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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/RSA AND A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SO EAID ET MOPS
SUBJECT: Somalia - Perspectives on TFG-ASWJ Agreement 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 314 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Patterson, Counselor for Somalia Affairs, State 
Department, Somalia Unit; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶1.       (C) The February 13 agreement between the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) (reftel) 
represents potential progress in their ongoing collaboration.  But 
to be successful, the agreement must first gain the support of ASWJ 
on the ground, especially from leaders and their forces who 
frequently clash with al-Shabaab.  ASWJ representatives from 
Galgaduud and other regions engaged in active fighting against 
al-Shabaab told us they were not represented at the Addis talks. 
ASWJ representatives argued that formal power-sharing discussions 
with the TFG are premature and that both sides should be more 
focused on military cooperation to defeat al-Shabaab.  ASWJ leaders 
told us that before discussing governmental posts, they would do 
better to first work at the grassroots level to establish a common 
position and a joint leadership structure across regions (and 
clans).  They said that Ethiopia was pushing through an agenda to 
favor one clan (Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr) and that all parties were 
there only to gain financial resources and materiel from an 
international community anxious to see the TFG broaden its support 
base.  The TFG and ASWJ are seeking at least $150,000 in the next 
two weeks to gain broad-based support for the agreement and $5 
million for the following implementation phase.  Deputy SRSG 
Charles Petrie has warned us and other internationals not to be 
seen as stampeding reluctant ASWJ groups to an agreement.  While we 
strongly support TFG-ASWJ collaboration, formalizing a 
power-sharing agreement at present may distract both from planned 
offensives against al-Shabaab and introduce new political fissures 
that neither party can afford.  Nevertheless, we are counseling 
ASWJ leaders to curb their rhetoric and engage in productive 
discussions to strengthen this agreement.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Potential for Progress 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.       (C) As reported reftel, on February 13 TFG Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of Finance Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden  and Sheikh 
Mahmud Sheikh Hassan (Hawiye/ Habr Gedir/Ayr) , a Saudi 
Arabia-based spiritual leader of ASWJ, initialed an agreement to 
integrate ASWJ and the TFG.  UN Deputy Special Representative of 
the Secretary General Charles Petrie briefed us privately, and 
later, international Somalia watchers on the agreement.  According 
to Petrie, the agreement is a positive step, but will challenge 
ASWJ's ability to unite itself.  Indeed, he said, he was hearing 
reports some ASWJ leaders, including important Galgaduud region 
ASWJ leader "Heffo" were rejecting the agreement.  Petrie counseled 
quite diplomacy to encourage ASWJ leaders to move past their 
dissatisfaction and begin to discuss the agreement.  Petrie asked 
us to work behind the scenes, but not to raise the agreement's 
visibility in a way that might be threatening to those feeling left 
out for the moment.  He emphasized this was only an initialed 
agreement, with a two-week period meant to allow for consensus 
building.   When we spoke to the Prime Minister, he said the TFG 
cabinet had been briefed today, and would accept the agreement, 
despite some grumbling.  He asked us to reach out to disaffected 
TFG ministers and key ASWJ leaders, especially in Galgaduud region, 
and try to "smooth ruffled feathers." 
 
 
 
¶3.       (C) This agreement represents another attempt to formalize 
the relationship between the government and this important 
religious group cum fighting force.   Since the first agreement 
between the TFG and ASWJ was signed in Nairobi in June 2009, there 
have been fits and starts in their collaboration.  According to our 
sources, the TFG has transferred limited financial resources to 
ASWJ, with some funds reportedly ending up in unintended hands. 
Almost all the various ASWJ groups with which we meet have praised 
 
NAIROBI 00000191  002 OF 003 
 
 
the fledging TFG-ASWJ partnership but also have asked for the U.S. 
to encourage the TFG to do more, as quickly as possible. 
 
 
 
"The 'Spiritual Leader' Does Not Speak for Us" 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
 
¶4.       (C) In our initial consultations with our ASWJ contacts in 
Nairobi and the regions, we heard skepticism about the Addis 
agreement.  Our contacts lamented that the talks in Addis were 
being spearheaded by an ASWJ faction which had moved too quickly, 
and not consulted with other ASWJ factions around Somalia.   While 
they acknowledge that Sheikh Mahmud is influential, they said that 
he had been away from Somalia for some time and was out of touch 
with the political and security realities on the ground. 
Expressing concern they may be shut out of the agreement's largess 
of cabinet ministries and other government posts, they said, "He 
better arrive with something significant to put on the table."   To 
us they questioned the rationale and optics of holding the talks in 
Addis instead of within Somalia.  They claimed that Sheikh Mahmud 
was brought in by his (reportedly) kinsman,  ASWJ financier Mahdi 
Dahir Sheikh Nur, who has been advocating for ASWJ in Addis since 
last year. 
 
 
 
¶5.        (SBU) In a February 10 meeting, ASWJ representatives with 
ties to the Galgaduud region, they told us that they have no 
problem with disparate groups assuming the AWSJ mantle to fight 
against al-Shabaab, since the majority of Somali's share the Sufi 
traditions and beliefs at ASWJ's core.  Post has been in closest 
contact with the Southern Galgaduud group led by Sheikh Amir 
(Hawiye/Abgal/Waesle) and Northern Galgaduud-based Sheikh Omar 
Sheikh Mohamud (Hawiye/Murosade), both of which frequently clash 
with al-Shabaab.  At that time they presciently emphasized the 
urgent need to bring together ASWJ groups into a more formalized 
structure with a common vision, objectives, and leadership 
structure.  Seemingly unaware of impending meetings in Addis, they 
said they were working with other ASWJ groups to convene a 
conference to elect representatives who would then be empowered to 
hold formal negotiations with the TFG.  When asked on February 18 
about the current discussions in Addis, they told us Sheikh Mahmud 
does not speak on their behalf. 
 
 
 
¶6.       (C) Some of the groundwork to establish political 
cooperation among ASWJ factions began in 2009 with technical 
conferences bringing together members of several ASWJ factions in 
Hiran, Galgaduud, and Mogadishu under Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Muhiyadin (Hawiye/Abgal) .  In December, embassy funds supported an 
ASWJ workshop in Nairobi that made progress on bringing together 
various ASWJ factions.  Also in December, Sheikh Mahmud returned to 
Galgaduud for the ASWJ meeting in Abudwaq.  This meeting was cut 
short by an al-Shabaab attack, but not before a leadership struggle 
alienated Sheikh Omar from Sheikh Mahmud.  We understand that 
Sheikh Omar was not consulted and was sidelined from the Addis 
talks.  These representatives told us they are in full support of 
collaboration with the TFG, but that any power-sharing negotiations 
and talk of ministerial positions were premature. 
 
 
 
Strategies to Build Support 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.       (C) While the text of the agreement has not been made 
public, scanned copies of it are being circulated widely.  By 
dedicating so many seats for ASWJ, the agreement is politically 
"expensive" for the TFG, observers told us.  Some TFG officials are 
already resisting the idea of expanding the cabinet further to 
accommodate five new ministers and numerous additional government 
 
NAIROBI 00000191  003 OF 003 
 
 
positions.  Some may also be wondering if their cabinet seat is in 
jeopardy.  TFG officials have previously cautioned that giving up 
seats to ASWJ will open the floodgates for all other groups to 
"demand their part."  Yet other officials told us that TFG needs 
ASWJ and is in no position to play hard ball.  Gaining support 
within the TFG to sign the agreement will be easier than the 
implementation phase of the agreement, where the government will 
have to decide how it will divvy up the positions along the 4.5 
clan formula.  In contrast, ASWJ will have more difficulty getting 
initial buy in and establishing a legitimate signatory to the 
agreement. 
 
 
 
¶8.       (C) The UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) is 
reaching out to key donors to help garner diplomatic and financial 
support for the agreement, emphasizing the immediate need for 
resources that will not fall into the traditional funding 
categories.  A UN official told us Ethiopia "is leaning hard" on 
UNPOS to secure cash to allow especially the ASWJ to visit the 
regions to sell the agreement.  Current estimates are that at least 
$150,000 will be needed for the ASWJ's campaign, according to 
UNPOS.   UNPOS has funds that it can use to for this initial cash 
infusion to support these discussions and the Danish representative 
in Addis has promised to provide 150,000 through IGAD (so long as 
it is not the only donor), according to the UN. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶9.       (C)  The Addis agreement is indeed a positive step wherein 
both parties re-affirm their commitment "to eradicate the scourge 
of extremism," recognize the Transitional federal Charter, 
strengthen the Transitional Federal Institutions,  and support the 
Djibouti Process.  Most important, by integrating ASWJ into 
government structures, the agreement would integrate their security 
forces.  Also important is TFG willingness to accept regional 
administration already established by ASWJ in areas under its 
control (Note: This was a major sticking point in the lead-up to 
talks in Jeddah last December.  However, the agreement will only be 
a major step forward if both sides, but ASWJ in particular, is able 
to bring together its factions and secure broad based support. 
ASWJ representatives said that at present, this agreement has no 
legs because there was no work done to prepare the ground for a 
formal power-sharing agreement. 
 
 
 
¶10.    (C) Comment, cont.:  With UNPOS we have been discussing 
strategies to help build concrete support for this agreement prior 
to an official signature.  One idea is to bring the council of nine 
ASWJ spiritual leaders who were elected in Dusamareb, and would 
include Sheikh Omar, out of Somalia (perhaps to Djibouti) to meet 
with Sheikh Mahmud and to establish the signatories that would 
represent ASWJ .  Deputy SRSG Charles Petrie believes that if the 
leaders were to meet in Dusamareb, the agreement would never be 
signed.  Petrie has warned us and other internationals not to be 
seen as stampeding reluctant ASWJ groups to an agreement.  We are 
encouraging our ASWJ contacts to discuss the agreement, 
highlighting the positive aspects of integrating their security 
forces with the TFG.  While a public statement of support for the 
agreement from the United States may be premature (and could 
inadvertently discourage certain camps) , we will encourage both 
sides to continue dialogue toward signing and operationalizing the 
agreement. 
RANNEBERGER