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Viewing cable 10TOKYO284, SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR WEBB'S FEBRUARY 14-17

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10TOKYO284 2010-02-12 06:56 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO1941
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0284/01 0430656
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120656Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9357
INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8798
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1135
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2614
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9290
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USFJ
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 000284 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/J, NSC FOR RUSSEL 
DOD FOR APSA - GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON MARR JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR WEBB'S FEBRUARY 14-17 
VISIT TO JAPAN 
 
1. (SBU) Begin Text of Scenesetter: 
 
Dear Senator Webb: 
 
Welcome to Japan, a nation in transition.  The Democratic 
Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in last year's 
August 30 Lower House election has dramatically altered 
Japan's political landscape, marking the end of the former 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) virtually 
uninterrupted 54-year rule.  Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
and the DPJ have laid out an ambitious domestic agenda as 
well as a foreign policy vision aimed at a "more equal" 
relationship with the United States and, with the U.S.-Japan 
relationship as Japan's foreign policy foundation, a greater 
emphasis on Asia. 
 
Disappointed with years of economic stagnation, growing 
employment insecurity and increasingly visible holes in the 
social safety net (including the loss of millions of pension 
records), Japanese voters turned to the DPJ, which had 
promised solutions to these problems and fundamental "change" 
in the way Japan is governed, including giving more authority 
to elected leaders as opposed to the bureaucracy. 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama has made clear that continuing a good 
relationship with the United States is one of his highest 
priorities.  Japan has been a strong supporter of U.S. 
diplomatic objectives in the region and the world.  The U.S. 
and Japan remain two of the most significant contributors of 
global development assistance, and our priorities and policy 
positions are frequently closely aligned.  Japan has provided 
invaluable support to our policies regarding North Korea, 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East peace process, and 
recently Haiti.  Although the Hatoyama government chose not 
to extend Japan's Indian Ocean refueling mission that 
supported Operation Enduring Freedom, it has sought to play a 
visible role in other parts of the world, including through a 
five-year, $5 billion pledge to Afghanistan and a decision to 
dispatch Japan Self Defense Forces medical and engineering 
teams to Haiti. 
 
Japan supported key U.S. positions -- particularly for 
mitigation efforts by major developing countries -- at the 
COP-15 summit in December, and its recent inscription of a 25 
percent cut in greenhouse gases over 1990 levels helped build 
momentum for the Copenhagen Accord.  Unlike earlier periods, 
with the exception of restrictions on market access for U.S. 
beef producers and level playing field concerns for the 
insurance sector, as well as more recent concerns about the 
ability of U.S. autos to qualify for Japan's eco-car subsidy 
program, we have few major contentious trade issues with 
Japan.  Our cooperation on financial stabilization has been 
good although there are still concerns about the long-term 
prospects for the Japanese economy. 
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains 
the cornerstone of peace and stability in East Asia.  The 
strength of the Alliance notwithstanding, the media has 
portrayed differences on several issues as symptoms of a 
strained partnership  The focus of media attention has been 
the new government's decision to review a 2006 agreement (the 
Realignment Roadmap) on the transformation of U.S. forces and 
facilities in Japan, specifically the relocation of U.S. 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in heavily populated 
southern Okinawa to the planned Futenma Replacement Facility 
(FRF) at Camp Schwab in northern Okinawa.  This development 
has overshadowed notable progress in other areas of the 
Roadmap as well as planning for new initiatives to deepen the 
Alliance in this anniversary year.  We see your visit as an 
opportunity to highlight the vibrancy of the Alliance and the 
overall relationship, while advancing cooperative efforts to 
address points of difference. 
 
John V. Roos 
Ambassador 
 
2. (SBU) Begin text of checklist: 
 
----------------- 
 
TOKYO 00000284  002 OF 007 
 
 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
To date, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his DPJ-led 
government have sought to project an image of competence, 
stability, and experience while quelling concerns about their 
ability to address pressing domestic issues, such as economic 
recovery, health care and pensions.  The DPJ has also moved 
to strengthen the administration's role in budget and policy 
formulation, putting "political leadership" ahead of the 
bottom-up, bureaucracy-led policymaking style of previous LDP 
governments.  But while "not business as usual" has been the 
unofficial slogan of this new government, political finance 
scandals continue to dog party leadership, including PM 
Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa.  While the 
prosecutors' early February decision not to indict Ozawa 
appears to have let him off the hook for the time being, it 
remains to be seen whether the public will be so forgiving, 
particularly with an important election in July. 
 
----------------------------- 
Bilateral and Security Issues 
----------------------------- 
 
-- Support for the Alliance: While the plan to relocate 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the planned 
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab in northern 
Okinawa has been a dominant feature of bilateral discussions, 
we are also engaging the DPJ government on a wide range of 
bilateral and security issues.  On one hand, Prime Minister 
Hatoyama has publicly acknowledged that the Alliance remains 
the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy.  On the other, the 
DPJ government is reexamining components of bilateral defense 
cooperation, including the following: 
 
-- Realignment/Futenma: Since taking office in September, the 
DPJ Government has withheld endorsement of the FRF portion of 
the Realignment Roadmap, pending a review of this 2006 
agreement to reconfigure U.S. forces and facilities in Japan. 
 At the November Summit, Prime Minister Hatoyama and 
President Obama noted their intent to resolve the FRF issue 
expeditiously, but the GOJ announced in December that it 
would delay a decision, due to the need for further 
consultations within the governing coalition.  In recent 
weeks, a working group comprised of GOJ officials and 
representatives of the three coalition parties has been 
examining possible alternative relocation sites for MCAS 
Futenma.  The working group will soon submit proposals on 
these sites, with a view to meeting Prime Minister Hatoyama's 
May target date for a resolution. 
 
Expectations are rising within Okinawa that Japan's new 
government will relocate MCAS Futenma outside of the 
prefecture.  In response, however, some government leaders 
have publicly noted that their review does not exclude the 
current plan.  Government leaders in Tokyo were also quick to 
preempt efforts to use the election of an "anti-base" mayoral 
candidate, in the Okinawan town that is slated to host the 
planned FRF, as grounds for ruling out the current plan.  The 
Okinawa Governor remains committed to the current plan, 
although he concedes that the loss of local municipal support 
will make implementation more difficult 
 
The consistent U.S. position has been that the planned FRF at 
Camp Schwab remains the best option to maintain our 
military's deterrent capabilities and to reduce its impact on 
local communities, the twin goals of the Realignment Roadmap. 
 We have also emphasized the need to maintain momentum on 
other Roadmap initiatives and to deepen new forms of 
cooperation within the Alliance, such as in ballistic missile 
defense, humanitarian assistance/disaster response, and 
trilateral engagement with regional partners. 
 
-- "Secret" Agreements:  Reports of the existence of "secret" 
agreements between the United States and Japan dating from 
the 1960s have caused mild media interest focused on Japan's 
"three non-nuclear principles" of not producing, possessing 
or allowing introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 
Former Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata, who served as 
Vice Foreign Minister from 1987-89, disclosed to local press 
 
TOKYO 00000284  003 OF 007 
 
 
the existence of an agreement between the United States and 
Japan (declassified in the United States in 1999 and 
available publicly), that has allowed nuclear-armed U.S. 
vessels and aircraft to make port calls and transits in 
Japan.  Although members of previous Japanese administrations 
and bureaucrats consistently denied the existence of any 
agreement, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to clarify 
the issue.  Foreign Minister Okada on September 16 ordered 
MOFA officials to begin an investigation into this and three 
other purported "secret" U.S.-Japan agreements covering 
combat operations from Japan, reintroduction of nuclear 
weapons into Okinawa and monetary arrangements associated 
with Okinawa's reversion to Japan.  MOFA engaged in a 
document review at MOFA headquarters and the Japanese embassy 
in Washington to find Japanese documentary evidence of these 
agreements.  The review is now complete and FM Okada has 
asked an expert panel of academics to review the report of 
the findings. 
 
-- Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation:  The Japanese 
government has welcomed the President's initiatives on 
disarmament, beginning with his speech last year in Prague. 
Former Foreign Minister Nakasone gave his own speech in April 
in response, outlining 11 benchmarks for nuclear disarmament. 
 The Japanese disarmament community, centered on several NGOs 
and the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has 
enthusiastically welcomed the President's disarmament 
initiatives.  The two mayors have asked for the President to 
visit their cities. 
 
-- SOFA: DPJ politicians, prefectural governors in 
particular, have talked about pursuing changes to the Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to address perceived public 
concerns about criminal jurisdiction and environmental issues 
associated with U.S. base facilities.  Despite publicity on 
this subject, the new Japanese Government to date has made no 
request to revise the SOFA. 
 
--HNS: Host Nation Support (HNS) defines Government of Japan 
cost-sharing for U.S. Forces stationed in Japan.  HNS totaled 
USD 4.3 billion in FY 2008, but has declined 15 percent since 
1997.  Currently, both sides are preparing to conduct a 
"Comprehensive Review" of Host Nation Support to ensure that 
the package is economically efficient and politically 
sustainable. 
 
-- IPCA: International Parental Child Abduction (IPCA), is 
the highest priority consular issue for the Mission.  There 
are currently 75 cases in which a parent abducted a child 
from the U.S. to Japan leaving the American Left Behind 
Parent (LBP) with no access to his or her child.  There are 
also American parents living in Japan who have little or no 
access to their children because the other parent abducted 
the child in Japan or because they got divorced in Japan and 
do not have enforceable visitation rights.  In October 2009 
the Ambassador led an eight embassy demarche on the Minister 
of Justice calling upon Japan to accede to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction and implement measures to enable access by LBPs. 
On January 30, 2010, the Ambassador and envoys from the same 
embassies demarched the Foreign Minister calling for Japan to 
accede to the Hague Convention, enable access, and establish 
a mechanism for resolution of existing cases.  In late 
November 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
established the Division for Issues Related to Child Custody 
(DIRCC) to coordinate matters related to child abduction.  On 
February 10, the Consul General, joined by colleagues from 
seven nations, will meet with the DIRCC and Ministry of 
Justice officials.  Consular officers are working with MOFA 
officials to establish a bilateral working group to discuss 
individual cases, including improved access and visitation, 
as well as ultimate resolution of these cases.  A/S Campbell 
met with LBPs in Japan on February 2 and encouraged them to 
request a meeting with Senator Webb.  He stated that if left 
unresolved, this issue has the potential to raise serious 
concerns, and added that legal measures, such as indictments, 
may be necessary. 
 
----------------- 
Foreign Relations 
 
TOKYO 00000284  004 OF 007 
 
 
----------------- 
 
-- Afghanistan-Pakistan:  Japan has been a leading 
international donor for Afghanistan reconstruction and 
development since 2002, contributing over $2 billion in aid 
for such important areas as rule of law/security sector 
reform (e.g. paying salaries and training of 80,000 Afghan 
National Police) aid, health improvements, and 
rural/agricultural development.  Prior to President Obama's 
inaugural visit to Japan last November, Japan rapidly 
developed and publicly committed to providing a substantial 
package of increase civilian assistance for Afghanistan. 
With this new $5 billion/5 year pledge, Japan is essentially 
quadrupling its Afghanistan program, becoming the second most 
significant bilateral donor there (after the U.S.) in terms 
of aid funding levels.  Japan's new assistance is targeted on 
providing incentives and training for the re-integration of 
ex-Taliban members, continued police reform assistance, 
infrastructure improvements such as the development of a new 
city to improve services and relieve severe overcrowding in 
the Kabul Metropolitan Area, and expansion of its 
agricultural assistance.  As part of its expanded pledge, 
Japan also confirmed its intent to provide on an expedited 
basis $1 billion for assistance to Pakistan. 
 
-- Iraq:  Japan is the second-largest contributor to Iraq's 
reconstruction and has established a new Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) regional office in 
Erbil, and has committed several multi-billion major 
infrastructure development loans to spur economic development. 
 
-- Iran:  Although Japan maintains what it terms a "normal" 
relationship with Iran, it supports international efforts led 
by the P-5 plus 1 to address concerns about Iran's nuclear 
program and has diligently implemented UNSC resolutions on 
Iran.  Senior Japanese officials meet intermittently with 
Iranian representatives and carry the message urging Iran to 
abide by the will of the international community.  Japan 
imports virtually all its oil and relies heavily on imports 
from Iran.  Japan prefers the framework of UN Security 
Council resolutions and has expressed support for additional 
coordinated international pressure against Iran, including a 
possible new UNSC resolution.  Japan has stressed the 
importance of broad international participation for measures 
on Iran to be effective.  Japan,s desires to be an 
intermediary between the United States and Iran, maintain its 
relationship with Tehran, and reluctance to work outside the 
UNSC framework can create potential conflicts for the GOJ and 
raise some concern  that Japan will remain firm as we seek to 
increase pressure on the regime. 
 
-- Middle East Peace Process: Japan plays a role in 
supporting the Middle East Peace Process and is broadly 
supportive of U.S. efforts to restart negotiations.  In that 
context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has sounded 
out Southeast Asian countries, in particular Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, about a Japan-led initiative to 
build international support for Peace Process discussions, 
particularly among Southeast Asian countries.  Japan's 
Special Middle East Envoy Iimura traveled to Southeast Asia 
late last year to discuss the proposal, receiving cautious 
but interested responses.  Although Japan maintains its 
traditional focus on development assistance to the 
Palestinians, in December 2009, the GOJ announced $15 million 
in "non-project" assistance to the Palestinian Authority in 
response to U.S. entreaties to provide budget support to the 
PA to ease its fiscal crisis.  Japan used the February 7-10 
visit of Palestinian Authority President Abbas to reaffirms 
its support for the Middle East Process and  to strengthen 
Abbas, political standing. 
 
-- China:  Japan's relations with its other immediate 
neighbors are generally stable, although problems persist 
just beneath the surface.  Prime Minister Hatoyama is 
continuing the efforts of Former Prime Minister Aso, who had 
been successful in defusing the sharp conflicts over history 
that damaged relations with China during the Koizumi years. 
Hatoyama participated in the second stand-alone 
Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral Dialogue in October 2009. 
Japan also recently hosted PRC Vice President Xi Xinping, the 
 
TOKYO 00000284  005 OF 007 
 
 
presumptive next president, in a visit that had all the bells 
and whistles of a state visit.  Japan restarted its version 
of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) last year after 
a long hiatus. 
 
While Japanese acknowledge that good U.S.-China relations are 
in Japan's interest, they also fear that the United States 
will discount Japan's interests in pursuit of more robust 
relations with China.  Japan has opposed China's apparently 
unilateral exploration of oil and gas fields in the East 
China Sea the two countries have pledged to jointly develop. 
Japan also has been wary of falling behind China in securing 
access to natural resources. 
 
-- North Korea:  Japan and the United States coordinate 
closely on North Korea and the Six Party Talks, and there is 
no daylight between our positions on how to move forward:  a 
return to the Six Party Talks and progress on 
denuclearization must precede any lifting of sanctions and 
discussion of a peace regime.  Japan remains exceedingly 
uneasy about the DPRK in light of its nuclear tests, missile 
launches over the Sea of Japan, and bellicose rhetoric.  You 
will be expected to express concern for the fate of Japanese 
citizens abducted by the DPRK. 
 
-- South Korea:  Territorial disputes over the Liancourt 
Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo) and history issues remain an irritant 
to Japan's relations with South Korea, but both sides have 
expressed a desire to build a Japan-ROK relationship that is 
"different from the relationship up until now."  The ROK 
Government sees the Hatoyama Government as a much more 
sympathetic interlocutor.  Under the administration of former 
Prime Minister Aso, the pace of "shuttle diplomacy" picked up 
markedly.  The year 2010 marks the 100th anniversary of 
Japan's annexation of Korea, and both sides are seeking to 
avoid controversy and use the opportunity to create a more 
future-oriented relationship.  The bilateral defense 
relationship between the ROK and Japan, in particular, has 
improved since the 2008 change in administration in South 
Korea.  Senior-level exchanges among both uniformed and 
civilian defense officials increased substantially.  This, in 
turn, has allowed trilateral defense talks among the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea to gain momentum, culminating 
in Secretary Gates, participation in the first-ever 
trilateral defense ministerial in May 2009. 
 
--Japan's Concept of an East Asian Community:  As part of its 
overall efforts to improve relations with its neighbors, the 
DPJ government initially proposed the establishment of an 
East Asian Community with the goal of pursuing an ambitious 
program for regional integration along the lines of the 
European Union.  While short on specifics, the idea 
nevertheless generated a certain amount of controversy, 
mainly because it was unclear at first whether Japan was 
proposing an East Asia community that was open to the United 
States.  More recently, however, PM Hatoyama and others have 
clarified that Japan's relationship with the United States is 
the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and that Japan would 
on this basis seek to strengthen and expand its ties with its 
Asian neighbors. 
 
-- Climate Change/Energy Security:  Before taking office, PM 
Hatoyama announced that the GOJ would target a 25 percent 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, from 1990 levels, by 
2020 - a far more ambitious target than the cuts proposed by 
former Prime Minister Aso. In late January, Japan inscribed 
its commitment to these targets under the Copenhagen Accord, 
conditional upon "ambitious" reductions by other major 
emitters. The new targets were set with little or no 
consultation with Japanese ministries to the dismay of the 
bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI).  A Government panel is expected to release 
its roadmap for achieving Japan's climate goals in March.  A 
substantial part of these cuts -- up to 40 percent -- will 
have to come in the form of carbon credits from developing 
countries, most likely through expanded Japanese ODA for 
clean energy projects, especially in Asia.  Prime Minister 
Hatoyama has proposed substantially increasing Japan's 
already robust climate change assistance programs.   While 
final budget numbers are still being considered by the GOJ 
 
TOKYO 00000284  006 OF 007 
 
 
and Diet, climate change assistance to developing countries 
for mitigation and adaptation is likely to exceed $10 billion 
over the next three years. 
 
Domestically, the DPJ is expected to propose a cap-and-trade 
program, some form of carbon tax, an expanded feed-in-tariff 
for renewable energy, and incentives for the purchase of 
efficient vehicles and appliances.  Despite stiff opposition 
from certain Japanese businesses and the opposition LDP, some 
sectors such as next-generation vehicles, solar, wind and 
nuclear expect to see expanded business opportunities under 
the new Administration.  Japan is home to a number of 
world-class "clean tech" companies, some of whom have 
commercial tie-ups with American businesses. Encouraging 
Japan to support open global standards for emerging 
technologies like smart grid is a priority for the Mission. 
The DPJ, like its predecessor, has also emphasized 
diversification of Japan's energy supply and stable relations 
with a broad range of natural resource suppliers. 
 
----------- 
The Economy 
----------- 
 
Japan remains the world's second largest economy with a GDP 
of $4.9 trillion (2008).  The economy emerged from four 
consecutive quarters of contraction in the second quarter of 
2009 ending the country's deepest economic recession since 
World War II.  After contracting 5.4 percent in 2009, the 
International Monetary Fund projects GDP to grow 1.7 percent 
in 2010.  Growth is projected to be driven by a domestic 
stimulus package and a modest recovery in net exports.  The 
latest unemployment rate of 5.1 percent is down from last 
October's record high 5.5 percent, but that figure masks a 
large number of unemployed Japanese who are paid small 
subsidies to not seek work.  Japan's financial services 
industry was relatively insulated from the global financial 
crisis due to its conservatism and limited exposure to 
structured securities.  However, export-oriented sectors of 
the economy, such as automobiles and electronics, suffered 
immensely. Deflation remains a concern, as the "core-core" 
consumer price index (CPI) fell 1.2 percent in December, 
2009, its steepest decline ever.  Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Japan, while up significantly over the past decade, 
remains low compared to other OECD nations, with FDI stock in 
Japan totaling $179.6 billion in 2008 (3.6 percent of GDP), 
of which $65 billion came from the United States.  The 
comparatively low level of inward FDI hinders innovation, 
hampers competition and limits opportunities for increased 
productivity and transfer of knowledge -- all of which are 
important to promoting sustainable economic recovery. 
 
Domestic Economy:  The Hatoyama Cabinet has stressed the 
importance of higher domestic demand, which is very welcome 
in the broader context of returning to more balanced pattern 
of global growth. However, their proposed fiscal policy, 
outlined in its August 2009 campaign platform, has a populist 
bent as it primarily seeks to channel fiscal resources to 
households.  The DPJ pledges called for increasing disposable 
income and encouraging consumption by abolishing provisional 
taxes rates, eliminating highway tolls, and providing 
subsidies for children and farmers.  The proposed 
expenditures would cost about $177 billion annually, or 3.6 
percent of Japanese GDP. The administration also supports the 
development, production, and marketing of the latest 
technologies such as IT, biotechnology, and nanotechnology 
with particular focus on reducing the impact of global 
warming through renewable energy development and other green 
technologies, which the DPJ believes will foster new and 
large-scale employment, spur innovation and boost long-term 
GDP growth. 
 
DPJ Economic Policies:  Economists believe the DPJ's policies 
should boost short-term economic growth, but worry that the 
new spending measures will cause additional strain in the 
medium term by adding to the national debt, which already 
totals almost 180% of GDP and is expected to surpass 200 
percent of GDP in 2010. The Hatoyama Cabinet, originally 
insisted it had identified existing revenue sources for these 
expenditure increases:  "cuts in wasteful government 
 
TOKYO 00000284  007 OF 007 
 
 
spending"; rebalancing of surplus funds in special accounts; 
tax increases; and sales of government assets, but has 
recently reneged on its promise to not issue additional 
government bonds to pay for the stimulus measures citing a 
shortfall in tax revenue from the economic slowdown.  Whether 
higher growth over the longer term can be sustained is open 
to question without productivity increases, particularly in 
the services sector. 
 
End text of checklist. 
ROOS