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DE RUEHTH #0117 0491730
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O R 181730Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1551
INFO RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0018
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 
TAGS: PTER KTFN KCRM KHLS ECPS ECON PREL KPAO KTIA EUN GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
INFORMATION-SHARING AND DATA PRIVACY ISSUES WITH EUROPE 
 
REF: STATE 8403; BERLIN 128 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah McCarthy, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Greeks are concerned about the privacy of data 
involved in law enforcement and counterterrorism information 
sharing with the U.S., as would be expected in a country with 
privacy laws that are significantly stronger than the European 
norm.  Nevertheless, it is possible to engage in low-visibility and 
necessary cooperation with Greece, as evidenced by the Greek 
government's signing of HSPD-6 and PCSC agreements in 2009, which 
we required for Greece to be eligible for the Visa Waiver Program 
(VWP).  Parliament ratified these agreements with support from both 
major parties - the then-governing center-right New Democracy party 
and the now-governing center-left PASOK party - despite criticism 
from smaller parties.  In general, mainstream Greek parties are not 
doctrinaire on these issues, though they try to be careful to 
minimize domestic political risk, and they do sometimes 
opportunistically align themselves with larger countries within the 
EU that take hard-line positions on certain data privacy issues. 
We do not believe, however, that most Greek governments or Greek 
MEPs would be willing to be the decisive holdout in blocking 
U.S.-EU information sharing.  Following up on ref A demarche, we 
will continue to work with key Greek policy makers to ensure that 
they understand the benefits of law enforcement and 
counterterrorism information sharing and the flaws in some of the 
most common arguments against it.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) We shared ref A nonpaper February 5 with the Greek 
government's point of contact for counterterrorism, MFA D1 
(International Organizations) Directorate Counselor Dimitris 
Papandreou, who disseminated it to relevant colleagues within the 
government.  We shared and discussed the paper February 17 with 
Ministry of Justice advisor on EU issues Iota Karatzaferi.  We also 
reached out to selected Greek MEPs February 8 to express our 
position on the February 11 European Parliament vote on the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).  The response from these 
contacts was positive, as is generally the case when we engage 
Greek officials on these subjects. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Nevertheless, suspicion of information sharing programs such 
as these is an ingrained part of contemporary Greek political 
culture, as a result of the high priority Greek governments have 
put on privacy rights following the 1967-1974 junta period.  This 
has left Greece with some of the most restrictive privacy laws in 
Europe, including a prohibition on the video recording of any 
individuals in a public space for any reason other than traffic 
control.  These laws - though weakened in some areas by the 
previous government in a package of legislative amendments passed 
in June 2009 - continue to cause real problems for Greek law 
enforcement.  But despite the legal and political biases in favor 
of an extreme view of privacy rights, Greek officials generally 
take a much more nuanced view when it comes to concrete areas of 
international cooperation.  They tend to be open to reasonable 
arguments, and at a  fundamental level they are unwilling to take 
any position that would put them on their own - either isolating 
their party on the unpopular side of high-profile political debate 
within Greece or isolating Greece in an internal EU debate. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Embassy will continue to engage key Greek officials 
and opinion leaders, including MEPs with their new importance under 
the Lisbon Treaty in ratifying agreements, to stress the successful 
track record and the data privacy safeguards of existing 
information sharing mechanisms.  We noted that a U.S. team of data 
privacy experts recently visited Brussels and perhaps other 
European capitals to engage on these issues (ref B), and we believe 
such a visit to Greece could serve a useful educational purpose for 
elites in the major parties and opinion circles.  Many Greeks are 
instinctively suspicious of information-sharing programs, and this 
is likely to remain a political fact of life for a long time, but 
it does not have to be an obstacle to important U.S.-EU programs as 
long as we take the time to educate key Greek decision makers well 
in advance of crucial deadlines. 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) Embassy Athens POC is Alan Purcell, PurcellAS@state.gov. 
MCCARTHY