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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK RS
SUBJECT: ENGAGING RUSSIA ON THE FUTURE OF BOSNIA 
 
REF: A. 09 MOSCOW 2728 
     ¶B. 09 MOSCOW 2780 
     ¶C. 08 MOSCOW 319 
     ¶D. 09 MOSCOW 2527 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) While GOR officials share our goal for BiH -- a 
stable country integrated with Europe -- they are 
increasingly calling for the Office of High Representative 
(OHR) to close, assessing that the entities have nearly met 
all five objectives and two conditions ("5 plus 2") set by 
the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).  The GOR agrees that 
Bosnia needs constitutional reform in-line with the failed 
April 2006 reform package, but disagrees that external 
pressure is necessary and prefers constitutional change take 
place after OHR closure.  Russian experts downplay the GOR's 
influence on the Republika Srpska (RS), telling us that 
Russia engages with RS PM Milorad Dodik to maintain a role in 
the region.  Russia is not adamant in its opposition to EU or 
NATO membership for Bosnia, with FM Lavrov declaring that it 
is up to Bosnia itself.  The GOR does insist, however, that 
membership in the EU and NATO not erect new barriers (i.e., 
visa requirements and trade restrictions,) between Russia and 
BiH.  By engaging Russia in dialogue, the U.S. can call them 
on efforts to front for the RS, while at the same time 
building agreement on steps forward.  End Summary. 
 
"Butmir Package Undermining '5 plus 2'" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a Janaury 29 meeting, Russia's new representative 
to the PIC Steering Board, Fourth European Deputy Director 
(Balkans) Pyotr Ivantsov told us that Russia wants "to see 
Bosnia as a stable and European country," with the PIC agreed 
"5 plus 2" objectives and conditions the best means to move 
forward.  He assessed that BiH was not far from achieving a 
consensus on the outstanding defense and state properties 
issues, but charged that the U.S.-EU "Butmir package" had 
undermined consensus and diverted attention to finalizing 
reform.  He claimed that the U.S.-EU initiative had 
antagonized the RS and the Croats, causing them to seek more 
entity-based rights, while the Bosniaks had taken a stronger 
negotiating position and were blocking "5 plus 2." 
 
¶3.  (C) While critical of U.S. and EU efforts, Ivantsov said 
that the GOR supports constitutional reforms in-line with the 
failed April 2006 package.  He argued that constitutional 
reforms needed to be built on a Bosnian consensus, not done 
to meet EU or NATO requirements for membership and not done 
before OHR had closed and transitioned to the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR).  Ivantsov commented that U.S. and EU 
energies would have been better spent on concluding "5 plus 
2." 
 
February's PIC Steering Board 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Referring to OHR Inzcko's December 29 letter and 
"food for thought paper" to PIC Steering Board Members and 
EUSR Ashton, Ivanstov said that Russia preferred Option 1's 
transition and closure, but judged that the PIC would likely 
accept Option 2's status quo.  While he did not dismiss 
Option 3 (strengthening OHR) and 4 (decoupling OHR/EUSR), he 
made it clear that the GOR was not reconsidering its support 
of "5 plus 2."  In looking toward the PIC Steering Board 
meeting at the end of February, Ivantsov said that Russia 
wanted either a decision to close OHR or a timeline that 
included the six months necessary to transition operations to 
the EUSR.  His Bosnia Desk officer Ivan Gorbunov added, that 
closure or the promise of imminent closure would change the 
dynamics of the upcoming Bosnian elections.  Gorbunov argued 
that such a decision would compel Bosnian candidates to lay 
out a vision of the country's future within the EU, turning 
the campaign process into a positive articulation of policy, 
rather than a divisive debate over entity-based authorities. 
 
Bosnian Serbs and Dodik 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Assessing Russia's real influence on the RS and Dodik 
 
MOSCOW 00000324  002 OF 003 
 
 
is difficult, with GOR officials defending Dodik but 
unwilling to apply pressure on him for any concessions (REF 
A).  On January 29, Gorbunov defended RS PM Dodik as being 
more constructive than many of Bosnia's leaders on Dayton. 
He also argued that Dodik was in favor of European 
integration and pointed to Dodik's statements favoring 
changes to the BiH constitution, following a European Court 
of Human Rights decision that certain provisions were 
discriminatory.  While neither Gorbunov nor Ivantsov defended 
the RS's push for referenda and Dodik's statements on 
weakening state authority, they maintained the GOR's 
"principled position" that OHR should do nothing more than 
what has been agreed to under Dayton.  They also pushed back 
on the necessity for any external pressure on the entities. 
FM Lavrov has also echoed Dodik's charges that the OHR had 
used the Bonn Powers outside of his Dayton and PIC Steering 
Board mandate (REF B). 
 
¶6.  (C) Georgiy Engelhardt of the Russian Academy of Science 
Slavistics Institute told us separately that contrary to 
popular views, Russia has little direct influence on the RS, 
which explained why Russia pressed so little on reforms.  He 
also belittled official Russian statements on "Slavic 
brotherhood" as a convenient label with little real 
substance.  He argued instead that Russia's "principled 
position" on Dayton conveniently coincided with the dominant 
RS interests and provided a way for Russia to remain relevant 
in the region, if only as a balance to the U.S.  Engelhardt 
assessed that it would be difficult for Russia to withdraw 
support from the RS and Dodik, as Russia would lose its 
limited influence. 
 
Working with Russia 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  As the U.S. seeks to move the process in 
Bosnia forward, we need to engage Russia in dialogue to both 
seek their support and to call Russia out on its efforts to 
front for the RS.  While the GOR continues to follow a policy 
of strict adherence to the Dayton Accords, limited use of 
Bonn Powers, and an early closure of OHR, there is room for 
working with them on common goals.  Consulting with Russia 
will also permit us to define our actions, rather than 
letting the RS interpret them to the GOR in the worst 
possible terms -- a lesson revealed by Russia's continuing 
resentment on our handling of the Butmir package, which they 
consider as informing them late in the process rather than 
consulting them (REFS A, B, and C). 
 
¶8.  (C) On the Butmir package, the GOR continues to say it is 
principally opposed to it, but this opposition is based on 
the sequencing of "5 plus 2" and constitutional reforms, 
rather than opposition to our ultimate goals.  If we can 
assure Russia that we have similar interests for Bosnia's 
future and that "5 plus 2" is only part of the answer, we may 
seek to develop a sequence that moves OHR to closure while at 
the same time ensuring Bosnia's stability and progress 
towards EU integration.  We must understand that the GOR's 
support for BiH's EU membership is not absolute, and will 
fall away if it sees membership requirements on visas and 
trade erecting new and troublesome barriers between the two 
countries.  Further, Russia will not make public statements 
in support of Bosnia's membership in NATO, with Lavrov's 
November 2009 statement in Sarajevo that NATO membership is 
"up to the people of Bosnia" the best we can expect. (REF D) 
 
¶9.  (C) In conversations with former Special Representative 
Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko before his departure to serve as 
Russia's Ambassador in Sarajevo, he commented repeatedly that 
Russia wanted a PIC-like body to continue after the closure 
and transition of OHR.  He made it clear to us that the end 
of the PIC would significantly reduce Russia's influence in 
the region.  While a limited lever, an offer to include 
Russia in an ongoing consultative role could provide a chip 
in seeking greater Russian pressure on the RS.  Such a role 
would provide Russia the ability to voice and support RS 
interests, but potentially in exchange for some gains on the 
Butmir package and progress on "5 plus 2."  End Comment. 
 
Biographic Note 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Pyotr Anatolevich Ivantsov:  In a quiet move in 
December, the Russian MFA designated Pyotr Ivantsov as the 
GOR's representative to the PIC Steering Board.  Ivantsov 
 
MOSCOW 00000324  003 OF 003 
 
 
recently returned to Moscow after working UNMIK issues, 
including as political director, and is unfamiliar with much 
of the background on Bosnia.  He holds the title of Fourth 
European Deputy Director (Balkans) but does not carry the 
title of Special Representative, a downgrade in 
representation from his predecessor Aleksandr 
Botsan-Kharchenko (who is now Russia's Ambassador to BiH). 
According to Fourth European Director Aleksandr Alexeyev, the 
change in the position was due to a change in administrative 
procedure, rather than a change in how the GOR judged the 
issue.  Ivantsov is fluent in English, although as he was 
only coming up to speed on Bosnian issues, he had not yet 
developed the specialized English vocabulary to discuss the 
technical aspects of the issues.  Ivantsov was in Brussels on 
February 10 for consultations with his EU counterparts, and 
will travel to Sarajevo February 24, in advance of the PIC 
Steering Board. 
 
¶11.  (C) Ivan Nikolaevich Gorbunov:  The head of the BiH and 
Croatia desk, Ivan Gorbunov is an unusual member of Russia's 
diplomatic service:  he is a member of a tandem couple, his 
wife is a more senior-ranking officer in the consular branch. 
 He is also a skilled linguist -- in addition to his fluent 
English, he is the preferred Serbo-Croatian interpreter for 
FM Lavrov and President Medvedev for high-level meetings in 
the region, including with RS PM Dodik.  His entire career 
has focused on Yugoslavia and its successor states, having 
served in Russia's embassies in Sarajevo and in Belgrade. 
Gorbunov is due to rotate out of his position at the MFA in 
the summer of 2010, with Russian Ambassador Kislyak to the 
U.S. considering him for a post in Washington.  Gorbunov has 
one young child, under one-year in age.  We have found him to 
be an open and honest interlocutor.  He tells us he is eager 
to change portfolios, and explore issues outside of southern 
Europe. 
Beyrle