VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0292/01 0351520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041520Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6452
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLING MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2025 
TAGS: PREL PGOV LKDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CRACKS IN THE KDP-PUK ALLIANCE? 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 091 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 157 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 254 
 
Classified By: Acting Charge d'Affaires Gary Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY. Cracks are beginning to emerge in the 
alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK), as evidenced by the 
absence of a high-level PUK representative in the KRG 
delegation that met POTUS on January 25.  The erosion of the 
PUK's party base and the struggle between the PUK and 
opposition Goran ("Change") Movement have taken their toll, 
making PUK a weakened and distracted partner for the KDP. 
Despite calls by KRG President Masoud Barzani for the PUK and 
Goran to temper their rhetoric and refrain from violence, 
tensions have continued.  The KDP has seized its advantage, 
forcing Talabani to give up key positions in both the KRG and 
GOI. PUK-Goran competition and the evolving KDP-PUK 
partnership could complicate government formation: the PUK 
and KDP do not yet agree on whom to support for Prime 
Minister, and it is unclear what might happen if Goran were 
to win more seats than the PUK.  While there is palpable 
tension within the KDP-PUK alliance, it is too soon to 
declare that the PUK's demise. Much will depend on how the 
PUK performs against Goran in the elections, and Barzani and 
Talabani recognize that a unified front in their dealings 
with the GOI in Baghdad allows them to play the familiar role 
of kingmaker in most political deals of consequence.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND - KRG ELECTIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Jalal Talabani's PUK suffered significant losses in 
the July 2009 KRG parliamentary elections, calling into 
question the bipolar PUK-KDP Kurdish political order that had 
obtained since 1998. The opposition Goran ("Change") Movement 
outperformed the PUK in Sulemaniyah traditionally the PUK's 
stronghold, seriously damaging Talabani's stature. Talabani 
is no longer on equal footing with KRG President Masoud 
Barzani, who won 70 percent of the popular vote in his run 
for the KRG presidency in 2009.  The disastrous election 
results have occasioned a debilitating internal power 
struggle within PUK, pitting KRG VP Kosrat Rasoul Ali against 
Halo Ibrahim, Talabani's brother-in-law. The erosion of the 
PUK's base, together with its ossified and increasingly 
fractious leadership cadre, have forced Talabani to spend 
more of his time in Sulemaniyah (vice Baghdad), where he has 
grudgingly undertaken an effort to reform the party he 
founded in 1975. 
 
¶3.  (C) With Talabani in a weakened state, his former PUK 
Deputy Nawshirwan Mustafa (now head of Goran Movement) has 
pounced on the opportunity to weaken him further, luring PUK 
members to Goran and, in a direct threat to the PUK's base, 
consolidating power in Sulemaniyah and Kirkuk.  Many stalwart 
PUK politburo members - resentful of the prosperity their KDP 
counterparts enjoy with the Barzanis helming the regional 
government in Erbil - blame Talabani for their predicament. 
While Talabani is preoccupied with restructuring the PUK, the 
KDP is moving to put the controversial draft KRG 
constitution, which would strengthen the office of the KRG 
presidency, to a referendum in fall 2010.  (Note:  The new 
KRG draft constitution allows the President to extend his 
term by two more years.  The authority and power given to the 
President are considered absolute because it stipulates that 
s/he would have the ability to dissolve the Kurdish 
parliament. End Note.) 
Qparliament. End Note.) 
 
KRG PREMIERSHIP AND CABINET FORMATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) It took some groveling by Talabani with KRG President 
Barzani to ensure that Talabani's protege, Barham Salih, 
assumed the KRG premiership in November 2009. Influential KDP 
leaders Rowsch Shaways and Fuad Hussein grumbled that the PUK 
had lost Sulemaniyah and did not deserve to run the KRG, 
hence an agreement between Talabani and Barzani that Salih 
would only serve a two-year term. In December, there were 
rumors that Salih planned to resign his post to protest 
efforts by former KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani (nephew of KRG 
President Barzani) and his allies to block Salih's reform 
initiatives.  Friad Rwanduzi, leader of the PUK bloc in the 
national Council of Representatives, lamented that with only 
two years, Salih would have to rush to institute reforms and 
raise his stature - and the PUK's - with the Kurdish people. 
Partly as a consequence of the drama related to the PM 
position, KRG cabinet formation was more tumultuous than 
usual.  Salih struggled with KDP hardliners to replace old 
faces in the cabinet with new individuals in an attempt to 
demonstrate to Kurds that the KDP-PUK alliance was responsive 
to demands that it be more accountable and transparent in its 
governance. 
 
¶5.  (C) Although Salih was able to remove a KDPer, Dindar 
Zebari, from the UN Liaison position, the KDP forced Salih to 
retain KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami (a 
close friend of Nechirvan Barzani), whose truculence has 
hindered progress on a hydrocarbons law and oil revenue 
issues.  In January, Salih published two pre-2005 KRG oil 
contracts on the KRG's website (ref B) and has discussed 
possible resolutions with Baghdad in an apparent attempt to 
end-run Hawrami. 
 
IRAQI DPM POSITION AND ELECTION LAW NEGOTIATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Barham Salih vacated the GOI Deputy Prime Minister 
(DPM) position in September 2009 and moved north to assume 
his responsibilities as KRG Prime Minister.  Most PUK 
politicians assumed the DPM position in Baghdad would be 
filled with another PUK leader.  The leader of the Kurdish 
Alliance List (KAL) bloc in the COR, Fuad Masoum, was 
nominated for and wanted the position; however, Salih was 
instead replaced by senior KDP leader Rowsch Shaways, who was 
voted in by the COR on January 10.  Observers have 
interpreted the move as a sign of the KDP's strength relative 
to the diminished PUK. 
 
¶7.  (C) In another sign that the KDP has become less reticent 
about flexing its political muscle, the November-December 
2009 election law negotiations culminated in President 
Barzani ostensibly delegating authority to a delegation led 
by Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) Speaker Kamal Kirkuki 
(KDP).  PUK parliamentary leaders Fuad Masoum, Friad 
Rwanduzi, and Khalid Schwany were mortified when Kirkuki, 
working closely with several IKP parliamentarians from Goran 
who accompanied Kirkuki to Baghdad, pressured PUK 
representatives on an election law compromise.  Rwanduzi was 
sharply critical, claiming "Kirkuki has no business in 
Baghdad - he has a small brain and is unable to think beyond 
the borders of his small office!"  PUK-KDP tensions flared. 
Rwanduzi and Kirkuki are at odds and exchanging barbs in the 
press. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8.  (C) If, as appears increasingly likely, a constitutional 
amendment is not adopted to extend the veto power of the GOI 
President into the next administration, PUK insiders have 
told us the Kurds may not fight for Talabani to keep the 
presidency.  The KAL may instead bargain it away for what 
would be the more powerful position of COR Speaker.  Such a 
development would take Talabani out of the game in Baghdad 
and further diminish the PUK's status in Kurdistan and in 
relation to the KDP.  However, in a sign that Barzani may be 
nervous about losing Talabani as a strategic partner and 
national-level figure of stability, Barzani confidante Rowsch 
Shaways told Emboffs on February 1 that Talabani had 
definitively decided he wanted the presidency and that 
Barzani would support him for it. Nonetheless, a number of 
Kurdish politicians have told us they dread the upcoming 
government formation process, especially since the PUK and 
KDP have not agreed on whom they would support for the Prime 
Minister position. 
 
¶9. (C) Adding further strain to the PUK-KDP partnership is 
uncertainty about how many seats the PUK and Goran may win in 
the national elections.  Goran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa told 
Qthe national elections.  Goran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa told 
Ambassador on January 26 that he predicted Goran would take 
about 15 of the 60-odd seats the Kurds expected to win, while 
the PUK would take 8-10, and the KDP at least 30 seats. 
Other observers have told us they expect Goran and the PUK to 
take roughly the same number of seats.  Rowsch Shaways 
insisted that the KDP would continue to adhere to its 
strategic partnership with the PUK, even if the latter failed 
to win as many seats as Goran.  However, such a result could 
call into question the logic of continuing to divide national 
Kurdish leadership positions evenly between the PUK and KDP. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: The absence of a high-level PUK 
representative in the KRG delegation that met POTUS on 
January 25 is evidence of the imbalance of power between KDP 
and PUK.  There is palpable tension within the KDP-PUK 
alliance and some argue that the PUK's demise is imminent; 
however, much will depend on how the PUK performs against 
Goran in the March 7 elections.  In the interim, both Barzani 
and Talabani recognize that the fight for Kurdish interests 
is in Baghdad, and that presenting a unified front to the GOI 
allows them to play the familiar role of kingmaker in most 
political deals of consequence.  Moreover, the KDP and PUK 
need each other in the IKP, where Goran's message of reform 
and transparency resonate, especially with younger voters (of 
whom there are many).  In the IKR, politics is business and 
business is politics.  For Barzani, Talabani and the PUK - 
who have born the brunt of Goran's criticism of traditional 
Kurdish politics - are useful buffers against calls for 
change.  Losing Talabani and the PUK as partners would compel 
Barzani and the KDP to reach a modus vivendi with Goran - 
whom it does not see as a natural partner - to preserve the 
heft of the Kurdish bloc in national politics. END COMMENT. 
HILL