Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD485, BABIL TRIBAL LEADER PREDICTS IRAQIYYA COALITION TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BAGHDAD485.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BAGHDAD485 2010-02-23 15:20 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO1007
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0485 0541520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231520Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6788
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: BABIL TRIBAL LEADER PREDICTS IRAQIYYA COALITION TO 
WIN UP TO 100 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 0422 
 
1.  This is a Babil PRT Cable 
 
2.    Summary.  On February 17, Chief Sheikh Adnan Abd 
al-Munim al-Janabi told PRToff that his public call for a 
boycott among his predominantly-Sunni 150,000 tribe is mostly 
for show. He said that he believes the Iraqiyya coalition 
could win as many as 100 seats (of 325) in the elections, but 
cautioned that the United States must overtly warn PM 
Maliki,s State of Law Alliance to cede power without 
resorting to violence. Adnan al-Janabi,s confidence is 
supported by an impressive, albeit self described, 
get-out-the-vote party machine. End summary. 
 
3.    On February 17, PRToff and 3/3 BCT Commander met with 
Sheikh Adnan Abd al-Munim al-Janabi, Chief Sheikh for the 
large al-Janabi tribe.  Sheikh Adnan was Minister of State 
without portfolio during the Iraqi Interim Government from 
2004 to 2005 and now is running for national office with the 
secular Iraqiyya coalition which has, he claims, wide spread 
support in Babil and as far away as Mosul and Kirkuk. 
 
4.    Sheikh Adnan complained that the de-Ba,athification 
exclusion list threatened the credibility of elections 
(reftel).  This credibility is important not only for Sunnis 
who need to be included, but also for Shi,a who need to know 
that the election represents all of Iraq.  As a result of the 
exclusion list, Janabi told PRToffs that he asked his 
supporters to boycott the election, but admitted this is for 
show.  He claimed that he needed to strenuously push for a 
boycott for its threat to be credible. 
 
5.    Janabi told PRToff that his coalition, Iraqiyya, 
expects to win a minimum of eight seats in parliament and 
could win as many as 100 (out of 325 seats).  He sees Prime 
Minister Maliki,s State of Law alliance (SLA) as the main 
opposition and calculated that Maliki,s Shi,a-based party 
would never win any Sunni votes and would have to win 75 
percent of the entire Shi,a bloc to win a majority.  He 
compared this to his own secular Iraqiyya alliance, which he 
predicted would win all of the Sunni votes and as much as 20 
percent of the Shi,a.  Janabi said that his supporters are 
going door to door to demonstrate to all 150,000 al-Janabi 
tribesmen on how to vote.  They will furnish all potential 
voters with instruction cards to take into the polling place, 
and will transport people to the polling site if needed. 
 
6.    Predicting victory for his 22-party coalition, Janabi 
said that the United States must ensure that Maliki cedes 
power peacefully.  Janabi rejected the notion that this is an 
Iraqi election run by Iraqis, insisting that &everyone knows 
the United States is influencing the elections8, even as 
everyone knows Iran has &encouraged8 the 
de-Ba,athification exclusion list.  He said that the recent 
expulsion of Babil Deputy Governor Iskandar Jawad Hassan 
Witwit is an example of what will happen if Maliki,s party 
loses the election.  Maliki is continuing to enhance his 
police and intelligence powers, he alleged, and it will be 
like a &bloodless coup8 when he decides not to transfer 
power; people like Witwit will just be &removed8.  He added 
that, whatever the outcome, the forming of a new government 
will take no less than two months.  Janabi flatly rejected 
the notion that his party would form a post-electoral 
coalition with other parties. 
 
7.    On security issues, Janabi said Maliki will continue 
his intimidation campaign with methods such as the 
de-Ba,athification exercise, but any overt police 
intimidation may be met with secular violence.  &We have our 
hot-heads and it may be difficult to stop them in the 
future.8 
 
8.    Comment: Janabi was candid and direct in his statements 
Q8.    Comment: Janabi was candid and direct in his statements 
to PRToff and 3/3 BCT Commander.  His description of his 
political machine impressed us for its practicality but his 
description of the United States and Iran,s election role 
struck us as just short of paranoid.  If tribal leaders like 
Janabi can influence the Sunni community to vote as a bloc 
for Iraqiyya, Janabi,s stridency could be part of the 
democratic Iraqi landscape.  End comment. 
 
FORD