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Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD416, ATF Promotes Standards in Iraqi Post-Blast

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BAGHDAD416 2010-02-17 04:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO5233
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0416 0480414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170414Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6658
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000416 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR ODAG, OPDAT, ICITAP, CRM 
STATE FOR NEA/I, INL/I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS IZ KCRM PTER
SUBJECT:  ATF  Promotes Standards in Iraqi Post-Blast 
Investigations 
 
REF:  09 Baghdad 2709 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The recent series of high-profile Vehicle Borne 
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) in Baghdad has highlighted the 
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior's urgent need for an incident command 
system that helps ensure the safe and necessary collection of 
evidence and facilitates follow-on investigation and prosecution. 
On February 11, the Embassy's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF) Attache was one of three presenters at a U.S. 
military Iraqi Transition Assistance Mission- sponsored (ITAM) 
incident command seminar reaching 90 senior MOI Police officials 
including numerous provincial police chiefs.   MoI Director of 
Operations Staff Major General Abdul Kareem expressed his ministry's 
desire to improve in this critically important area and acknowledged 
what ATF and other USG officials have identified as a key 
investigative gaps.  With VBIEDs a constant threat to Iraqi 
stability and security, ATF will continue its efforts to cultivate 
MOI capacity to properly conduct effective post-blast 
investigations.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  On February 11, ITAM hosted a successful one-day seminar 
on implementing  an  effective incident command system allowing safe 
and proper site exploitation and evidence collection.  The 
conference focused specifically on high profile explosive incidents 
such as VBIEDs.  The topics included an overview of the incident 
command system common in the U.S and evidence exploitation 
protocols.  ATF Attach closed the session with a discussion of his 
first-hand observations from multiple explosive incidents both in 
Iraq and the U.S., offering insight on its implementation in Iraq. 
 
 
3.  (SBU)  Reflecting the rising number of VBIED incidents 
specifically in Baghdad, post has argued for the continuation of ATF 
support in Iraq (reftel).   Additionally, the GoI has increased its 
requests for security assistance from the Embassy in the area of 
explosives exploitation and post-blast investigation, and it has 
recognized the ATF Attach office as having "overall responsibility 
for all counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED)- related 
assistance to the GoI.  ATF's support for the Incident command 
seminar further underscores the Embassy's capacity building goal in 
this important area. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Multiple MoI entities have conducted VBIED investigations 
during the past six months  The investigations focused primarily on 
 
interrogations and confessions, often ignoring the collection and 
potential analytical value of forensic evidence.  In fact, the 
evidentiary summaries provided by MoI's General Counter Explosives 
Directorate (GCED) misidentified the explosive materials used in the 
August 19 and October 25 attacks.  The Iraq National Intelligence 
Service (INIS) report, completed within 48 hours of the October 25 
bombings, misidentified the explosive materials, causing additional 
confusion throughout the MOI ranks and specifically at the deputy 
minister level. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Frictions between the MoI and the Ministry of Defense 
over who will assume on-scene command and which MoI directorate will 
lead both the scene and follow on investigation remain a impediment 
to effective crime scene management.  The allocation of the 
Qto effective crime scene management.  The allocation of the 
necessary resources and time to properly control, manage and process 
a crime is critical to the safety of responding Iraqi police 
officers and civilians, who often gain unneeded and uncontrolled 
access to crime scenes, contaminating the scene, and opening the 
damaged facility to looting. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Comment:  VBIEDs remain the insurgents' top weapon 
against the GoI.  Enhanced crime scene management is critical to 
apprehension and prosecution of these terrorists.  The seminar was 
an important first step in advancing GoI post-blast exploitation and 
response capabilities.  With the impending withdrawal of U.S. 
military forces, similar capacity building efforts  that review 
known gaps in the GoI's response to high profile VBIED attacks are 
critical to the USG's mission in Iraq.   End Comment 
 
 
FORD