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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 000147 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR S/CT AND AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/08 
TAGS: MCAP MARR PGOV PREL PTER KE SO
SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN AND GOK OFFICIALS DISCUSS 
SOMALIA, REGIONAL SECURITY AND BILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 
 
REF: 09 NAIROBI 2203; 09 DJIBOUTI 1391; 10 ADDIS ABABA 0166 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Samuel A. Madsen, POL EARSI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  During a one-day visit to Kenya Ambassador-at-Large for 
Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin discussed threats from Somalia, 
Islamic extremism inside Kenya,  border security and Kenya's 
efforts to aid the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
Amb Benjamin met with George Saitoti, Minister of Interior and 
Provincial Administration, and commanders of the Kenyan police and 
intelligence services, as well as Brigadier Phillip Kameru Director 
of Military Intelligence (DMI).  All of the Kenyan officials 
emphasized the threat that Kenya faces from Somalia and from 
domestic radicalization, praised United States/Kenya 
counterterrorism cooperation, and requested additional resources to 
confront extremism and criminal activity.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Amb Benjamin met with George Saitoti, Minister of 
Interior and Provincial Administration, January 29.  Saitoti was 
joined by Mathew Iteere, Commissioner of Police, Commandant K. 
Mbugua, Administration Police (AP), MG Michael Gichangi, Director 
General of the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), and 
Nicholas Kamwende, Chief of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). 
The delegation met separately with Brigadier Phillip Kameru, 
Director for Military Intelligence (DMI).  Accompanying Amb 
Benjamin to these meetings were Lee Brudvig, Nairobi Deputy Chief 
of Mission, Mark Thompson, S/CT Deputy Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (Operations) , COL Rich Clarke, Joint Special 
Operations Command, MAJ Craig Miller, Liaison to S/CT, and Samuel 
Madsen, East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative Coordinator. 
Matt Thompson, Defense Intelligence Agency Resident Analyst, also 
accompanied the group to the meeting with the DMI. 
 
 
 
Somalia Concerns 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Minister Saitoti noted that Kenya has seen Somalia as a 
problem since 1991.  The Government of Kenya (GOK) has tried to 
help Somalia from time-to-time since then and fully supports the 
TFG now.  The activities of al-Shabaab inside Somalia are a major 
concern for the GOK, particularly given Al Shabaab's links to 
al-Qaida, foreign fighters and other radicals.  An additional 
concern is the 5000 to 6000 Somali refugees crossing into Kenya 
each month, adding to the more than 360,000 who are already there. 
The GOK is particularly worried that at least some of those 
entering Kenya are extremists rather than refugees. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In a related note, Saitoti said the GOK views the recent 
case of the Jamaican extremist Abdullah al-Faisal, who entered 
Kenya illegally from Tanzania, as destabilizing public harmony.  He 
claimed that radicals, including al-Shabaab, were behind violent 
demonstrations in protest of al-Fisal's arrest. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Saitoti also noted that Somali piracy has hurt Kenya.  He 
claimed proceeds from ransoms paid to Somali pirate syndicates are 
being used to purchase expensive commercial and residential 
properties in Kenya at inflated prices, thus affecting the Kenyan 
economy by distorting the real estate market.  In addition, 
quantities of small arms and light weapons from Somalia are 
entering the black market in Kenya.  Saitoti appealed for greater 
USG tactical and technical assistance for the Kenyan police, noting 
that the ATPU is limited in size and capabilities and "can't be 
everywhere." 
 
NAIROBI 00000147  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Siatoti added that the GOK sees Somalia as a security 
problem not just for Kenya but for the entire region.  He referred 
to the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam and the 2002 attacks on the Israeli owned hotel and airliner 
in Mombasa as examples of the terrorist threat coming from Somalia. 
The presence of al-Qaida operatives and foreign fighters in Somalia 
are causing increased concern.  Saitoti lamented that international 
peacekeepers left Somalia in the mid 1990s, thus losing the 
opportunity to "resolve the situation" years ago.  He added that 
the instability in and threats from Somalia are likely to get worse 
if the problem is not resolved now. While the TFG is weak, Saitoti 
said he believes they could do better with more help.  However, the 
international community has not adequately supported the TFG. 
Unless the TFG receives increased international support al-Shabaab 
is likely to defeat it eventually.  Saitoti noted that the GOK has 
proposed ways to assist the TFG, most recently with the Jubaland 
Initiative (see reftels), which is intended to train and equip a 
force of Somalis to drive al-Shabaab fighters from areas near the 
Kenyan border (further discussed below). 
 
 
 
Confronting Extremism Inside Kenya 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to Kenya's own concerns regarding religious 
extremism, Saitoti stated that al-Shabaab's control over most of 
southern Somalia reinforces the perception of TFG weakness and 
allows al-Shabaab to spread its ideology freely.  He noted that 
Kenyan youth are susceptible to al-Shabaab propaganda if that 
message is not countered.  While most Kenyan Muslims and ethnic 
Somali Kenyans are loyal citizens and reject extremism, Saitoti 
declared there is still a need to show that extremist ideology is 
false and wrong, particularly to the youth. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Saitoti noted that Kenya faces serious economic 
difficulties stemming from violence following the December 2007 
presidential elections.  Foreign investment and Kenya's vital 
tourism industry both suffered large declines following the unrest 
and recovery has been slow.  The economic downturn has led to high 
unemployment among youth in all communities.  He believes youth are 
easily misled by promises of opportunity from extremists.  Saitoti 
claimed the GOK is implementing youth programs to create jobs.  He 
did not offer details of specific programs but stated that these 
efforts need USG assistance, either directly or through NGOs.  He 
observed that there is a particular need for micro financing 
initiatives to empower youth and reduce the appeal of radical 
ideologies. 
 
 
 
 NSIS Director Alarmed over Civil Society 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Maj. Gen. Michael Gichangi, Director General of the 
National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), noted that the GOK 
is concerned by the global rise of radicalization, and fears this 
could spread to Kenyans, particularly the growing youth population. 
He stated that over the last seven years Kenya has developed a much 
more open civil society.  He expressed concern, however, that this 
greater openness can be exploited by radicals and U.S. efforts to 
support an open civil society can potentially "create space" for 
extremists. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Gichangi said the financial aid provided by the United 
States and others to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating 
in Kenya needs to be carefully monitored and directed in order to 
prevent radicals from using these NGOs as covers for extremist 
activities.  He encouraged the United States to target carefully 
its assistance to Kenyan civil society, suggesting that the USG 
"partner" with the GOK in directing aid to civil society in order 
to insure it does not go to radicals.  He asked that the Embassy 
share information with the GOK regarding which NGOs are currently 
 
NAIROBI 00000147  003 OF 005 
 
 
receiving assistance and specifically mentioned the Muslim Human 
Rights Forum as an NGO he believes to be affiliated with Islamic 
extremists.  Saitoti endorsed MG Gichangi's remarks, noting that 
terrorist front organizations operate around the world and the 
United States and other donor nations must avoid empowering them. 
 
 
 
Law Enforcement and Border Control 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Commissioner of Police Iteere noted that the border area 
is made up of an ethnic Somali culture divided by the border.  He 
praised the aid provided through the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) program but said he needs more, particularly additional 
resources such as equipment and vehicles to empower the ATPU.  He 
also said there is a need for increased resources for border 
security, noting that the crossing point where Jamaican extremist 
Faisal entered Kenya is not monitored around the clock and lacks 
computer based systems for tracking entries and exits.  Iteere also 
pointed out that Kenya has supported the trial and imprisonment of 
Somali pirates but these efforts pose a burden on the GOK. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Administration Police (AP) Commandant Mbugua seconded 
Iteere's appreciation for USG capacity-building assistance, 
particularly the recent donation of patrol boats and the efforts by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border 
Protection to help train a new AP border patrol unit.  He noted, 
however, that the AP's border agents still lack basic equipment, 
particularly vehicles and aircraft for border monitoring.  Mbugua 
stated that the international community and USG need to appreciate 
that in confronting the problems of Somalia Kenya is dealing with 
an international issue.  The GOK has done what it can with existing 
resources but requires more. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Saitoti recommended that the United States and Kenya work 
together to develop a joint strategy to address Somalia issues.  He 
concluded by stating that the GOK is committed to political and 
security reforms.  The violence that followed the 2007 elections 
damaged Kenya's tradition of peace and acted as a wake-up call 
regarding the need for reform.  He said the GOK is committed to the 
fundamental reforms now underway, including the new constitution 
that has been drafted and is now undergoing the review process. 
 
 
 
The Threat from Somalia and al-Shabaab's Motivation 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
---- 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) Phillip Kameru, Director for Military Intelligence (DMI), 
characterized Somalia as Kenya's primary foreign threat and noted 
that the Kenyan military is working to improve security along the 
border.  Kameru claimed that the medical school bombing in 
Mogadishu had reduced al-Shabaab's stature within Somalia, but top 
leaders remain firmly committed to their course.  There has been 
some al-Shabaab recruitment inside Kenya, including at the Dadaab 
refugee camp, particularly for local Somali clan militias.  Most of 
these recruits sign up with al-Shabaab for the pay as opposed to 
ideological reasons.  Al-Shabaab senior leaders obtain much of 
their funds from the port of Kismayo.  Al-Shabaab also skims money 
and supplies from humanitarian assistance and charges tolls for 
trucks carrying humanitarian aid and commercial cargo in areas 
under their control. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Maritime infiltration of suspected extremists from Somalia 
has declined since mid-2009, largely due to increased patrolling by 
the Kenyan Navy and Maritime Police Unit.  Some infiltrators still 
utilize existing smuggling routes.  Many of these involve sailing 
far out to sea then running straight into Kenyan ports, versus the 
traditional infiltration routes through coastal areas. 
 
NAIROBI 00000147  004 OF 005 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Kameru claimed there are signs of increasing 
radicalization among rank-and-file al-Shabaab members, largely as a 
result of proselytizing by Whabbists.  While many al-Shabaab 
fighters are still motivated by money, Kameru believes an 
increasing number are fighting for ideological reasons.  Al-Shabaab 
is also working to indoctrinate the populace in areas under its 
control. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (C) Kameru added that the DMI sees significant numbers of 
Tanzanians, Ugandans and Kenyans among the foreigners fighting 
alongside al-Shabaab.  Many are Muslim converts who have been 
radicalized.  He also claimed to have seen evidence of non-Muslim 
Nigerians working with al-Shabaab, although possibly not as 
fighters.  He said al-Shabaab members receive basic military 
training from Somali al-Shabaab members and foreigners, but 
specialized and advanced training is largely provided by the 
foreign fighters. 
 
 
 
The Jubaland Initiative 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶18.  (C) Kameru extensively discussed the Kenyan government's 
Jubaland Initiative, under which the Kenyan military is training 
and equipping a force of Somalis whose mission will be to enter 
Somalia and drive al-Shabaab militias away from the areas along the 
Kenyan border.  He began by stating that al-Shabaab views the 
Kenyan government as a threat that it needs to deal with.  He added 
that the DMI expects al-Shabaab to begin cross border incursions 
into Kenya and he claimed to have received reports indicating 
al-Shabaab has plans to use improvised explosive devices and 
landmines against security personnel and civilian traffic inside 
Kenya.   Kameru said there are other reports of al-Shabaab 
stockpiling weapons in border regions. 
 
¶19. (C) Kameru said Kenya wants to develop a buffer zone inside 
Somalia to prevent al-Shabaab infiltration and incursions.  He 
claimed that the TFG agrees with the initiative because it wants to 
reduce al-Shabaab pressure from the Juba region.  In addition, many 
in the region reject al-Shabaab's ideology and would like to see 
them driven out. 
 
 
 
¶20. (C) Kameru noted that the initiative cannot succeed as just a 
military operation.  A viable political process must be established 
as follow-on to the military operations, he said.  The force will 
need the support of the local population in order to prevent a 
prolonged guerrilla campaign.  He also stated that, while Kenyan 
military trainers are training the force in conventional military 
tactics and operations, veteran Somali and TFG personnel are also 
providing instruction in unconventional military tactics employed 
by al-Shabaab. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (C) Kameru stated that the original Jubaland Initiative called 
for 3000 trained fighters but only 2000 are now available. These 
include 600 police and trained civil administrators to provide 
security and government services following the operation.  He added 
that the DMI estimates al-Shabaab to have about 1000 to 1500 
fighters in the Juba area and approximately 6000 nationwide. 
According to Kameru, the GOK is also concerned about reports 
indicating that al-Shabaab is activating old training camps in the 
Juba region.  If true this would allow al-Shabaab to mobilize and 
train large numbers of additional fighters. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (C) Saitoti noted that he was aware of USG skepticism 
regarding the Jubaland Initiative.  He insisted, however, that 
Kenya intends to press forward.  He defended the program by 
pointing out that Kenya shares a long, poorly defined border with 
Somalia and sees a trend toward increasing numbers of Somali 
 
NAIROBI 00000147  005 OF 005 
 
 
refugees crossing into Kenya.  The GOK is seriously concerned by 
the possibility that Somali militants may be crossing the border 
hidden among the refugees.  He noted that the GOK is willing to 
consider alternative USG proposals to the Jubaland Initiative. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (C) COMMENT: Amb Benjamin's interlocutors universally 
emphasized that they view al-Shabaab and Somalia as their primary 
external security threat and that external threat is interconnected 
with the growing menace posed by domestic Islamic extremism. Post 
shares these concerns and views Kenya as a vital partner in 
regional counterterrorism efforts.  However, post believes efforts 
intended to counter extremism in Kenya must take place within a 
framework of fundamental political, judicial and security sector 
reform. 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Amb Benjamin did not clear this cable. 
RANNEBERGER