VZCZCXRO4950
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0066/01 0340818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030818Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1099
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BAMAKO 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, AND TINA 
MCCARTER 
 DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN 
 G/TIP FOR LUIS CDEBACA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EIND KTIP PHUM SOCI SIPDIS USAID ML
SUBJECT: MALI RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST: 2009 REPORT 
ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR 
 
REF: A. 09 SECSTATE 131995 
     ¶B. 08 BAMAKO 488 
     ¶C. 09 BAMAKO 009 
 
¶1. This cable responds to Reftel A requests for information 
on child labor and forced labor for DOL congressional 
reporting requirements. 
 
Tasking 1 / TVPRA 
 
¶2.  The following answers, keyed toquestions in paragraph 15 
of 2009 State 131995, are provided below: 
 1A) GOOD: As per paragraph 14 of Reftel A, post has no 
information pertaining to goods not already named on the 
current TVPRA list or discussed in Reftel B. 
 
1B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION: As per paragraph 13 in Reftel A, 
post has no new information pertaining to the type of 
exploitation described in Reftel B.  The labor practices 
described in Reftel B are exploitive child labor due to the 
hazardous nature of the labor. 
1C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION: In addition to the sources listed 
in Reftel B, post has obtained information concerning 
exploitive child labor from the director of TBP-Mali, a 
DOL/ILO project to address child labor in Mali, the director 
of the Malian National Office Against Child Labor, a project 
officer at the United Nation's Children Fund, and a 
provisional report entitled "Understanding Children's Work in 
Mali," a joint publication by the ILO, UNICEF, and the World 
Bank Group issued in October 2008. 
1D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: As per paragraph 13 in Reftel A, 
post has no new information concerning conditions of labor. 
1E) PREVALENCE: Post has no information beyond that reported 
in Reftel C, section E. 
1F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY OR NGO EFFORTS: On 
February 4, 2009, Mali's Ministry of Labor published a list 
of the "worst forms of child labor" prohibited for those 
under the age of 18.  The list expanded upon certain 
activities that had already been banned for those under the 
age of 18 pursuant to a government decree dating from 1996. 
The new list of hazardous work includes a variety of jobs in 
the agricultural domain, as well as eight enumerated tasks 
common in the mining industry.  In 2009, TBP-Mali, a 3.5 
million USD DOL/ILO project described in Reftel C, ended a 
few months sooner than anticipated due to funding shortfalls. 
 TBP-Mali had worked with the Malian Ministry of Labor on 
enumerating the list of "worst forms of child labor" 
mentioned above, and had promoted community-based awareness 
campaigns to decrease child exploitation.  TBP-Mali was able 
to amass statistical data concerning individual children 
rescued from exploitive labor through its efforts. 
 
Tasking 2 / TDA 
¶3.  The following answers, keyed toquestions in paragraph 21 
of 2009 State 131995, are provided below: 
2A) PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD 
LABOR: Of 1.8 million economically active children in Mali 
between ages 5 and 17, approximately 10 percent, or 180,000, 
are employed as domestic servants.  Domestic service is by 
far the most prevalent sector of child labor not related to 
the production of goods.  In certain parts of Mali, 
relationships of hereditary slavery/servitude exist, 
resulting in forced child labor.  In addition, children are 
frequently forced to beg on the streets by Koranic masters to 
whom their parents have entrusted them.  Child prostitution 
exists, although there are not reliable figures upon which to 
estimate its prevalence.  During the reporting period, the 
Malian government collected data on child labor, and 
publication of that data is anticipated as part of the 
process of developing a new National Action Plan to Eliminate 
Child Labor.  The data collection has been performed by the 
Ministry for the Advancement of Women and Children in 
conjunction with the National Statistics Directorate.  Post 
anticipates that the Ministry will be willing to share data 
with DOL once the data is published. 
2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS: There were no new laws adopted in 
2009 pertaining to curtailing exploitive child labor.  The 
Ministry of Labor finalized a list of the "worst forms of 
child labor" as required by Mali's obligations under 
international labor treaties.  As a general matter, Mali's 
legal framework is adequate, but enforcement of legal 
standards is lacking.  In certain areas, however, Mali's 
legal framework leaves a gap.  For example, the Criminal Code 
does not have a provision directly pertaining to child 
prostitution.  Child prostitutes are frequently taken into 
custody by the Malian Morals Brigade of the National Police, 
 
BAMAKO 00000066  002 OF 006 
 
 
but are released without the necessary support and follow-up 
to provide a means to escape permanently from their 
exploitation.  Similarly, although slavery is not legally 
recognized, there is no provision in the law that explicitly 
criminalizes it.  This limits the legal options of children 
caught in relationships of hereditary servitude.  Most 
importantly, there are no laws specifically pertaining to 
child labor in the informal sector, including agriculture, 
domestic service, and petty commerce.  ILO has also noted 
that most Malian laws on the subject of child labor are 
prescriptive in nature, prohibiting undesirable behavior but 
without providing alternatives for families driven by poverty 
to use child labor. 
2C1) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT -- HAZARDOUS 
CHILD LABOR 
2C) - 1:  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Responsibility for 
enforcement of child labor laws rests with the Ministry of 
the Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family; the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Internal Security 
through its Morals Brigade of the National Police; the 
National Social Security Institute (INPS) through its health 
service; and the Ministry of Labor. 
2C) - 2: HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   Mechanisms exist through a 
panoply of interagency commissions and committees set up, 
including the National Program Against Child Labor (PNLTE), 
the Project Against Child Trafficking (LUTRENA), the Support 
Project for TBP-Mali, and the Project Against Child Labor 
through Education (TACKLE).  In addition, there is a National 
Committee Director charged with coordinating the actions of 
the various ministries and committees in relation to the 
National Action Plan.  The mechanisms for exchanging 
information have proven counterproductive, as the 
multiplication of commissions, committees, programs, and 
projects have made the entire system inefficient and 
cumbersome. 
2C) - 3. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   The Ministry of Labor 
accepts complaints for all forms of labor violations, 
including child labor.  The number of complaints received 
during the reporting period pertaining to child labor was not 
made available to post. 
2C) - 4. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  The funding for Ministry of 
Labor inspections is inadequate, and there are no funds 
specifically earmarked to target child labor.  Instead, the 
Ministry of Labor has one budget for inspections of all labor 
code violations, and this has proven to allow only cursory 
oversight.  Inspectors are underpaid, and the most 
experienced inspectors often leave the Ministry of Labor to 
pursue work elsewhere.  The legislation authorizing 
inspections by the Ministry of Labor is only applicable to 
the formal sector, thus, inspectors have no jurisdiction over 
the vast majority of child labor in Mali. 
2C) - 5.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   In 2009, the Ministry of 
Labor employed 52 inspectors.  This number is inadequate, 
although an improvement from recent years (in 2007, post 
reported there were only eight inspectors). 
2C) - 6.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  At least one inspection was 
carried out during the reporting period.  An inspection of a 
restaurant/bar in Bamako's Commune III revealed eight 
under-aged girls working as prostitutes. 
2C) - 7.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   The eight under-aged girls 
working as prostitutes in a Bamako bar were placed in the 
care of the NGOs APAF/Moussa Dambe and Kanaso, which 
specializes in assisting prostitutes. 
2C) - 8.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  Unknown.  The bar 
identified above was charged a fine. 
2C) - 9.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   Unknown. 
2C) - 10.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  Unknown. 
2C) - 11.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  N/A. 
2C) - 12.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   The bar at which the 
eight under-aged girls were discovered working as prostitutes 
was assessed a fine, and the owners of the bar paid.  The 
criminal code does not specifically address child 
prostitution, although "pimping" is severely punishable.  The 
proportionality of the fine assessed to the penalties 
prescribed by law depends on what information the inspectors 
had in their possession.  Post does not know if the bar 
owners were "pimping" the prostitutes or merely allowing them 
to work there. 
2C) - 13.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:  The Malian government is 
sincere in its desire to combat child labor, although the 
inspections discussed in questions 7-10 above are not 
necessarily proof of that commitment as they were random in 
nature and too infrequent to be effective. 
2C) - 14.  HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR:   The Malian government, 
through ILO, offers its inspectors the opportunity to attend 
numerous trainings.  In 2009, there were four in-country 
 
BAMAKO 00000066  003 OF 006 
 
 
trainings.  In addition, inspectors are sent to CRADET, a 
training center in Cameroon for Francophone labor inspectors, 
and the International Training Center in Turin, Italy.  These 
trainings have had a negative impact overall, because once 
trained, inspectors use their new qualifications to seek 
higher-paid work outside of the Ministry of Labor.  One 
Embassy source indicated it was unusual for anyone returned 
from training at CRADET to still be at the Ministry of Labor 
one year later. 
2C) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT -- FORCED 
CHILD LABOR 
2C) -  1. FORCED CHILD LABOR:  Responsibility for enforcement 
of child labor laws rests with the Ministry of the Promotion 
of Women, Children, and the Family, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of the Internal Security through its Morals 
Brigade of the National Police, the National Social Security 
Institute (INPS) through its health service, and the Ministry 
of Labor. 
2C) -  2. FORCED CHILD LABOR:  Mechanisms for exchanging 
information exist through a panoply of interagency 
commissions and committees set up, including the National 
Program Against Child Labor (PNLTE), the Project Against 
Child Trafficking (LUTRENA), the Support Project for 
TBP-Mali, and the Project Against Child Labor through 
Education (TACKLE).  In addition, there is a National 
Committee Director charged with coordinating the actions of 
the various ministries and committees in relation to the 
National Action Plan.  The mechanisms for exchanging 
information have proven counterproductive, as the 
multiplication of commissions, committees, programs, and 
projects have made the entire system inefficient and 
cumbersome. 
2C) -  3. FORCED CHILD LABOR:  The Ministry of Labor accepts 
complaints for all forms of labor violations, including child 
labor.  The number of complaints received during the 
reporting period pertaining to child labor was not made 
available to post. 
2C) -  4. FORCED CHILD LABOR:  The funding for Ministry of 
Labor inspections is not adequate, and there are no funds 
specifically earmarked to target child labor.  Instead, the 
Ministry of Labor has one budget for inspections of all labor 
code violations, and this has proven to allow only the most 
cursory oversight.  Moreover, inspectors are woefully 
underpaid, and the most experienced inspectors leave the 
Ministry of Labor to pursue work elsewhere. 
2C) -  5.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  In 2009, the Ministry of 
Labor employed 52 inspectors.  This number is inadequate, 
although a dramatic improvement from recent years (in 2007, 
post reported there were only eight inspectors). 
2C) -  6.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  None dealing with forced 
child labor. 
2C) -  7. FORCED CHILD LABOR:  Zero. 
2C) -  8.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  Zero. 
2C) -  9.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  Zero. 
2C) -  10.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  N/A. 
2C) -  11.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  N/A. 
2C) -  12.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  N/A. 
2C) -  13.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  The Malian government has 
failed to adequately address forced child labor, in part 
because of its reluctance to admit the existence of 
hereditary slavery, and in part because it has focused on 
child labor in other areas. 
2C) -  14.  FORCED CHILD LABOR:  The Malian government, 
through ILO, offers its inspectors the opportunity to attend 
numerous trainings.  In 2009, there were 4 in-country 
trainings.  In addition, inspectors are sent to CRADET, a 
training center in Cameroon for francophone labor inspectors, 
and the International Training Center in Turin, Italy. 
Ironically, these trainings have had a negative impact 
overall, because once trained, inspectors use their new 
qualifications to seek higher-paid work outside of the 
Ministry of Labor.  One Embassy source indicated it was 
highly unusual for anyone returned from training at CRADET or 
in Italy to still be at the Ministry of Labor one year later. 
 
2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- 
CHILD TRAFFICKING 
2D) - 1. CHILD TRAFFICKING:  The Ministry for the Advancement 
of Women, Children, and the Family is charged with combating 
child trafficking, but shares enforcement responsibilities 
with the Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of 
Justice.  There were no personnel dedicated exclusively to 
investigating child trafficking. 
2D) - 2.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  The amount of funding 
specifically earmarked for combating child trafficking was 
not made available to post, although the total budget for the 
 
BAMAKO 00000066  004 OF 006 
 
 
Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the 
Family was USD 7.6 million.  The Ministry lacked resources to 
effectively investigate or respond to reports of child 
trafficking.  In one case in December 2009, a trafficker was 
arrested in Nioro du Sahel, but the Ministry lacked cash on 
hand to provide transportation for the trafficked children 
back to their families in Kidal, and turned to NGOs and 
diplomatic missions to provide the transportation costs. 
2D) - 3.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  Mali does not have a mechanism 
for reporting child trafficking.  However, the NGO Enda Tiers 
Monde has a network throughout the country and often 
substitutes for the Malian government in this regard. 
2D) - 4.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  On two occasions in 2009, the 
trafficker Sidamar Ag Cherif was taken into custody by Malian 
authorities in Nioro du Sahel with trafficked children in his 
possession.  On each occasion, Ag Cherif was released with no 
reasonable explanation, aborting any "investigation" that 
might have begun.  In addition, Malian authorities claimed to 
have arrested three traffickers in Sikasso, although there 
was no follow-up investigation. 
2D) - 5.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  A total of 24 children were 
rescued from Sidamar Ag Cherif on the two occasions that he 
was taken into custody in Nioro du Sahel.  Those children 
were repatriated by the NGO Enda Tiers Monde.  An unknown 
number of children were rescued from traffickers in the 
Sikasso incident, and were placed under the care of Save the 
Children. 
2D) - 6.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  Sidamar Ag Cherif was arrested 
and released on two occasions in 2009.  Government 
authorities made no other arrests, and there were no 
prosecutions. 
2D) - 7.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  No cases were resolved. 
2D) - 8.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  No convictions were pronounced. 
 
2D)  - 9.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  No sentences were handed out. 
2D) - 10.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  No sentences were imposed. 
2D) - 11.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  Child trafficking cases are 
not resolved.  Historically, the trafficker is released and 
the affair is forgotten. 
2D)  --12.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  The Malian government offered 
no such training, although NGOs have hosted awareness-raising 
workshops that government officials attended. 
2D) - 13.  CHILD TRAFFICKING:  N/A. 
2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- 
CSEC 
 2D) - 1. CSEC: The Morals Brigade of the National Police, 
housed within the Ministry of the Internal Security, has 
primary responsibility for protecting youth at risk of 
commercial sexual exploitation. 
2D) - 2. CSEC:  No budget figures for the Morals Brigade are 
available; however, the funding is not considered adequate, 
and the brigade is short of equipment and material to 
adequately perform the tasks assigned it. 
2D) - 3. CSEC:  Mali does not have a hotline or other 
mechanism specifically set up for reporting child trafficking 
or sexual exploitation.  Complaints can be made in person or 
by telephone to local police. 
2D) - 4. CSEC:  One, conducted by the Ministry of Labor. 
Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor discovered eight 
under-aged girls working as prostitutes in a Bamako 
restaurant/bar.  The Morals Brigade of the National Police 
took into custody an unspecified number of child prostitutes 
at various times throughout 2009, but in all cases the 
children were released within a few hours with no further 
action taken by the Morals Brigade. 
2D) - 5. CSEC:  Eight. 
2D) - 6. CSEC:  The bar in Bamako was assessed a fine. 
2D) - 7. CSEC:  One. 
2D) - 8. CSEC:  The bar in Bamako was assessed a fine. 
Otherwise, zero. 
2D) - 9. CSEC:  N/A. 
2D) - 10. CSEC:  N/A. 
2D) - 11. CSEC:  There are no cases. 
2D) - 12. CSEC:  Unknown.  13.  N/A. 
2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT - USE 
OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
Note: Although it is possible that there are some children in 
Mali being used as couriers or runners for drug and arms 
traffickers, Post has never heard of any specific instance, 
and no NGO has raised the issue as one of exceptional 
concern.  End note. 
2D) - 1. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: 
Responsibility for combating the use of children in illicit 
activities would reside with the Judicial Investigation 
Police under the Ministry of Internal Security as part of 
their regular law enforcement functions.  In the case of 
 
BAMAKO 00000066  005 OF 006 
 
 
children working for drug traffickers, responsibility would 
reside within the Drug Brigade of the Judicial Investigation 
Police. 
2D) - 2.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  The budget 
for the National Police and the Drug Brigade was not provided 
to post.  However, it is known that the Malian police are 
underfunded.  As of early 2009, the entire Drug Brigade 
employed only 24 officers to combat drug trafficking in a 
nation the size of Texas and California combined. 
2D) - 3.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  Mali has no 
mechanism specifically set up for that purpose.  Complaints 
can be made in person or by telephone to local police. 
2D) - 4.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  No 
investigations were opened during the reporting period. 
2D) - 5.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  Zero. 
 2D) - 6. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  Zero. 
2D) -  7. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  Zero. 
2D) - 8. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  Zero. 
2D) - 9. N/A. 
2D) - 10. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  N/A. 
2D) - 11.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  There were 
no cases. 
2D) - 12.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  The 
government offered no training specifically pertaining to the 
use of children in illicit activities.  The government did 
offer general law enforcement training, and Malian police did 
participate in general law enforcement trainings offered by 
NGOs and international partners. 
2D) - 13.  USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES:  N/A. 
2E) GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR 
2E) - 1. Yes. The Malian government is currently working on 
the fifth draft of a National Action Plan for the Elimination 
of Child Labor.  It is expected to be finalized and validated 
in July, 2010.  The National Action Plan will be built around 
the requirements of ILO Convetions 138 and 182.  In sum, it 
divides proposed actions into three categories: a) 
prevention; b) rehabilitation; and c) law enforcement.  Under 
prevention, the action plans anticipate efforts to raise 
awareness, particularly in rural locales, as to the hazards 
of child labor.  Under rehabilitation, the plans call for 
providing support to those rescued from child labor, 
including immediate needs such as medical care but also 
long-term needs such as education.  The Plans also have a law 
enforcement component, calling for application of laws 
already in place but currently unenforced. 
2E) - 2. No. The projects dealing with child labor have been 
free-standing. 
2E) - 3. Due to the overlap of responsibilities between 
ministries and the difficulty in obtaining accurate 
break-downs of individual ministry budgets, no specific 
figure can be given for the amount of money budgeted for 
combating child labor.  Moreover, the National Action Plan 
does not call for specific funding authorizations.  Rather, 
it defines the roles of the various ministries and expects 
funding for specific projects to come from ministry resources 
or international partners, such as the ILO. 
2E) - 4. The Malian government has established a number of 
steering committees, commissions, and task forces to put the 
Action Plan into effect.  As noted in Tasking 1F, this has 
resulted in the enumeration and publication in 2009 of a List 
of Worst Forms of Child Labor by the Ministry of Labor. 
2E) - 5. N/A. 
2E) - 6. Yes. The Malian government has established a number 
of commissions responsible for combating child labor, 
including commissions for the National Program Against Child 
Labor (PNLTE), the Project Against Child Trafficking 
(LUTRENA), the Support Project for TBP-Mali, and the Project 
Against Child Labor through Eduction (TACKLE).  The 
Commissions have generally been ineffective, resulting in 
more reports and speeches than action on the ground. 
2E) - 7. The government did not sign a bilateral, regional, 
or international agreements to combat trafficking during the 
reporting period. 
2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE CHILD LABOR: 
2F) 1. In 2009, the Ministry of Labor enumerated a list of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labor.  Also in 2009, the government 
collaborated with TBP-Mali, a DOL/ILO joint project that 
engaged in substantial efforts to raise awareness of child 
labor concerns in rural areas and provide a way out for 
children rescued from such labor. 
2F) 2. No. 
2F) 3. Funding for TBP-Mali came from DOL and ILO. 
2F) 4. The Malian government has established a number of 
steering committees, commissions, and task forces to put the 
Action Plan into effect. 
2F) 5. In general, the government relied upon NGOs and 
 
BAMAKO 00000066  006 OF 006 
 
 
international partners to provide support to children once 
they had been rescued from exploitative situations. 
2F) 6. The government did not sign any international 
agreements during the reporting period. 
2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS: 
2G) -1.  The Malian government is sincere in its desire to 
combat child labor, but lacks the resources to implement many 
of the "programs" and "plans" that its committees and 
commissions recommend.  During the reporting period, Mali 
made a significant step by completing the enumeration of the 
List of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.  While the government 
has not provided material support to NGOs and international 
partners, it has welcomed their efforts and cooperated to the 
extent its meager resources will allow.  There is a 
noticeable hesitancy, however, to enforce the laws that 
already exist.  There needs to be significantly greater 
effort to investigate and prosecute child trafficking and the 
exploitation of child labor.  To date, these crimes continue 
to be committed with impunity. 
 
 
MILOVANOVIC