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RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO 
DE RUEHNR #0155/01 0401105 
ZNY CCCCC ZZH 
R 091105Z FEB 10 
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0729 
INFO SOMALIA COLLECTIVE 
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC 
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC 
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE 
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL 
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC 
RUEPADJ/CJTF-HOA J2X CAMP LEMONIER DJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000155 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/E AND AF/RSA 
ABUJA FOR A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SO PTER EAID MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - MASS TFG ARMY MOVEMENT SIGNALS IMPENDING OFFENSIVE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Patterson, Counselor for Somalia Affairs, State 
Department, Somalia Unit; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
 
Summary 
----------- 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. On February 5 the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) deployed some 2,000 army troops from its training 
camp on the outskirts of Mogadishu into the city. With support 
from troops from the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), four Somali 
battalions have taken up new positions that contacts tell us will 
facilitate an urban offensive designed to form a defensive cordon 
around Mogadishu. The cordon should hinder Islamists' ability to 
move around the city, and enable TFG police to enter previously 
held areas. The offensive's timing is a closely held secret. 
Al-Shabaab has not yet challenged the government troops in their 
new positions, and may not immediately challenge the offensive, if 
confronted with overwhelming forces arrayed against them. We are 
urging the TFG and AMISOM to prepare logistically to hold newly 
captured areas, and to engage the media to tout any resulting 
successes. We are also urging the government and international aid 
community to rush into newly opened areas of Mogadishu with 
humanitarian, economic and IDP returnee assistance. End Summary 
 
 
Four Battalions in Surprise Move 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 5, the Transitional Federal Government 
suddenly moved nearly 2,000 army troops (four battalions) from 
their camp in the Jazeera area of Mogadishu. Two battalions moved 
to the TFG-controlled, strategic intersection known as Ex-Control 
Afgoye, where Via Lenin and Industrial Boulevard meet in 
Mogadishu's Deynile district. A third battalion crossed the city 
to take up positions near the National Security Headquarters in 
Shingani district. A fourth battalion moved into position near the 
Old Port in Shingani. TFG and AMISOM officials said they had 
repositioned the troops to facilitate an offensive in the days or 
weeks to come. 
 
¶3. (C) Multiple TFG and AMISOM sources tell us the 
offensive's objectives are key landmarks and intersections along 
Industrial Road (also known as 21 October Road), including the old 
Defense Ministry compound, the Soccer Stadium, and the Pasta 
Factory. The TFG will also reinforce Ex-Control Afgoye, which is a 
main avenue of approach for al-Shabaab into Mogadishu. Securing 
this key intersection is vital to prevent AS reinforcements. Other 
troops will form a defensive line near the Karan and Huriwa 
districts. 
 
¶4. (C) The Somali national police commissioner told us the 
troops in Shingani district are a demonstration of force to Shabaab 
militia in the area and will bolster the TFG perimeter in this 
hotly contested zone of the city. According to the commissioner 
this TFG defensive perimeter is held by clan militia and cannot be 
completely relied upon. Of particular concern is a militia group 
affiliated with Abdi Jinow Alasso, the reportedly corrupt Mogadishu 
Port Manager, whom we are told the TFG has just forced out. During 
the planned offensive these troops will form a defensive line a 
near the Karan and Huriwa districts. 
 
 
TFG Planning to Provide Security Inside a Cordon 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. (C) According to the police commissioner, the TFG and 
AMISOM forces hope to form a cordon around the city. Police and 
former Darawish militias will provide security inside this cordon, 
and will confront any remaining Islamist fighters there. (Note: 
In Somali vernacular, Darawish are special purpose paramilitary 
forces. In Southern Somalia, the Darawish was a 2,300 man 
paramilitary force loyal to the Islamic Courts Union that has 
recently been willingly disbanded and incorporated into the Somali 
police and army. End Note.) According to the police commissioner 
many of the Darawish share clan lineage with the Bakara Market 
neighborhood's Haber Gedir citizens. To take advantage of these 
clan affiliations the commissioner plans to use these forces to 
occupy the market during the offensive, hopefully to avoid direct 
military operations in the Bakara Market area. 
 
 
Shabaab Yet to Respond 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Over the past weeks, possibly in an attempt to 
disrupt TFG and AMISOM plans for the offensive, Al-Shabaab and 
allied Islamist fighters have intensified attacks, one 
Mogadishu-based NGO contact has told us . Since the TFG troop 
movement, however, there have been only sporadic skirmishes. Our 
contacts tell us Shabaab hastily moved their heavy weapons out of 
Mogadishu, and may have moved fighters out of their strong-hold at 
Bakara Market, as part of a plan to avoid confronting, or being cut 
off by TFG and AMISOM forces. 
 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C) We do not yet know when an offensive will occur, but 
when it occurs it will be supported by AMISOM armor, and 
calculated to deter an Islamist resistance. Tactical retreats are 
common in the Somali context. Shabaab commanders may have judged 
that they should withdraw rather than fight at this moment. Even if 
they choose not to contest the offensive, Shabaab will likely 
regroup, reinforce, and challenge the government's gains in 
Mogadishu in the days and weeks ahead. The government's and 
AMISOM's challenge will be to hold any new neighborhoods they may 
capture in the upcoming offensive, and exert control in newly 
captured areas. We are pushing the TFG and AMISOM to apply lessons 
learned in July 2009, when an offensive failed to hold newly-gained 
territory for lack of logistical support to advancing government 
troops. We are also urging the TFG to amplify any military success 
with a vigorous media campaign. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment continued: We believe there may be a short, 
post-conflict window of opportunity in which to expand development 
and humanitarian programming in Mogadishu. We are urging that the 
TFG, AMISOM, and our UN, NGO, and international partners move 
quickly to supply government services, humanitarian aid, 
unexploded ordinance disposal, employment programs, and IDP 
returnee support to newly opened areas, so that Mogadishu's 
citizenry may see dividends from government control. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment continued: USAID will work to assemble a 
broad package of interventions which will provide possible 
returnees and internally displaced in Mogadishu with much needed 
food and non-food relief. This package would include hygiene kits, 
blankets, chlorine tablets, jerry cans, kitchen sets and shelter 
material, as well as food rations. Further assistance that could be 
provided in conjunction with, or as a follow on to the 
reintegration package could include activities such as garbage pick 
up as a cash for work program, health and nutrition services and 
water and sanitation assistance, including activities such as water 
well rehabilitation. The provision of this assistance, commonly 
provided by Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food For 
Peace partners in conflict and post-conflict environments, will 
show the returnees that the stability provided by the TFG and 
AMISOM brings benefits. 
 
 
RANNEBERGER