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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BL
SUBJECT: CORDIAL FIRST MEETING WITH NEW BOLIVIAN INTERIOR MINISTER 
 
REF: 10 LA PAZ 35 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: William Mozdzierz, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, 
State, La Paz; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The ChargC) met February 4 with new Bolivian 
Interior Minister Sacha Llorenti for a surprisingly cordial 
one-hour exchange.   Llorenti, a frequent critic of the U.S. and 
reportedly close to hard-line Vice President Garcia Linera, 
underscored his interest in working closely with us on 
counter-narcotics and bilateral relations, acknowledged challenges 
facing Bolivian security force in terms of professionalization, and 
offered assistance in addressing problems we have had in securing 
visas for military personnel.  Llorenti inquired about the pending 
GOB extradition request of former President "Goni" Sanchez de 
Lozada and highlighted concerns about Bolivian suspects obtaining 
refuge in the U.S. and Peru.  The new minister's message and tone 
in this first meeting were remarkably positive given his role and 
reputation.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Llorenti pledged to work closely with the United States on 
counter-narcotics efforts, confirmed the GOB goal of eradicating 
7000 hectares of illegal coca this year (though acknowledging that 
heavy rains have pushed back their ambitious schedule), and 
expressed interest in joining Vice Minister Caceres and resident 
ambassadors for a NAS-supported trip to the Chapare coca-growing 
region February 22.   Llorenti characterized Bolivian police forces 
as well trained and professional, but allowed that challenges 
remain in reducing corruption, promoting greater respect for human 
rights and addressing what he described as a crisis in the penal 
system. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Llorenti, who participated in earlier rounds of talks on a 
bilateral framework agreement, declared himself extremely pleased 
with the progress made to date and wondered how we could "unfreeze" 
the process to reach a final agreement.  The ChargC) recalled our 
discussions with FM Choquehuanca on the eve of Morales's 
inauguration January 22.  He explained that we support talks, but 
noted that it would be helpful to have something in writing from 
the GOB outlining their concerns and position. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Llorenti inquired about the "Goni" extradition request, 
asking when the GOB would get an answer.  He claimed that the 
Bolivian embassy has sent three diplomatic notes to State and has 
not gotten a reply.  The ChargC) said he understood that an answer 
should be forthcoming, and underscored that the request will be 
decided on legal, not political, grounds. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Llorenti sought to convince us that the 2009 case of alleged 
separatist terrorists (the "Rozsa case") represented a real threat 
to Bolivia's security.  Without going into details (nor mentioning 
the prosecutor's finding of a CIA connection in the case, which 
would be revealed a few days later, reftel), he made clear that the 
GOB intends to pursue this case vigorously.  Llorenti highlighted 
GOB concerns about criminal suspects winding up abroad, principally 
in the U.S. and Peru, beyond the reach of Bolivian authorities. 
The flight to the U.S. of former presidential candidate Manfred 
Reyes Villa is one such case, Llorenti noted, indicating that the 
GOB will pursue a formal extradition request for Reyes Villa. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) The ChargC) raised with Llorenti the challenges we have faced 
in recent months getting visas for DoD officials and military, 
including lengthy delays and even denials.  He indicated that we 
understand that such visas are held up in the Interior Ministry, 
and requested the minister's assistance in ensuring that the visas 
are adjudicated quickly.  Llorenti (who appeared unaware of the 
problem) immediately pledged his assistance in making sure that all 
diplomatic staff, including military and U.S. marine security 
guards, get their visas approved.   On the way out, Llorenti made a 
point of asking the ChargC) that copies of such requests be sent to 
 
his office directly, to ensure they will be taken care of. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment:  Throughout this initial exchange, Llorenti was 
soft-spoken and respectful.   Although clearly still becoming 
familiar with his new responsibilities and issues, he repeatedly 
emphasized his interest in working with the U.S. and declared 
himself always available to us.  Who knows how long it will last, 
but this was a far more constructive first meeting than we 
otherwise could have hoped for.  End comment. 
Creamer