in its 
contracting and decision making process. A number of 
criminal cases, launched by the Anti-Corruption Commission 
against public officials accused of bribe-taking, are 
moving forward and are expected to conclude early in 2002, 
although an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the 
ICPC's constitutionality has delayed these cases. 
Meanwhile, corruption remains a significant obstacle to 
counter-narcotics efforts, especially in the courts. While 
the NDLEA has attempted to purge its ranks of officers 
suspected of corrupt practices, a fear of corruption 
hampers inter-agency cooperation as agencies are often 
distrustful and unwilling to share information. 
 
 
Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Nigeria has signed 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, 
and the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition 
Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is 
the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests. In 
1989, the United States and Nigeria entered into a mutual 
cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing 
illicit use, and combating illicit production and 
trafficking in drugs. The United States and Nigeria also 
signed in 1989 a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), 
which was ratified in 2001 and is entered into force on 
January 14, 2003.  Nigeria is a party to the World Customs 
Organization's Nairobi Convention, Annex on Assistance in 
Narcotics Cases. 
 
 
Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is the only illicit drug 
produced in any large quantities in Nigeria. The drug is 
cultivated in all 36 states. Major cultivation takes place 
in central and northern Nigeria and in Delta and Ondo 
states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is 
known locally, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout 
West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence 
of significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the 
United States. The NDLEA has been engaged in an active 
eradication campaign. Throughout 2002, the NDLEA claimed to 
have seized more than 304 metric tons of cannabis, a slight 
increase from the 290 metric tons seized in 2001.  In June 
2002, the NLDEA invited dignitaries and the diplomatic 
corps to a narcotics destruction ceremony in Lagos to 
highlight the agency's seizures of illicit drugs throughout 
the country. 
 
 
Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is a major staging point for 
Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and 
the United States and for South American cocaine trafficked 
to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transit hub, 
there are indications that the preferred methods of trans- 
shipment have changed. Improvement of the overall security 
posture at Lagos' Murtala Mohammed International Airport 
has prompted some drug traffickers to ship more narcotics 
through Nigerian seaports, concealing large quantities of 
contraband in shipping containers. They also use other West 
African airports and sea ports with more lax security 
controls. 
 
 
Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). Local production and 
use of marijuana have been a problem in Nigeria for some 
time; however, according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse 
of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin) is now on the rise. 
Heroin and cocaine are readily available in many of 
Nigeria's larger cities. Law enforcement officials admit 
that Nigeria remains a major narcotics trans-shipment 
point, but some officials deny that domestic drug abuse is 
on the rise. U.S. officials and training instructors find 
that many Nigerian officials do not understand that by 
serving as a transit point, Nigeria may itself begin to 
suffer significant drug abuse problems, like many other 
similar transit points worldwide. The NDLEA continues to 
expand its counter-narcotics clubs at Nigerian universities 
and distribute counter-narcotics literature. The NDLEA also 
has instituted a teacher's manual for primary and secondary 
schools, which offers guidance on teaching students about 
drug abuse. 
 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
 
Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counter-narcotics 
cooperation focuses on interdiction efforts at major 
international entry points and on professionalizing the 
NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training and 
material assistance have continued, with the NDLEA as the 
primary target. The DEA office in Nigeria deals with a 
small group of NDLEA representatives to lessen the chance 
of compromise by corrupt individuals. USG working-level 
representatives enjoy good excellent access to their 
counterparts and there is an evident desire on both sides 
to strengthen these relationships. The current NDLEA 
chairman appears committed to meeting agency goals and 
improving the morale of NDLEA officers. The United States 
and Nigeria signed a Letter of Agreement covering many 
aspects of law enforcement assistance, including a new 
U.S.-funded police reform program in 2002. The Nigerian 
government has reviewed plans for reform and U.S. agencies 
have presented their own suggestions for ways to proceed, 
but the task will be formidable as the police lack so much 
in the way of equipment, logistical support and a living 
wage.  Police morale has suffered over the years as the 
situation deteriorated. For example, salaries, in addition 
to being low, are frequently months in arrears. 
 
 
Bilateral Accomplishments. In 2001, at the request of the 
GON, a U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee was 
created to advance mutual drug and crime control issues. 
Co-chaired by Nigeria's Attorney General and the State 
Department's Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the group met for 
the first time in November 2001 in Washington.  A second 
meeting convened in Abuja in December 2002.  These meetings 
produced joint declarations containing Government of 
Nigeria pledges to: introduce new money laundering 
legislation; begin investigations of  major drug 
traffickers in cooperation with DEA; commence extradition 
proceedings of individuals wanted for prosecution by the 
U.S. government; and boost resources for the new Anti- 
Corruption Commission.  Most of these benchmarks have been 
met and some have been exceeded. Meanwhile, the DEA office 
in Nigeria continues to work with the NDLEA on expanding 
their relationship. New Department of State assistance to 
the NDLEA allowed for a stronger interdiction posture at 
the Lagos international airport, Nigeria's largest drug 
transit point, forcing many traffickers to route drug 
shipments through neighboring countries. Department of 
State assistance and U.S. Secret Service operational 
support have also been provided to the Nigerian Police 
Force to improve investigations and enforcement operations 
against criminal organizations involved in advance fee or 
419 Fraud, which largely targets American citizens and 
businesses and other Western nationals. The United States 
also provided training for NDLEA personnel on general 
investigative techniques and embarked on a project to 
support the NDLEA's training academy in Jos, Plateau State. 
 
 
The Road Ahead. After yeas of non-cooperation, the U.S.- 
Nigerian relationship expanded after the 1999 
reintroduction of democratic government in Nigeria. Despite 
a prolonged budgetary impasse in 2002 that limited most GON 
agencies to operating budgets of 40-50 percent of  2001 
levels, President Obasanjo demonstrated his commitment to 
the international drug fight by granting the NDLEA a 
special allotment exceeding the NDLEA's 2001 budget. 
Nevertheless, federal funding for the NDLEA and other key 
Nigerian law enforcement agencies remains insufficient and 
erratic in disbursement.  This inadequate funding is 
believed partially the cause of key weaknesses -- including 
the processing of U.S. extradition requests and the local 
prosecution of major drug traffickers -- that need to be 
addressed by the Nigerian Government. As noted elsewhere in 
this report, the narcotics and crime problems in Nigeria 
are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present governmental system, 
and in Nigerian society. It will require strong and 
sustained political will and continued international 
assistance for any Nigerian government to confront these 
difficult issues and bring about meaningful change. 
 
 
The U.S. government has expanded aid to Nigeria's counter- 
narcotics efforts; anti-drug assistance provided since 
February 2001 now totals over $1.2 million.  Another area 
of  key concern is the performance of Nigeria's judiciary. 
Law enforcement efforts are often stymied by the slow pace 
of the judicial system, which can be attributed to both 
intimidation and corruption of the judiciary by criminal 
organizations. The U.S. Agency for International 
Development is expanding a "rule of law" program with the 
Nigerian government to help strengthen and professionalize 
the judiciary. Through the framework of the new Bilateral 
Law Enforcement Committee, the Nigerian government has made 
good on its commitment to the establishment of a reliable 
extradition process that allows extradition requests to be 
heard expeditiously and fairly. Nevertheless, many U.S. 
extradition requests for narcotics traffickers have been 
outstanding for years. 
 
 
Although Nigeria does not produce reliable crime 
statistics, most observers agree that public security 
deteriorated throughout the country in 2002.  The police 
remain grossly mistrusted by the Nigerian populous and 
organized crime groups exploited that mistrust by preying 
on citizens throughout the nation, but particularly in key 
urban areas such as Lagos, Enugu, Port Hartcourt, Jos, Kano 
and Kaduna. 
 
 
In early 2002 the Inspector General of Police was removed 
by the President, a move widely believed to have been 
linked to the IGP's alleged corruption and the failure to 
contain un unprecedented December 2001-January 2002 police 
strike over unpaid salaries and allowances.  A newly 
appointed IGP, Tafa Balogun, began his tenure by announcing 
an eight-point plan to tackle corruption and crime, 
including an approach to dealing with violent criminals he 
termed "Fire-for-Fire"  This was later followed by a 
"Shoot-To-Kill" policy announced by the Inspector General. 
These policies, while designed to address aggressively 
violent crime, resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
excessive use of force by police officers and the killing 
of numerous innocent civilians throughout the country. 
 
 
Nigerian police are poorly trained.  Most new constables 
and corporals -- the bulk of the force -- have never 
qualified in the use of a firearm, yet they are given 
automatic weapons and the implicit and explicit license to 
use excessive force.  A standing internal police order 
allows police personnel confronting an unarmed riotous 
group to use firearms if they feel threatened. 
Implementation of a 2001 Presidential order to recruit 
40,000 new police constables each year exacerbates the 
problem of absorbing poorly trained police into the force. 
 
 
In late 2002 the U.S. government embarked on a project to 
assist the Nigerian Police Force in addressing fundamental 
problems caused or exacerbated by 16 years of military 
rule, during which the Police Force was denied material and 
human resources.  This project seeks to provide the 
Nigerian Police with a roadmap for adopting reforms that 
will provide greater transparency and checks and balances 
to current management practices, and reorient police 
officers to community policing.  While President Obasanjo 
and his advisors are aware of the need to modernize the 
police as a key pillar of democratic consolidation, little 
has been done to address key issues such as a living wage 
for the police and other law enforcement personnel. Salary 
arrears also remain a problem. The Government of Nigeria 
needs to demonstrate a commitment of its own resources to 
reorienting the police to serve the public rather than 
preying on the population to earn a living. 
 
 
The U.S. government will continue to actively engage 
Nigeria on the issues of counter-narcotics and money 
laundering. There have been important successes in the last 
year, but long-term progress will only come through the 
continuation of serious dialogue and cooperation, and a 
willingness on the part of Nigeria's government to confront 
difficult issues. The underlying institutional and societal 
factors that contribute to narcotics-trafficking and money- 
laundering activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and 
require comprehensive, long-term solutions.  Progress can 
only be made through sustained effort, political will, and 
support by Nigeria's friends. 
 
 
JETER