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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP
SUBJECT: U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING 
DETAINEE MEETING 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 448 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary. In the February 20 Joint Subcommittee on 
Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) meeting, United States Forces - 
Iraq (USF-I) Deputy Commanding General for Detainee 
Operations (DCG-DO) MG David Quantock, Co-Chair of the 
JSC-DA, delivered a tough message - if the GOI is unable to 
provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction 
orders on the remaining 1,600 release-eligible detainees in 
U.S. custody, the U.S. would have no choice but to begin the 
process of releasing these high-threat detainees from U.S. 
facilities immediately following the Iraqi national elections 
in March.  Faced with this threat, and after much heated 
debate to include the GOI's request for the U.S. to violate 
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (Security Agreement), the 
GOI agreed that the files for those 1,600 detainees would be 
submitted in the coming days to an Iraqi investigative judge 
for his review and determination as to whether enough 
probable cause existed on each case to produce an arrest 
warrant.  In order to keep the focus on this important issue 
and to follow-up on the GOI assurances, USG and GOI officials 
agreed to hold another JSC-DA on February 27.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) During the February 20 meeting of the JSC-DA, MG 
Quantock urged GOI officials to send the 1,600 remaining 
release-eligible detainee files to Judge Al Taie, the Iraqi 
investigative judge charged with reviewing U.S.-held detainee 
files and producing arrest warrants. (Note: There are 5,825 
detainees in U.S. custody at this time. Of this number, 
approximately 4,200 are transfer eligible, meaning the GOI 
has provided the U.S. arrest warrants, conviction orders, or 
detention orders on those individuals. End Note.) MG Quantock 
stated that approximately 800 of these release-eligible 
detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI has not provided 
the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order, or conviction 
order) are very dangerous individuals - AQI- and Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM) special groups-affiliated. Further, once 
released, these detainees will return to their terrorist 
networks and "will pose a grave risk to security in Iraq," MG 
Quantock warned. He informed JSC-DA Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal, 
Ministry of the Interior, National Information and 
Investigation Agency (NIIA), that if this issue is not 
resolved soon, the U.S. would have no choice but to involve 
the Prime Minister's office. 
 
¶3.  (S) In response to this plea for action, the GOI 
suggested forming a committee that would review the 1,600 
detainee case files and make a recommendation to the JSC-DA. 
The GOI also asked that, rather than releasing these 
high-threat detainees, the U.S. could transfer them to the 
GOI without a valid arrest warrant or other transfer 
paperwork.  (Note and Comment: Article 22 of the Security 
Agreement provides, "The United States Forces shall act in 
full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq 
to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi 
authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and 
shall release all remaining detainees in a safe and orderly 
manner..."  If the U.S. were to honor this request by the 
GOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security 
QGOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security 
Agreement.  End Note and Comment.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MG Quantock responded to this request by pointing 
out the requirements of the Security Agreement and 
reiterating the need to transfer the 1,600 detainee case 
files to Judge Al Taie for his determination on whether 
probable cause exists for an arrest warrant. He stressed that 
the U.S. plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the GOI on March 
15 (reftel). If at that time, the GOI has not provided 
transfer paperwork for these 1,600 detainees, the U.S. has 
the option to transfer them to the Cropper TIF.  (Note: The 
U.S. plans to transfer the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15. 
End Note.)  However, MG Quantock stressed, if the GOI has not 
shown any progress on producing transfer paperwork on these 
1,600 detainee cases in the next two weeks, the U.S. will 
start releasing 400 detainees per month, starting after the 
Iraqi national elections and completing the releases of the 
1,600 detainees by July.  (Note: This would give USF-I DCG-DO 
the necessary time to set the Cropper TIF detainee population 
in preparation for the July 15 transfer to the GOI.) 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000477  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (S) The GOI then suggested that the U.S. continue to hold 
the 1,600 release-eligible detainees in the Cropper TIF and 
send all transfer-eligible detainees, to include high-threat 
detainees, to the Taji TIF in time for the transfer of the 
TIF on March 15.  MG Quantock responded that the U.S. plans 
to transfer the Taji TIF with medium-threat detainees only 
(reftel), which will allow the Iraqi correction officers 
(ICO) to train on a lower threat level detainee population in 
preparation for the high-threat level detainees that the U.S. 
would transfer with the Cropper TIF on July 15.  He stressed 
that this lack of progress on the transfer paperwork 
threatens to derail the entire process that the U.S. has put 
in place. (Note and Comment: After July 15, the U.S. will 
maintain a 360-bed space facility in Compound Five, near 
Cropper, with a guard force of 100 personnel (reftel). If the 
GOI does not produce transfer paperwork on these 1,600 
detainees before the transfer of Cropper and the U.S. decides 
to maintain custody of these individuals based upon a request 
of the GOI, a larger facility and guard force would be 
necessary, but is not currently planned. End Note and 
Comment.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) After much debate between the members of the GOI 
delegation, the GOI agreed that it would send the 1,600 
detainee case files to Judge Al Taie within two days.  The 
USG and GOI also agreed to meet again on February 27 to get 
an update on how far the GOI has progressed with producing 
transfer paperwork on these 1,600 release-eligible detainees. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment. The message delivered by MG Quantock was 
tough, but necessary.  Time and time again, the U.S. has 
raised the threat of the release of AQI-affiliated and other 
high-threat detainees from U.S. detention facilities, but to 
no avail.  The GOI appears concerned at this prospect, but 
either does not have the will or the ability to speed up the 
transfer paperwork process. At times during the February 20 
JSC-DA meeting, the GOI seemed to swing between wanting to 
send this problem to the Prime Minister's office, blaming the 
investigative judge on the lack of transfer paperwork, and 
requesting the U.S. to either transfer the detainees without 
transfer paperwork, in violation of the Security Agreement, 
or continue to hold them in U.S. custody for some 
unforeseeable moment in time.  The U.S., however, made it 
clear that, although it does not wish to release high-threat 
detainees from its facilities, the GOI had a decision to make 
- either produce the transfer paperwork in the coming weeks 
or prepare for an increase in violence upon the release of 
these high-threat detainees.  If this warning is not met with 
GOI action, we must address this issue with the caretaker 
government following the elections, reminding the GOI that 
the U.S. is obligated to abide by the Security Agreement and 
that the release of high-threat detainees immediately 
following the national elections will only serve to increase 
violence against Iraqi civilians and governmental entities. 
End Comment. 
FORD