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DE RUEHNJ #0109/01 0531250
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221250Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7734
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000109 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD
SUBJECT: END OF THE AFFAIR?  DEBY AND KHALIL GO THEIR 
SEPARATE WAYS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 282 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 102 
 
------------------- 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Working overnight February 19 and into the 
afternoon February 20, Chadian President Deby brokered an 
agreement between his erstwhile JEM client, Khalil Ibrahim, 
and Sudan Presidential Envoy Ghazi Salahhudin, potentially 
ending fighting between the JEM and GoS.  Deby is now en 
route for Doha, where he hopes to meet with President Bashir 
February 23 and where the JEM-GoS agreement is set to be 
signed that same day.  In addition to encouraging peace 
between the GoS and one of the main rebel movements in 
Darfur, the February 20 agreement represents a diplomatic 
coup for Chad and apparently completes the long and 
complicated process of Chadian disengagementwith the JEM, 
begun last summer.  The seeming "en of the affair" between 
Deby and Khalil helps tosatisfy one of our own strategic 
objectives in Cad, hat of encouraging normalization between 
Chd and Sudan and cessation of the five-year proxy wr 
involving respective rebel movements.  Deby is ow en route 
for Doha (via Riyadh, where we understand he plans to see 
ailing Nigerian President Yar Adua) with FM Faki and other 
members of his foreign policy team.  Text of press communique 
on the weekend JEM-GoS agreement is at para 3 below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Chadian government has accomplished a kind of 
high-stakes diplomatic trifecta over the past two years. 
Since rebel attacks on N'Djamena in February 2008, the GoC 
has ended its diplomatic isolation by exploiting multilateral 
opportunities offered by the UN, AU and third parties 
including Libya and Qatar, and more recently bilateral 
opportunities afforded by Khartoum's changed priorities.  At 
the same time, the GoC has attracted rebel chiefs (e.g., Al 
Jineidi and Soubiane), the rebel rank and file (several 
thousand), and regime opponents in exile (e.g., Goukouni 
Oueddei) back to Chad, enhancing Deby's claims on statesman 
status.  The Deby-brokered JEM-GoS deal is not only an 
aditional step forward for Chad-Sudan relations but also a 
successful attempt at intra-Zaghawa diplomacy involving a 
politically sensitive "divorce" from the JEM, which may yet 
put Deby at risk from his own Zaghawa brethren (but which 
scores one for national over ethnic identity).  Meanwhile, 
the February 21 deadline for remaining rebel movements on 
both sides of the Chad-Sudan border either to return home or 
to accept refugee status abroad has passed with no local word 
on the circumstances of remaining Chad rebels in Sudan (e.g., 
Timan Erdimi's troops), and with the SLA/AW still evidently 
not ready to settle (Ref A).  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
-------------------- 
TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL 
PRESS COMMUNIQUE 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Begin informal Embassy translation: 
 
Presidency of the Republic 
Press Communique 
 
At the commendable initiative of His Excellency, President 
Idriss Deby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, and with 
his assistance, consultations took place between a delegation 
of the Government of Sudan headed by Doctor Ghazi Salahhudin 
Atabani, special adviser to President Oumar Hassan Ahmat Al 
Bashir and a delegation from the Movement for Justice and 
Equality (JEM) headed by Doctor Khalil Ibrahim. 
 
These consultations occurred on the basis of efforts to 
broker peace in Sudan undertaken in Doha, Emirate of Qatar. 
The two parties achieved significant results including 
agreement on an immediate cease-fire and the start of 
negotiating efforts to put it into effect on the ground. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000109  002 OF 003 
 
 
The two parties agreed on the necessity of the immediate 
participation of the JEM in Doha negotiations, with the 
aiming of a definitive peace agreement to be based on a final 
accord that will be signed before March 15, 2010. 
 
They also expressed their willingness to pursue efforts and 
consultations in the aim of bringing about definitive peace 
in Darfur, integrating all political forces support and 
offering hope and aspirations for all of the people of Darfur 
and Sudan. 
 
N'Djamena, February 20, 2010 
 
End translation. 
 
-------------------------- 
THREE PATHS REACHING GOALS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Over a protracted period, the Deby regime has 
taken part in various international and bilateral processes 
aimed at regional stabilization, normalization of relations 
with Sudan, return of respective rebels, and integration of 
opponents into political processes here.  As part of efforts 
with the Government of Sudan, Chad hosted a Contact Group 
meeting under the Dakar Accord process in November 2008. 
Since that time, it has taken part in other international 
mediation efforts sponsored by the UN, AU, Libya, Qatar and 
U.S., under S/USSES Gration.  The GoC has been in close 
direct contact with the GoS since this fall, when FM Faki and 
Sudan Presidential Adviser Ghazi met on the margins of the 
UNGA in New York.  Deby himself went to Khartoum two weeks 
ago, in breakthrough meetings reported to SE Gration (Ref B). 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  At the same time, Chad's National Mediator has 
helped to woo some Chad rebels home, in keeping with the 
terms of the Sirte Accords of 2007.  The GoC has given many 
former rebels amnesty and incorporated political opponents 
into the government of Prime Minister Youssef Saleh Abbas, 
himself a former member of the politico-military opposition. 
The GoC remains acutely nervous that Chad rebels still in 
Sudan will prove more than the GoS can handle. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Deby began disengaging with the JEM, his fellow 
Zaghawas and erstwhile clients, last year, having told S/E 
Gration in the summer that he had advised Khalil Ibrahim to 
abandon armed struggle and seek a political settlement with 
Khartoum.  Via a series of increasingly firm interventions, 
culminating in a multiple-ministerial "ultimatum" to the JEM 
seven weeks ago, the Deby regime has made clear that it has 
chosen good relations with a neighboring state over a 
relationship of convenience with Sudanese nationals who share 
ethnic affiliation with Deby's own group (and who helped Deby 
in his armed struggle against Habre).  The dangers to Deby of 
breaking with the JEM, should the mercurial Khalil go back on 
his word, include the possibility of armed conflict between 
the Chadian Army and JEM on Chadian soil, as well as the 
possibility that Zaghawa notables will seek to unseat Deby 
himself in response to his having "abandoned" key clan 
brothers. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  As reported in Ref B, Deby son-in-law and 
Ambassador to the U.S. Adoum Bechir was sent to the former 
JEM redout in Eastern Chad at Am Jarras last week to meet 
Khalil -- said to be traveling from Sudan -- and persuade him 
to come to N'Djamena for talks with GoS Presidential Advisor 
Ghazi.  Bechir succeeded February 19, with meetings here 
running overnight and well into the next day before agreement 
was reached.  GoC officials who remain in N'Djamena advised 
us February 22 that Deby has now left for Doha, via Riyadh, 
where he apparently plans to see ailing Nigerian President 
Yar Adua.  Deby plans to be in Doha February 23 for the 
signing of a GoS-JEM cease-fire agreement and to meet with 
Sudanese President Bashir. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
 
NDJAMENA 00000109  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The Chadian government has accomplished a kind of 
high-stakes diplomatic trifecta over the past two years.  The 
GoC has ended its diplomatic isolation by exploiting 
multilateral opportunities offered by the UN, AU and third 
parties including Libya and Qatar, and more recently 
bilateral opportunities afforded by Khartoum's changed 
priorities.  At the same time, the GoC has attracted rebel 
chiefs (e.g., Al Jineidi and Soubiane), the rebel rank and 
file (several thousand), and regime opponents in exile (e.g., 
Goukouni Oueddei) back to Chad, enhancing Deby's claims on 
statesman status.  As a third negotiating string, the 
Deby-brokered JEM-GoS deal represents a potentially 
successful attempt at intra-Zaghawa diplomacy, so long as the 
JEM itself and Deby's Zaghawa brethren remain accepting. 
Deby's breaking with the JEM is of course a score for 
nationhood over tribal identity. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Additional challenges to what we essentially see 
as a series of good-faith efforts on both Chad's and Sudan's 
parts in recent months to achieve stabilization in Darfur and 
Eastern Chad include the status of the as-yet unrepentant 
Chadian rebellion in Sudan, including troops under Timan 
Erdimi, and the apparent unwillingness to be part of Doha of 
the SLA/AW.  Handling these players will require more work in 
the coming days and weeks. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
BREMNER