VZCZCXRO1966
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #0051/01 0430711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120711Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6316
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 4198
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 6559

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/12/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CH VM
SUBJECT: NEW YEAR'S UPDATE WITH FORMER MAYOR VO VIET THANH 
 
REF: (A) 2009 HCMC 398, (B) 2008 HCMC 712, (C) 2008 HCMC 282, (D) HCMC 33, (E) 
HANOI 23, (F) OPENSOURCE.GOV PRODUCT ID SEP20100202124011 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000051  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth J. Fairfax, Consul General, U.S. 
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Vo Viet Thanh, former HCMC Mayor and current 
advisor to both PM Dung and President Triet, remains deeply 
troubled by what he views as China's increasingly belligerent 
stance towards not only Vietnam but the rest of Asia.  His 
message for the USG was that whether we are dealing with 
Vietnam, Burma, ASEAN or other nations, we should always 
consider how our actions will impact our counterparts' relations 
with China.  He expressed great concern over China's 
increasingly aggressive stance in the East (South China) Sea, 
framing the GVN purchase of Russian arms in that light.  He also 
noted that the Russians gave them a really good price.  On the 
domestic political scene, Thanh predicted a "very early" release 
for the four democracy activists (including Le Cong Dinh) 
convicted in HCMC on January 20 and expressed great optimism 
that Vietnam would make a renewed push on fighting corruption 
and deepening grass roots democracy following the 2011 Party 
Congress.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) On February 10, CG and PolOff paid a pre-Tet call on Vo 
Viet Thanh, the former Chairman (Mayor) of HCMC as well as 
former Deputy Minister of Public Security and Central Committee 
Member and current advisor to President Nguyen Minh Triet.  As 
in our numerous previous conversations (reftels A - C), Thanh 
was expansive and made a number of interesting observations. 
 
 
 
China Defines Many Issues 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) As in previous conversations, Thanh devoted much of the 
conversation to China and tended to frame other issues in terms 
of how they impact Vietnam's -- and ASEAN's -- dynamic relations 
with China.  He started off by "reminding" the CG that for over 
2,000 years China has pursued territorial expansion through 
military conquest.  Times and methods have changed, Thanh said, 
but the Chinese still want to control Vietnam and the rest of 
Asia. Without quite painting a picture of a China-USA balancing 
act, Thanh nonetheless said that it is important for the USA to 
carefully maintain its influence in Vietnam so as to provide a 
perspective other than China's in the region.  This China focus 
included not just US-Vietnam relations but other issues as well. 
He cited North Korea as a type of worst-case scenario for the 
end result of Chinese efforts to dominate its neighbors by 
"supporting" them against aggressors (in other words, us). 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to Burma, he said that the GVN agrees that the 
generals are simultaneously harming their people and playing a 
difficult and even obstructionist role in ASEAN, but added that 
Vietnamese leaders feel constrained by their desire to avoid 
actions that could push Burma even closer to China.  He did not 
dispute CG's point that the generals are already steering Burma 
toward a quasi-satellite relationship with China, instead 
responding that the open question is what policies will be more 
effective in correcting Burma's worrisome behavior.  Given the 
GVN's often-repeated policy of non-interference, leaders feel 
constrained into limiting their comments to Burmese authorities 
to "non-political" topics such as the economy and trade.  He 
made a brief foray to Cuba to make his point, stating that when 
he accompanied GVN leaders on a visit to the island last June no 
one in the delegation made any political comments.  They did, he 
asserted, make numerous economic and management comments, noting 
to Cuban leaders that they could greatly improve the 
productivity of both farms and factories by allowing people to 
directly benefit from their work.  He said they used the example 
of state farms, noting that farmers produce little since their 
rewards are the same if they produce a little or a lot. 
 
 
 
East (South China) Sea 
 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the Spratley and Paracel islands, Thanh noted 
that China wanted to derail efforts to move toward a 
multilateral settlement since it stands a better chance of 
bullying nations one by one.  Without asking the US to back 
Vietnam's claims, he urged the USG to take constructive steps to 
demonstrate our commitment to freedom of navigation and the 
dispute resolution process based upon principles in the Law of 
the Sea. 
 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000051  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Thanh commented that recent GVN agreements to purchase 
roughly $1 billion in Russian arms reflects an increasing 
realization that Vietnam must be able to defend its claims to 
the East (South China) Sea.  He emphasized that while the GVN 
does not want confrontation, it also realizes that it will 
accomplish nothing dealing from a position of extreme military 
weakness.  He said the decision to buy Russian arms came down to 
two points.  First, the U.S. market is closed to them.  Second, 
Russia offered them a very good deal.  According to Thanh, 
Vietnam will pay 40% less than other nations that have purchased 
similar equipment in recent years. (Comment: The fact that most 
senior CPV leaders were educated in Russia, maintain a close 
affinity for Russia, and Russia's historic role in providing 
Vietnam defense-related equipment likely were also factors 
behind Hanoi's decision.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
Early Release For Activists? 
 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Thanh predicted that the four democracy activists 
convicted on January 20 (ref D) would be released "very soon" 
but did not provide a date.  (Comment: It is likely that Thanh 
was trying to put some lipstick on that pig.  In this context, 
"very soon" could mean several months, a year or even longer, 
especially considering that the MFA DG for the Americas told 
visiting DAS Marciel February 5 that it was "too early" even to 
discuss Le Cong Dinh's release, given the sensitivity of the 
case and the overwhelming evidence against him -- ref E.  End 
Comment.)  While he expressed understanding for the U.S. 
position and added his own view that the four were guilty only 
of acting too soon rather than pursuing the wrong goal, he 
reacted negatively to CG's and other public statements on the 
trial, noting that such public statements make it more difficult 
for GVN and Party leaders to show flexibility, particularly by 
creating a contrast between the USA and China. Following a 
pattern established in previous exchanges, he expressed his own 
hopes for democracy in Vietnam but urged patience and caution, 
adding that more could be accomplished via direct, quiet 
diplomacy and high-level discussions than public announcements. 
The CG countered by saying the increasingly negative attention 
Vietnam's human rights and religious freedom record was 
receiving in the U.S. makes it difficult for the USG to push the 
relationship forward, and could affect our efforts to push for 
high level visits and increased engagement. 
 
 
 
Upbeat on 2011 Party Congress 
 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) When the conversation turned to the upcoming Party 
Congress, Thanh was among the most optimistic people we have 
spoken to recently.  While agreeing that the run-up to January 
2011 will not be easy, he predicted that the results of the 
Party Congress will be to reinvigorate the reform movement.  He 
rested part of his optimism on what he described as 
democratization moves within the CPV.  He predicted that the 
Central Committee would approve a proposal before it that would 
require all candidates for senior positions within the party to 
prepare personal platforms detailing not only their political 
positions but the types of policies and reforms they intended to 
advocate if elected.  He predicted that the Party Congress 
itself would focus heavily on the issue of administrative 
reform, which in the Vietnamese context essentially means 
fighting corruption by CPV and GVN insiders.  One key reform 
that he believes has a good chance of passing is direct 
elections of commune and district officials without the CPV (via 
the Fatherland Front) choosing who is allowed to run. (Comment: 
Thanh's list of hoped-for reforms is consistent with a longer 
set of fundamental reforms that Le Phuoc Tho, retired 
Chairperson of the CPV's Organization Committee, presented in an 
interview marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam. In the interview, Tho acknowledged 
that many CPV members are "opportunistic" and "corrupt." He 
advocated "democratically and publicly" electing CPV leaders. 
The interview was translated and published by OpenSource.gov -- 
ref F.) 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Thanh's personal political star appears to be rising. 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000051  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
While he mainly occupied himself with golf just a few years ago, 
he now travels to Hanoi frequently in his capacity as advisor to 
the Prime Minister and President and frequently meets with the 
Central Committee's Standing Committee.  He also accompanies the 
President and PM on their foreign trips.  Our meeting with Thanh 
had to be rescheduled due to the fact that he was having dinner 
at President Triet's private residence in HCMC.  While we cannot 
say for certain, many of his statements probably do reflect his 
own personal views, although they are views that he assures us 
he shares during private conversations with top CPV and GVN 
leaders. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. 
FAIRFAX