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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0468
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

248767
2010-02-13 01:07:00
10MEXICO518
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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OO RUEHNG RUEHRS
DE RUEHME #0518/01 0440108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 130107Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0468
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000518 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
WHA DAS JACOBSON, DIRECTOR LEE 
NSC O'REILLY AND RESTREPO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MX PINR
SUBJECT: CALDERON VISITS JUAREZ, ANNOUNCES NEW STRATEGY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The January 31 murder of fifteen people in 
Ciudad Juarez, most of whom were students with no known criminal 
ties, captured the nation's attention and prompted increased 
government engagement in the city from the federal and state 
governments to restore security in the city.  Most importantly, in 
response to the Salvarcar massacre, President Calderon hastened the 
announcement of a new Juarez strategy, which the GOM has been 
developing with US Mission support.  The new approach will not only 
increase GOM's commitment to improving the capacity of law 
enforcement and judicial institutions in Ciudad Juarez, but will 
also invest in the necessary socio-economic interventions for 
Juarez residents to resist criminal organizations in the long-term. 
Calderon's announcement is consistent with the needs identified 
during our assessment visit to Ciudad Juarez-El Paso and months of 
bilateral engagement.  End Summary 
 
 
 
Juarez Massacre Sparks Public Outrage, GOM Response 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The January 31 murder of fifteen people, mostly high 
school and university students, in a private home in the working 
class Ciudad Juarez neighborhood of Villas de Salvarcar has 
captured the nation's attention and convinced the GOM to move 
quickly to revise its strategy to reduce violence in the city.  The 
attack, carried out by members of the Juarez Cartel, ignited an 
outpouring of anger against state and federal authorities for not 
preventing the death of so many youth, whom law enforcement 
authorities say were innocent.  January was the most violent month 
in Mexico since Calderon initiated his war against organized crime, 
with well over 900 narcotics-related homicides, 240 of which took 
place in Juarez. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The attack hastened the Calderon government's announcement 
of an evolving security strategy in Juarez and has created an 
unprecedented level of engagement by every level of government to 
address the violence in Juarez.  In his February 11 visit to 
Juarez, President Calderon presented the GOM's estimated USD 230 
million proposed action plan for Juarez, which focused on four key 
themes: 1) Strengthening rule of law; 2) Building civilian police 
and investigative forces, including enhanced intelligence capacity; 
2) Socio-economic development, including investments in education, 
health, and job creation; and 4) Civil society participation.  He 
unveiled the plan in a public forum to leaders from the city's 
political, economic and social sectors, and received credit for 
assuming partial responsibility for what he called the "city's dire 
security situation and breakdown of social capital."  Further, he 
recognized that federal authorities need to better coordinate 
actions with state and municipal governments and overcome political 
differences if the plan is to succeed.  He apologized for his 
initial handling of the homicides - while in Tokyo, the President 
publicly suggested that the victims were likely involved in illicit 
activities - and also announced he will return to Juarez next week 
to receive feedback from the community on the proposal. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Calderon's announcement marked a shift toward a new 
programmatic focus in Ciudad Juarez that will include 
socio-economic development and community involvement to support law 
enforcement's efforts to reduce violence.  Notably, Secretary for 
Education Alonso Lujambio and Secretary for Social Development 
Heriberto Felix Guerra accompanied Calderon on the presidium, along 
with the usual security players.  Calderon's delegation also 
represented a rare joint appearance by members of his National 
Security Cabinet and Economic and Development Cabinet.  Members of 
Calderon's security team told the Ambassador that his delegation 
was expanded at the last moment - a possible sign of his commitment 
to Juarez and his effort to make a strong showing of federal force 
there. 
 
 
 
State Government, Opponents, Offer Their Take 
 
MEXICO 00000518  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Calderon's advance team was at work in Juarez on the new 
strategy since at least the January 31 massacre, but pressure from 
the Chihuahua State government and other political opponents 
hastened the unveiling of the plan.  Chihuahua Governor Jose Reyes 
Baeza Terrazas had also received heavy public criticism after the 
Salvarcar attack, and when President Calderon announced during his 
February 1-2 trip to Japan his plan to integrate jobs, education 
and drug treatment programs into his government's security package 
for Juarez, Baeza accused the federal government of cutting the 
state out of the program's planning process. (Note: That claim is 
disingenuous.  Baeza participated in a number of planning sessions 
with federal agencies, including one with the Ambassador.)  During 
a visit to the Salvarcar site on February 3, Baeza emphasized that 
any federal programming in Juarez must be coordinated with the 
state and local governments, and complained that he had received no 
information about the kinds of programs the GOM is considering for 
the city.  Baeza's visit to Salvarcar coincided with a national 
security cabinet meeting in Mexico City to discuss the federal 
government's strategy for Ciudad Juarez, to which the governor 
claimed he was not invited. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Baeza's frustrations were compounded by recent polls 
showing that Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) gubernatorial 
candidate Cesar Duarte's lead in the poll numbers over National 
Action Party (PAN) rival Carlos Borruel had narrowed over the past 
month from 40 to 20 percent in advance of state elections election 
in July.  By the time Calderon arrived in Juarez on February 11, 
however, tensions between the federal and state governments were 
reduced.  Much of the credit for this could be attributed to the 
intervening visit of Secretary of Government Fernando Gomez Mont. 
During his visit on February 8, Gomez Mont visited the Salvarcar 
massacre site and stressed the federal government's commitment to 
working with state and local authorities on the new security and 
development program. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The massacre and its aftershocks reverberated in Mexico 
City, as well, and Calderon's PRI and Revolutionary Democratic 
Party (PRD) opponents accused the President of pursuing a failed 
policy.  Even members of his own PAN asked that the GOM's security 
approach be revised in light of continued violence throughout the 
country, and in Juarez particularly.  Immediately following the 
incident, the Senate called for the Secretaries of Public Security, 
Defense, Navy, Government, and the Attorney General to testify - 
the closed hearing is scheduled for February 16 and will be in 
front of only twelve select senators. 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Meanwhile, in a move that took the GOM by surprise, 
Governor Baeza also announced on February 6 his intention to 
transfer state executive, legislative and judicial functions from 
Chihuahua City to Ciudad Juarez for an indefinite period of time. 
Baeza said that the move was to "ensure that the federal government 
implements its social programming plan for Juarez in a manner 
consistent with the city's needs."  Public opinion polls and 
Consulate conversations with local politicians, civil society, and 
the private sector suggested that Juarez residents were skeptical 
the proposed transfer of powers would have any impact on the 
security situation, and in a February 12 vote the state 
legislature's PAN bloc abstained; a measure to move the state 
congress's functions to Juarez fell two votes short of the 
two-thirds super-majority required.  Still, the governor's office 
says that Baeza intends to spend several days each week in Juarez. 
[Note: As has commonly been the case in the past, Juarez Mayor Jose 
Reyes Ferriz has been a non-factor in the aftermath of the 
Salvarcar tragedy and the subsequent disputes between the federal 
and state governments.  If Governor Baeza and Agriculture Reform 
Secretary Abelardo Escobar Prieto take up at least part-time 
residence in Juarez (as promised by Calderon) to manage the new 
programs, their presence could represent the kind of hands-on 
governance that the city has lacked for some time.] 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
MEXICO 00000518  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ciudad Juarez has become emblematic of Mexico, shaping the 
political debate domestically and perceptions of the country 
internationally.  The January 31 Salvacar massacre - while a new 
low for the city - has prompted a previously unseen level of 
attention by federal and state governments to resuscitate Ciudad 
Juarez, with both Calderon and Baeza accepting ownership and 
responsibility for both the city's ills and providing the remedies. 
Additionally, the GOM's new Juarez strategy is a sign that the 
Calderon government and Chihuahua state counterparts have taken on 
what we have learned from months of bilateral engagement on this 
topic - that the development of more effective judicial and 
security institutions, as well as social and community side 
solutions will create the institutions and opportunities necessary 
for long-term success in the counternarcotics fight that an 
exclusive focus on the capture of high-value targets will not. 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) One of Calderon's key challenges is to channel the 
public's new engagement - and anger - in Juarez and around the 
country in a constructive way.  A poll conducted by Ulises Beltran 
and Associates following the Juarez massacre indicates that, while 
67 percent of respondents support Calderon's counternarcotics 
strategy, 60 percent still see the President as not having control 
of the country.  The GOM can address the public's growing weariness 
by demonstrating results from a strategy that is broader than 
arrests and raids and offers instead real citizen security on the 
ground.  This will not be easy, and the issues of impunity, lack of 
accountability, and the need for real law and order are all 
critical components that must be addressed in addition to 
development and economic issues.  Moreover, we should fully expect 
security issues - and Juarez in particular - to be increasingly 
politicized as the country moves toward state elections this summer 
and presidential elections in 2012.  Nevertheless, the USG is 
well-placed to support efforts to implement new and creative 
strategies, starting with the February 22 bilateral planning 
session in El Paso.  Building on the findings of the December 
assessment visit to El Paso-Ciudad Juarez, the week-long event will 
be a key opportunity for us to develop with Mexico the kind of 
strategy it needs to re-establish control of Juarez's streets. 
PASCUAL