VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0127/01 0471709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161709Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1213
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0472
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0533
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3711

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA AND IO/PHO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM PREF MO WI
SUBJECT: DAS SANDERSON MEETS SENIOR MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE 
AND MFA OFFICIALS 
 
REF: A. RABAT 114 
     ¶B. RABAT 34 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: DAS Janet Sanderson held separate 
meetings in Rabat January 21 with Director-General for 
Studies and Documentation (DGED) Mansouri and MFA Chief 
of Staff Bourita.  Mansouri indicated that Morocco 
intends to remain deeply involved in assisting Guinea's 
transition.  On counterterrorism, he highlighted 
Moroccan fears regarding possible AQIM attacks in sub- 
Saharan Africa, and alleged links between AQIM and the 
Polisario (but did not elaborate).  Both interlocutors 
welcomed UNSG Personal Envoy Ross's invitation to resume 
informal Western Sahara talks Feb. 9-11 and said Morocco 
would participate; however, they held out little hope 
for progress if the Personal Envoy (and the U.S.) failed 
to convince Algeria to participate officially and to 
play a less obstructive role.  At the MFA, Bourita 
further argued that Ross's mandate is two fold: to 
reinvigorate the talks, but also to find ways to improve 
relations between Morocco and Algeria.  He also 
unleashed a spirited case against enlarging MINURSO's 
mandate to include human rights, when it comes up for 
renewal in April.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson 
visited Morocco January 20-23.  In addition to meeting 
Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri (Reftel A), she met 
separately in Rabat with DGED (Morocco's Director of 
National Intelligence and National Security Advisor 
equivalent) Mohammed Yassine Mansouri and with 
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, MFA Director-General for 
Multilateral Cooperation and Chief of Staff to the 
Foreign Minister. 
 
--------------------------- 
Model Cooperation on Guinea 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In each meeting, Bourita and Mansouri highlighted 
the French-U.S.-Moroccan cooperation in response to the 
Guinea crisis (Reftel B), saying that our shared efforts 
to convince junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara not to 
return to Conakry should serve as a "model" for dealing 
trilaterally with future crises in Africa.  Guinea 
remains fragile, "and King Mohammed VI has asked me -- 
not as national intelligence director, but personally -- 
to remain involved in the transition," Mansouri said. 
For that transition to succeed, Camara cannot go back to 
Conakry, but he also cannot come back to Rabat, he 
added.  Sanderson responded by commending Morocco's 
efforts, and thanked the GOM for "creating the space" 
for the U.S. to work with its partners to resolve the 
crisis. 
 
--------------------------- 
The Terror Threat in Africa 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On counterterrorism, Mansouri highlighted 
Moroccan fears regarding possible AQIM attacks in sub- 
Saharan Africa.  He emphasized that, in combating the 
AQIM threat, the Magreb cannot be disassociated from 
Africa, and that Morocco sees the potential for AQIM 
attacks in Nigeria, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire.  AQIM has 
begun to develop two separate cells in southern Algeria 
-- one of which, Mansouri alleged, may have links to the 
Polisario -- but he offered no further detail.  In 
responses to Sanderson's question, Mansouri admitted 
that Moroccan/Algerian counterterrorism cooperation and 
intelligence sharing is non-existent.  He described 
various unofficial triangulation schemes, whereby 
information is shared through third parties, but 
admitted that over the course of the past year direct 
communication has ceased. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Algeria Undermining Sahara Negotiations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Highlighting a theme Sanderson heard throughout 
her visit, Mansouri welcomed UNSG Personal Envoy 
Christopher Ross's invitation to resume informal Western 
Sahara talks Feb. 9-11 and said Morocco would 
participate.  However, he expressed frustration with 
 
Algeria's apparent refusal to participate officially in 
informal discussions, stating that the GOM needs Algeria 
to become "an interlocutor of good faith."  Mansouri 
also laid a small portion of the blame for Algerian 
intransigence at the feet of the U.S., saying that 
Algiers has misinterpreted the Obama administration's 
less outspoken support for Morocco's autonomy play as "a 
change in position on the issue," and is using this as 
an excuse not to participate.  From a security 
perspective, the DG also alleged that Morocco has 
evidence that small numbers of "individuals with 
narcotics and terrorist connections" are moving from the 
Tindouf camps into Moroccan-controlled Sahara at 
Algeria's behest, potentially to create unrest.  At the 
last round of informals in Austria, Mansouri recounted, 
Minister Delegate and Algerian Western Sahara negotiator 
Abdelkader Messahel even stated to Ross, "We are capable 
of creating unrest in the Western Sahara." 
 
¶6.  (C) Sanderson responded that the USG shared some of 
Morocco's concerns about the Algerians' reluctance to 
play a formal role in the negotiations and said she 
would urge them to play an active role at the meeting. 
However, she noted that the USG wants the talks to move 
away from formalities and toward substance -- something 
all sides needed to work to achieve.  She reassured 
Mansouri that the USG's position regarding Morocco's 
autonomy plan as one viable option for resolving the 
dispute has not changed. 
 
¶7.  (C) At the MFA, Bourita echoed many of the same 
themes as Mansouri regarding Morocco's willingness to 
participate in the next round of informal talks.  That 
said, he acknowledged the poor relations between Morocco 
and Algeria, and noted that the UNSC had given Personal 
Envoy Ross two missions: to get the GOM-Polisario talks 
back on track, and to seek ways to improve Moroccan- 
Algerian relations.  "We are doing OK on the first, but 
failing on the second," he admitted.  On a positive 
note, Bourita added that there has been no better hope 
in recent years for progress in resolving the Sahara 
crisis, given that both Morocco and Algeria are in a 
position to negotiate from a position of strength; that 
there is international political consensus in favor of a 
negotiated solution; and that "we have the best mediator 
since (former UNSG Personal Envoy James) Baker." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
GOM Strongly Opposes Human Rights Mandate for MINURSO 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Bourita also gave a spirited defense of 
Morocco's longstanding opposition to adding a human 
rights component to the UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara's (MINURSO) mandate, which comes up for 
its annual renewal in April.  First, he argued, 
MINURSO's implementation of such a mandate would be easy 
on the Morocco side, because Morocco has willingly 
become party to all the relevant UN human rights 
conventions; however, the Polisario -- to whom Algeria 
has "abdicated its sovereignty" -- is party to none of 
them, and would never agree to permit MINURSO to carry 
out its human rights role.  Second, a human right 
mandate would introduce a political component into a 
ceasefire agreement that is purely technical -- 
potentially creating "unnecessary tension between 
Morocco and MINURSO."  Third, Bourita said, Algeria and 
the Polisario would politicize any MINURSO human rights 
activities and distort them as a means to "give 
separatists more freedom to operate."  Finally, adding 
the human rights mandate would be simply unnecessary, 
given that Morocco has already opened its doors to UN 
and European Union human rights monitors, international 
NGOs and U.S. diplomats who freely travel to and 
examine the human rights issues in the territory. 
 
¶9.  (C) Sanderson emphasized that the USG has made no 
decisions yet regarding how it will react in New York in 
April to the question of enlarging MINURSO's mandate; 
however, she cautioned, some UNSC members intended to 
press the issue and the GOM needed to be prepared and 
consider how best to manage this.   Bourita urged the 
USG to inform the GOM early in the process if its 
position changes and to "explain to us how it is in U.S. 
interests." 
 
¶10.  (U) DAS Sanderson has cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
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