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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000340 
 
USDOE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY/ MCGINNIS, HERCZEG, GILLESPIE 
USDOE FOR NNSA/ BLACK, HUIZENGA, WHITNEY, BIENIAWSKI 
STATE PASS TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (DOANE) 
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/YOSHIDA, CUTLER, HUANGFU 
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
NSC FOR HOLGATE 
STATE FOR EAP/CM-BRAUNOHLER, EAP/CM 
STATE FOR ISN/NESS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG ECON ETTC TRGY KNNP IAEA KTIA CVIS CH
 
SUBJECT: CHINA'S MFA, GACC, CAEA PRESS FOR GREATER NUCLEAR SECURITY 
COOPERATION WITH DOE/NNSA 
 
BEIJING 00000340  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) Assistant Deputy Administrator for the U.S. Department of 
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of 
Nonproliferation, Dave Huizenga, visited Beijing China 20-23 
January.  He participated in the Transportation Security Workshop 
with China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and China Institute of 
Atomic Energy(CIAE), met with Hao Chongfu, Director General, 
Department of Customs Control and Inspection, General Administration 
of China Customs (GACC), met with Wu Chuntai, Deputy Director 
General, Dept of External Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), and Liu Yongde, Director General Department of 
International Cooperation, CAEA.  A common theme in each of these 
meetings was an acknowledgment by the Chinese host that China has a 
growing international role in nuclear security and that there is a 
strong desire to further collaborate with the U.S. in this important 
area. The MFA expressed strong support for going forward with the 
joint Center of Excellence (COE) training facility and stated 
China's strong support for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. 
Although when pressed, they would not commit to who would represent 
China at the NSS.  The State Council has assigned CAEA the 
responsibility to work with NNSA to design and construct the nuclear 
security training facility.  This project was proposed by Deputy 
Secretary Poneman last fall on his trip to China.  The expectation 
is to announce this joint activity at the April Nuclear Security 
Summit.  To clarify the scope and expectations, the CAEA is 
proposing to have a meeting in late March in Washington between 
their Vice Chairman/Party Secretary General and the Administrator, 
NNSA. The GACC reported their Megaports project milestones are on 
track, agreed to joint collaboration efforts to support EXPO 2010, 
using the successful formula that was used for the Beijing Olympics, 
and identified shared responsibilities for developing a joint 
training center in China to train Chinese and regional nations on 
the proper planning, operations and conduct of radiation detection 
at shipping ports and border crossings and other ports of entry and 
departure. End Summary. 
 
Building on Successful Cooperation with China Customs 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2.  (SBU) In an open and candid meeting with GACC, Huizenga covered 
three main topic areas.  Project review and status of the joint 
US-China Megaports demonstration project at Shanghai, reaching 
agreement on the timing, scope and responsibilities for joint 
U.S.-China collaboration on radiological detection for EXPO 2010, 
and negotiations on the creation of a radiation detection training 
facility that would create an indigenous training capability that 
could not only support China's needs but that of the Asian region. 
In exchange for U.S. support in creating this training facility, 
China would provide access to additional ports and border 
surveillance areas for the U.S. teams to visit and confirm the 
 
BEIJING 00000340  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
operational effectiveness of the Chinese equipment and operations to 
detect illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The Megaports 
demonstration project is proceeding on schedule with a projected 
operational date of 2011.  For EXPO 2010, agreement was reached on 
the type and quantities of equipment to be provided.  NNSA will also 
provide training for 60 Chinese customs officials to ensure the 
equipment is properly operated and maintained.  After Expo 2010, the 
equipment will deployed to principal border crossings and sea ports 
to enhance the detection of illicit nuclear material trafficking in 
and out of China. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) To create an indigenous training capability, similar to 
NNSA's Richland HAMMER training site, China has requested DOE/NNSA's 
design, construction and "train the trainers" assistance.  NNSA has 
agreed in principle but on the condition that China provide access 
to different ports and border crossing that, to date have not been 
open to DOE/NNSA inspectors.  A second stipulation is that the 
curriculum include dual use equipment training so China is able to 
detect nuclear equipment that could be used for terrorist or other 
illicit purposes. GACC has accepted these conditions but needs to 
complete interagency staffing before reaching final agreement. 
Huizenga also extended an invitation for DG Hao Chongfu to visit the 
U.S. and to meet US senior officials to further demonstrate advanced 
collaboration.  DG Hao was receptive to this invitation and went on 
to discuss cooperative efforts they are undertaking with the 
European Union in the area of second line defense and offered to 
better collaborate across all programs in and with China. 
 
CAEA ASSUMES A LEADING ROLE IN THE COE TRAINING CONCEPT 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶4.  (SBU) The meeting with DG Liu Yongde, CAEA Department of 
International Cooperation, addressed three topics.  Review and 
agreement on the nuclear security work under the Peaceful Use of 
Nuclear Technology (PUNT), concept and shared responsibilities for 
the Center of Excellence (COE) proposal as conveyed in the USG 
non-paper (presented by Deputy Secretary Poneman during his fall 
visit to Beijing), and potential future joint statements or 
agreements that would recognize the enhanced collaboration between 
our two countries as well as the expanded role of CAEA. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Huizenga and Liu Yongde reaffirmed the positive nature of 
U.S.-China nuclear security cooperation and discussed several 
different options for designing and operating the COE. Liu expressed 
strong Chinese willingness to collaborate on a COE, and stated that 
the State Council had designated CAEA as lead agency for negotiating 
and implementing the COE with the US.  Other agencies involved 
include MFA, GACC, MPS, MOFCOM and MEP.  Liu expressed his interest 
in having the USG name NNSA as its counterpart implementing 
organization, and that the USG inform GOC of this decision through 
appropriate channels. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Both sides agreed on several key points about for the 
 
BEIJING 00000340  003 OF 004 
 
 
nuclear security training Center of Excellence: 
 
- It would be necessary to jointly decide on the scope of a Center 
or Excellence.  For example, should it be a small renovation of 
existing CAEA space or a larger center involving substantial new 
construction?  Liu expressed interest in larger center involving new 
construction. 
 
- Liu expressed a desire for an NNSA-CAEA agreement on COE scope, 
list of shared responsibilities, and commitment to funding by the 
end of March which could be announced at the upcoming Nuclear 
Security Summit. He proposed to have CAEA Party General Secretary, 
Wang Yiren visit NNSA to finalize the agreement before the summit. 
He estimated a 2-3 year implementation schedule would be necessary 
to complete COE. 
 
- Liu suggested that the COE could be designed in a manner to not 
only accommodate China's domestic nuclear security training needs, 
but also noted that it could serve a wider audience - bilateral or 
multilateral nuclear security events for the Asia/Pacific region as 
well as bilateral and multilateral nuclear security training 
involving a broader international audience. Huizenga noted that the 
Center of Excellence could eventually serve training needs of 
defense complex nuclear security personnel as well.  Liu 
acknowledged this but made no commitment as to when or if that might 
happen.[In follow-up conversation, Liu noted to Huizenga that CAEA 
could accept a U.S. Department of Defense supporting role in 
implementation of the training Center of Excellence as long as this 
was not intended to pressure them into cooperation with their 
defense complex.  Huizenga assured him that this was not the 
intention.] 
 
- Huizenga noted a substantial degree of Chinese funding support 
would be needed.  Such cost sharing might take the form of land and 
labor provision, for example and Liu accepted the principle of 
U.S.-China cost-sharing. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Liu emphasized IAEA's leading role on the nuclear security 
front and expressed desire of inviting IAEA to join this 
initiative/cooperation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Liu expressed a preference for a direct NNSA-CAEA, 
agency-to-agency agreement to govern NNSA-CAEA nuclear security 
cooperation, given the Chinese government structure changes that 
took place in year 2008. The Chinese government reorganization also 
resulted in responsibility shifting. CAEA desires a new 
agreement/legal document between CAEA and NNSA to clearly 
acknowledge CAEA's role in carrying out collaboration on nuclear 
security and safeguards and nonproliferation. Huizenga proposed that 
CAEA outline key points for such an agreement based on their needs 
to continue the cooperation and the NNSA can work on turning it to a 
formal proposal. In the meantime, all the on-going cooperation under 
 
BEIJING 00000340  004 OF 004 
 
 
the PUNT should not be stopped. 
 
MFA LOOKING TO UP NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶9.  (SBU) Huizenga met with Wu Chuntai, the Deputy Director General 
for the Department of External Security Affairs of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) to discuss nuclear security collaboration with 
China and advance preparations for the upcoming Nuclear Security 
Summit. Huizenga discussed the enhanced collaboration that was both 
ongoing and additional collaboration that was being discussed with 
both GACC and CAEA. In opening, while acknowledging the importance 
of strengthening bilateral dialogue, deepening our cooperation on 
combating nuclear terrorism and making joint efforts to enhance 
nuclear security and nonproliferation, DDG Wu called for some 
sensitive issues such as arms sale to Taiwan, Tibetan and Xinjiang 
related issues to be properly addressed. Wu expressed MFA's 
willingness to continue cooperation based on the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit. MFA confirmed to work along with other 
relevant agencies to promote our cooperation particularly supporting 
the idea of reaching broad agreement on these new collaborative 
nuclear security efforts in time for them to be announced at the 
upcoming NSS.  He noted the Joint statement between presidents Obama 
and Hu cited increased cooperation in this area and was grateful for 
the tangible projects that were being developed.  He also noted the 
collaboration that took place in the run-up to the Olympics, which 
had been very helpful in building China's capacity to prevent 
nuclear terrorism and to ensure nuclear security.  The MFA said it 
agreed in principle to the U.S. proposal to establish a center of 
excellence on nuclear security in China and recognized CAEA's lead 
role. 
 
¶10.  (U) This cable was cleared by the DOE/NNSA delegation. 
 
HUNTSMAN