VZCZCXRO9153
RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0199/01 0530534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220534Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1441
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000199 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
STATE FOR S/CT AND AF/RSA 
NAIROBI FOR S.MADSEN 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/22 
TAGS: PTER PINS PREL EAID MASS DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: S/CT AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN AND GODJ NATIONAL 
SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSS ERITREA, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA 
 
REF: 10 DJIBOUTI 13 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Djibouti's key security concerns include Eritrean 
sponsorship of al-Shabaab fighters as well as ethnic-Afar rebels, 
al-Qa'ida forces allying with al-Houthi rebels in neighboring 
Yemen, and maintaining the loyalty of Somali TFG forces combating 
Islamic extremists, according to Djiboutian National Security 
Advisor Hassan Said Khaireh.  The presence of over 5,000 foreign 
troops (nearly half of whom are U.S. forces at Camp Lemonnier) 
raises concern among Djiboutian security officials that terrorists 
may attempt to target Djibouti.  Key areas where Djibouti seeks USG 
assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities include: 
border protection (e.g., equipment to screen travelers from 
neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia), training of personnel; 
establishment of a laboratory for analysis; and material support 
for counterterrorism forces (e.g., vehicles, arms, and equipment). 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) On January 28, S/CT Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Ambassador Daniel Benjamin met with Hassan Said Khaireh, who is 
triple-hatted as Djibouti's National Security Advisor, Director of 
Djibouti's National Security Service (DNSS), and head of President 
Ismail Omar Guelleh's Office of Military Affairs.   Ambassador 
Swan, S/CT Mark Thompson, and DCM (note-taker) accompanied 
Ambassador Benjamin.  Hassan Said was accompanied by Abdillahi 
Mohamed Abdillahi, deputy director of the DNSS. 
 
 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Also accompanying Ambassador Benjamin's party were GRPO 
chief; COL Rich Clarke, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
J-3; and MAJ Craig Miller, JSOC Liaison to S/CT. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
DJIBOUTI FEARS THREAT TO ALLIED MILITARY FORCES 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Hassan Said expressed appreciation for the USG's close 
collaboration with the Government of Djibouti (GODJ).  He welcomed 
Amb. Benjamin's visit, noting that President Guelleh had directed 
him to "sensitize" the USG delegation to the threats Djibouti 
faced.  Djibouti's counterterrorism efforts had begun, Hassan Said 
noted, in 1991.  Since 2001, Djibouti had welcomed working with the 
United States, France, other European countries, and Asia.  There 
were now more than 5,000 foreign troops in Djibouti representing a 
possible target for terrorists, including extremists from 
neighboring Yemen and Somalia.  To counter such threats, the GODJ 
not only partnered with U.S. and European allies, but also 
exchanged threat information with other authorities in the region 
(including Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen). 
Liaison with security services of neighboring countries had led to 
success in detaining suspects, as well as to deterring or stopping 
potential threats.  As the GODJ was responsible for protecting 
expatriate members of the diplomatic and international community in 
Djibouti, it needed to work with foreign intelligence services and 
foreign militaries to guarantee security. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Since 2009, piracy off the coast of Somalia had also become 
an issue for concern, Hassan Said added, further exacerbating fears 
that Djibouti was a target for terrorists and other hostile 
elements.  (NOTE:  Djibouti plays a prominent role in supporting 
international counterpiracy efforts, not only as a venue for key 
conferences organized by the International Maritime Organization, 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000199  002 OF 004 
 
 
but also by hosting the European Union's "Atalanta" counterpiracy 
naval task force, and by hosting the historic deployment of 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces destroyers and P-3 maritime 
surveillance aircraft since May 2009.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) To address "all the facets of terrorism in the region," the 
GODJ had created a rapid intervention force.  However, Djibouti's 
limited resources meant it could not fight terrorism alone; 
Djibouti therefore called on the United States as a key partner to 
provide assistance.  Djibouti also sought assistance from other 
countries, including "friendly" Arab states, Hassan Said noted. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
AREAS FOR USG COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Hassan Said identified the following areas as priorities for 
possible donor assistance from the USG: 
 
-- border protection:  specifically equipment to screen the large 
number of trucks and other vehicles traveling from neighboring 
Somalia and Ethiopia; 
 
-- training of personnel:  for those responsible for monitoring 
cross-border movements; the GODJ also seeks training in explosives 
detection; 
 
-- establishment of a laboratory, to support scientific analysis; 
 
-- vehicles, arms, and equipment:  to provide the GODJ with the 
"means of intervention"  (vehicles were needed to transport GODJ 
security service components responsible for anti-terrorism 
functions, including the National Gendarmerie's Intervention Group 
(GIGN) and the newly established coast guard); 
 
-- other unidentified "preventive measures" that could be employed 
by GODJ security forces. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Hassan Said highlighted his concern that the USG had 
sometimes been "tardy" in its response to previous host country 
requests.  In response, Amb. Benjamin concurred that the USG's 
budgeting and planning processes were lengthy. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
TOP CONCERNS:  AL-SHABAAB, YEMEN, ERITREA 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Djibouti's greatest security concern, according to Hassan 
Said, was al-Shabaab and other Islamic groups -- including Hisbul 
Islam and even Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) -- who could exert 
undue influence on Djibouti's (moderate Islamic) population.  A 
priority for the GODJ was therefore identifying those who sought to 
radicalize the population by establishing madrassas or similar 
institutions.  Such radicalization was already evident in Somalia, 
where Somalis who had travelled to Yemen and Pakistan for 4-6 
months of "religious instruction" had received ideological 
indoctrination. 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000199  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶10. (S) As for Saudi influence on mosques, Hassan Said observed 
that in mid-2007 the GODJ had expelled a Saudi diplomat 
(al-Kouflehli, NFI) who had headed the Saudi Islamic Institute in 
Djibouti.  While declared persona non grata by the GODJ, the former 
Saudi diplomat now ran relief operations in Ethiopia's Ogaden 
region; a dual Sudanese-Djiboutian national who headed a Saudi NGO 
remained in contact with him, Hassan Said added. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Yemen was also a key concern for Djibouti, due to the 
presence of al-Qa'ida, as well as the threat of southern secession. 
Al-Houthi rebels had forged an alliance with al-Qa'ida forces, 
Hassan Said asserted, as demonstrated by the large number of 
al-Qa'ida representatives found in regions controlled by al-Houthi 
(e.g., Sa'dah).  Houthi businessmen reportedly financed 
tuition-free universities that fostered extremists, and al-Qa'ida 
financed non-Yemeni students (including French nationals and other 
Europeans) to study at universities in Yemen. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
ERITREA TRAINING AL-SHABAAB AND AFAR REBELS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
 
 
¶12. (S) Eritrea represented another threat to Djibouti's security, 
Hassan Said observed, particularly as it continued to construct 
military fortifications on Djiboutian territory (at Ras Doumeira) 
occupied since at least June 2008.  Despite international 
condemnation from the United Nations Security Council, the European 
Union, IGAD, the African Union, and others, Eritrean troops still 
had not withdrawn (as Djiboutian troops had) to establish a neutral 
"no-man's land".  Hassan Said asserted that there were links 
between al-Shabaab and Eritrea:  Djiboutian diplomats in Cairo had 
reported encountering Somali youth who had been trained in Eritrea, 
by the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE), for operations in 
Djibouti, and who were members of al-Shabaab.  Such Somalis trained 
in Eritrean camps needed to be returned to Somalia, Hassan Said 
added. 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) Eritrea was attempting to reestablish an Afar-dominated 
liberation front to destabilize Djibouti, and was also training 
ethnic-Afar rebels in Eritrea, Hassan Said stated.    Noting the 
1994 and 2000 peace agreements that had ended the civil war between 
the ethnic-Somali dominated Djiboutian administration and the 
ethnic-Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy (FRUD), Hassan Said observed that Eritrea was training 
militant Afars from Ethiopia and Eritrea--as there was insufficient 
support for the rebel cause among Afars in Djibouti. 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) Questioned about his outlook for neighboring Somalia, 
Hassan Said responded that one key mechanism for addressing 
counterterrorism in Somalia was simply securing adequate financial 
resources.  Specifically, funds were needed to pay wages to the 
Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) troops.  Despite its own 
extremely limited resources, Djibouti had provided assistance to 
the TFG, including training several hundred TFG troops to serve as 
a "vanguard" for a revitalized national army of Somalia.  He noted 
that Sudan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia were among those countries now 
providing material support to the TFG.  As a result, the TFG was 
now preparing an operation to "decimate the Islamicists," he 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000199  004 OF 004 
 
 
declared. 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT.  Despite Djibouti's status as the most stable 
country in the Horn of Africa, Djiboutian security officials remain 
vigilant in the face of suspected Eritrean-sponsored rebel 
activity, al-Shabaab threats from neighboring Somalia, and the 
presence of al-Qa'ida forces in neighboring Yemen.  A small country 
with limited resources, Djibouti has nevertheless placed itself at 
the forefront of international efforts to promote regional 
security.  Djibouti's diplomatic and military support for Somalia's 
Transitional Federal Government (ranging from hosting UN-sponsored 
"Djibouti Process" peace talks, to training TFG troops, and 
publicly committing to deploy a battalion to support AMISOM); its 
hosting of international counterpiracy contingents (e.g., from the 
EU and Japan); and its hosting of U.S. and French bases, including 
Camp Lemonnier, the only U.S. military base in Africa - underscore 
President Guelleh's active support for strategic goals that advance 
U.S. interests.  These activities, however, have also raised the 
profile of Djibouti, and the concern that terrorist elements may 
find Djibouti an irresistible target, if its counterterrorism 
capabilities are not strengthened.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by S/CT. 
SWAN