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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0091/01 0531332
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O 221332Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9749
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1370
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1932
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, NSC FOR HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 
TAGS: PINR PREL MARR KV
SUBJECT: THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE 
FOR KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. KOSOVO DEFENSE POLICY MEMO (20-JUN-08) 
     ¶B. 09 PRISTINA 225 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Current OSD policy (Ref A) preventing the 
implementation of the National Guard State Partnership 
Program (SPP) until the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) reaches 
Full Operating Capability (FOC) is not in the best interests 
of U.S. foreign policy goals nor the KSF.  We propose 
re-examining this policy, and if the KSF continues its 
positive progress, we recommend initiating the process to 
establish a formal state partnership in January 2011.  U.S. 
policy recognizes Kosovo as an independent state on an equal 
footing with its neighbors, which all currently participate 
in the program.  Kosovo's participation in the SPP would 
provide a unique opportunity to socialize KSF members via 
regular, long-term interaction and engagement with 
experienced military and civilian personnel.  The current 
policy forges a connection between FOC and the SPP based on 
an FOC date that is not firmly established and remains 
malleable.  Implementing the SPP in 2011 allows us to 
evaluate progress in the KSF.  The bilateral nature of the 
program sends a strong message of support and long-term 
investment in the KSF, an investment that supports our 
broader goals for Kosovo.  END SUMMARY 
 
TREATING KOSOVO LIKE A STATE, AND LIKE ITS NEIGHBORS: 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (C) OSD's June 2008 Kosovo Policy memo (Ref A) prevents 
the USG from offering the State Partnership Program (SPP) to 
the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) until it has achieved Full 
Operating Capability (FOC).  This policy runs counter to the 
USG policy of engaging Kosovo as an independent state on an 
equal footing with its neighbors.  Since the U.S. recognized 
Kosovo's independence, our foreign policy goal has been to 
ensure Kosovo's independence and its long-term viability and 
stability.  Establishing an SPP for Kosovo would allow the 
U.S. to interact with the KSF directly, side-stepping KFOR's 
status neutrality and the concerns of NATO's non-recognizers. 
 Moreover, it would reaffirm our commitment to Kosovo, and by 
treating Kosovo as full-fledged state, we encourage others to 
do the same.  Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia all participate in the SPP.  Denying Kosovo its 
opportunity to participate unnecessarily separates Kosovo 
from its neighbors and signals doubt when our policy is to 
emphasize confidence.  Accordingly, we believe that the 
inter-agency process should re-examine the current OSD policy 
with an eye towards initiating the process to establish a 
formal state partnership in January 2011. 
 
SOCIALIZING THE KSF: 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The citizen-soldier nature of the National Guard/SPP 
uniquely fits the current missions of the KSF, and it is in 
the KSF's best interest to enter the SPP sooner rather than 
later.  The KSF declared Initial Operating Capability on 
September 15, 2009, and is developing towards FOC. 
Long-term, day-to-day cooperation with U.S. military 
personnel through the SPP will socialize KSF officers and 
NCOs.  This interaction will both accelerate the KSF's 
progress towards FOC and improve the quality of the KSF's 
performance once it reaches FOC.   The unscripted interaction 
between the two will be critical in shaping KSF members into 
a modern, professional security force, with a modern outlook 
and ultimately the ability to inter-operate with NATO 
militarily.  If we delay introducing the SPP in Kosovo until 
after FOC, we risk that Kosovo's new state partner will spend 
as much time undoing poor habits as it does in sharing best 
practices.  It is in everyone's best interests to start 
working with the KSF soon, while it is at a formative stage. 
 
 
PRISTINA 00000091  002 OF 002 
 
 
DE-LINK FOC AND THE SPP: 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Current OSD policy lashes FOC and the SPP together, 
and the latter cannot begin until the former is complete. 
This is problematic in that FOC is a vaguely defined concept, 
and we have no firm date for when the KSF may achieve this 
status.  According to KFOR's initial planning, FOC should 
come about two to five years after IOC.  Waiting for the 
political stars to align such that everyone is ready to 
declare the KSF as fully operational puts a state partnership 
in a holding pattern for little substantive reason.  We 
should de-link the two concepts and focus on the criteria 
that potential state partners tell us they need for a 
successful program.  We believe that the KSF will meet these 
criteria in the coming months. 
 
NOT A DISTRACTION, BUT A WAY TO DEVELOP TOWARD FOC 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) Some contend that establishing an SPP prior to the 
KSF's achievement of FOC would pose a distraction.  In fact, 
the opposite is true.  National Guard representatives from 
several states have expressed interest and enthusiasm in 
organizing a robust SPP for Kosovo.  Such an active state 
partner in Kosovo would support KFOR's goal of securing 
additional training for the KSF.  The Ministry for the KSF 
echoes this sentiment and made a specific request to enter 
the SPP on May 13, 2009 (Ref B.).  The presence of a National 
Guard state partner will enhance NATO's own program for 
developing the KSF.  The NATO Advisory Team's director agrees 
that FOC will be too late if we want to ensure development of 
a quality security force that meets NATO standards.  He views 
the SPP as a useful tool for ensuring the KSF's development, 
a tool that is relevant now.  Additionally, senior leadership 
of the U.S. military in Europe has indicated support for this 
project.  Far from a distraction, the SPP dovetails with 
KFOR's developmental goals for the KSF as it moves towards 
FOC. 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT: We strongly support the KSF in its interest 
to enter the State Partnership Program.  We urge a 
re-examination of OSD's policy prohibiting implementation 
until after FOC.  The bilateral nature of the program sends a 
strong message of USG support and long-term investment in the 
KSF and Kosovo institutions, an investment that will support 
our broader goals in Kosovo and throughout the region.  The 
SPP offers many advantages, and the benefits accrue over 
time.  Starting the SPP process in January 2011 will allow us 
to assess the situation, lay the proper groundwork, and enjoy 
the benefits until FOC and beyond. 
DELL