VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0714/01 2331147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211147Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1145
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000714 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM CS
SUBJECT:  COSTA RICA: PAC PARTY PROFILE - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE? 
 
REF: SAN JOSE 624 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Charge d'Affaires Brennan met on August 18 with 
the main opposition contender for Costa Rica's presidency in the 
February 2010 elections, Otton Solis.  Solis, from the Citizen 
Action Party (PAC), is now running for president for the third time, 
after a weak turnout for the party's primary in May 2009.  PAC is 
Costa Rica's main opposition party, with the second most seats in 
the National Assembly and a base of support among the urban lower 
and middle classes.  If Solis is able to pull out a victory, he 
plans to increase spending on social programs and agricultural 
subsidies, while curbing benefits to multinational corporations and 
increasing taxes on the business sector.  However, PAC and Solis are 
currently far behind in the polls, and Solis could be headed for yet 
another defeat.  If PAC does go on to a third consecutive defeat, 
the party could emerge with a new and pragmatic leadership for the 
2014 elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
"NOT LOOKING FOR A ROAD TO CARACAS" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Despite a sometimes combative relationship with the 
Embassy, in particular during the 2007 CAFTA debate, Solis expressed 
his desire for closer ties to the U.S. at the Charge's residence on 
August 19.  Solis went to pains to distance himself from Hugo Chavez 
and "the leftists" in Latin America.  Instead, he insisted that the 
PAC is a centrist party, which "is much closer in thought to the 
Obama administration than the current Costa Rican government." 
Solis highlighted his past interaction with Democratic members of 
Congress, stating that PAC "has a clear trail to Washington, and 
doesn't want a path to Caracas." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Solis also said that, if elected, while he might try to 
rework some portions of the CAFTA-DR agreement (on agriculture, for 
instance), he was not interested in withdrawing from the treaty as 
whole.  Solis admitted that public security was one of Costa Rica's 
major challenges, and called for more training and better pay for 
police officers.  He said he was open to continued security 
cooperation with the U.S., as long as it did not lead to 
militarization in Costa Rica.  While he refused to label his party, 
Solis is trying to position PAC as a social-democratic party with a 
strict anti-corruption focus.  However, many experts believe that 
his shot at the presidency might have already passed him by. 
 
---------------- 
PAC'S BEGINNINGS 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (U) After over 50 years of two-party hegemony, the PAC was formed 
in December 2000, reflecting the frustration of voters with 
corruption in the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Christian 
Social Unity Party (PUSC).  PAC and its founder, Solis, burst onto 
the political scene with a new style and message.  Although Solis 
was not a particularly charismatic figure, he embodied voter outrage 
against corruption in the wake of a number of public corruption 
scandals.  Solis tried to emphasize public ethics and transparency 
in government and promised a more efficient government. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the 2002 elections, Solis finished in third place with 
26 percent of the popular vote, an impressive showing only 14 months 
after PAC was founded.  PAC's rise formed a different dynamic in the 
Legislative Assembly, as it won 14 out of the 57 seats.  In 2003, 
after one year in the Assembly, six PAC legislators defected, citing 
disagreement with the party's inflexible ethics code (under which 
Solis requires that PAC legislators reject public funding for 
official travel and prohibits them from using diplomatic passports, 
hiring more than two staffers, using official license plates for 
vehicles, or taking more than 15 days of annual leave).  This 
severely weakened the party, leaving it with only eight seats in the 
Assembly. 
 
------------- 
2006 ELECTION 
------------- 
 
¶6. (U) In 2006, Solis was able to increase his political influence, 
in part by focusing on an anti-CAFTA message.  Solis nearly won the 
presidential election (losing by only 1.12 percent) against PLN 
candidate Oscar Arias.  Meanwhile, PAC became the second largest 
party in the Assembly with 17 seats.  PAC was able to attract the 
votes of the "Anti-Arias" opposition from lower and middle class 
urban areas.  With the crumbling of PUSC (which only won 5 seats), 
PAC became the major opposition party.  However, in a sign that 
voters were more pro-Solis (or anti-Arias) than supportive of the 
party as a whole, PAC's National Assembly ticket only won 25 percent 
of the vote (compared to Solis' 40 percent). 
 
--------- 
PAC TODAY 
--------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) During its second term in the Assembly (2006-2010), the PAC 
faction has been trapped by the inflexibility of its ethics 
principles, the rigidness of Solis' political control over the 
party, and its demand for excessive oversight of government.  PAC 
has obstructed passage of a number of bills by presenting hundreds 
of motions (essentially filibustering the bills).  These factors and 
PAC's continued opposition to CAFTA implementing legislation even 
after a public referendum approved the agreement, have caused a 
decline in general PAC popularity over the past three years. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Although PAC is still the main opposition political party, 
it showed continued signs of decline after its first-ever primaries 
in May 2009 (Reftel).  PAC held a "closed" primary, in which less 
than twenty-five thousand party members voted.  Solis handily won 
the election with 71 percent, followed by former PAC Secretary 
General Epsy Cambpell and businessman Roman Macaya.  PAC failed to 
properly mobilize voters in the primary, including refusing to 
provide transport to the polls, a common practice in Costa Rica. 
This was due, again, to PAC's strict ethics code and Solis' quest to 
keep money out of politics. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Solis continues to receive high marks among voters for his 
honesty, though his inflexibility as a leader has recently become 
more obvious.  In the run-up to the primary, Campbell and Macaya 
defied him by entering the race and forcing a primary for the first 
time in the history of PAC. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Although the primary campaign revealed weaknesses within 
the party and particularly with Solis' leadership, it also might 
have strengthened the party as a whole.  Some political analysts 
told us they saw PAC's primary as the first real step in a 
transformational process that PAC was undergoing from a 
one-man-movement to a new and modern political party. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: PAC'S FUTURE - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Polls published in mid-August showed Solis trailing PLN 
candidate Laura Chinchilla (Reftel) by almost 15 percent.  In the 
upcoming 2010 election PAC could further consolidate its position as 
the country's second political force, particularly given PUSC's 
continued low standing under party caudillo Rafael Angel Calderon. 
However, pushing ahead for an out-and-out victory over PLN should 
prove difficult.  Though Solis is personally respected by many Costa 
Ricans, the man and his message seem a bit haggard after two 
presidential defeats (and another defeat in the CAFTA referendum). 
Solis must find a way to reconnect with the public, but also will 
need to work on basic issues such as voter mobilization, grass-roots 
organization, and the fundraising required for such activities, to 
have any chance of winning the presidency. 
¶12. (SBU) If Solis can somehow scrape together a victory, there 
remain numerous questions on how he would actually govern.  One of 
our most pressing concerns is how Solis would manage our ongoing 
bilateral security programs.  One of Solis' colleagues, PAC 
Assemblyman Olivier Perez, has told us that a PAC-led government 
would want a Costa Rican shiprider (authorized from our Bilateral 
Maritime Agreement) on every U.S. vessel that might detain ships in 
Costa Rican waters.  This would be logistically impossible, and is 
not technically required by current agreements.  Regardless, we 
would expect a Solis-led government to undertake a thorough review 
of Costa Rica's security cooperation with the U.S.  While we would 
not anticipate any major changes under such a review, some aspects 
of our security engagement, such as with the shiprider issue, might 
face challenges. 
 
¶13. (SBU) If, instead, Solis loses again in next year's elections, 
PAC would probably be forced to move past Solis and seek new 
leadership.  It is in this respect that this year's primary could 
serve as a useful stepping stone, as it opened up the party to the 
prospect of younger leadership, including Campbell and Macaya.  PAC 
also might be forced to re-think the party's identity and focus, or 
at least re-calibrate to better address voter priorities.  The party 
that Solis started has in fact come a long way in its eight years of 
existence; the next challenge might be where it can go once Solis 
himself has left the stage.