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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
PASS TO FOLLOWING SECDEF OFFICE 
//USDP/DSCA-MEAN//ISA-DESA// 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03 
TAGS: MARR MOPS MASS PREL AE
SUBJECT: Country Team Assessment for Transfer Advanced Anti-Radiation 
Guided Missile (AARGM). 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD G. OLSON, JR, AMBASSADOR; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), 
(C) 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject:  (u) Country Team Assessment for Transfer Advanced 
Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). 
 
 
 
Ref: (u) Ref A UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/112 dated 27 Jan 09 
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case 
AE-P-AAM.  Ref B. UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/113 dated 27 Jan 09 
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case 
AE-P-AAM. Ref C UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/116 dated 6 April 2009 
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case 
AE-P-AAM. 
 
 
 
¶1.  (u) Classified by Ambassador Richard G. Olson, reasons 1.4 
(a),(b), and (d). 
 
 
 
¶2.  (u) Summary.  The armed forces of the United Arab Emirates 
requested a LOA for the transfer of advanced anti radiation guided 
missiles (AARGM) to consider for purchase.  The AARGM transforms 
the agm-88 harm from a single function 
Suppression-of-Enemy-Air-Defense (SEAD) role to a multi-mission 
weapon capable of both Destruction-of-Enemy-Air-Defense (DEAD) and 
strike capabilities.  The weapon consists of the following: 
autonomous emitter detection and id, autonomous target geolocation, 
versatile dual mode seeker, lethal active terminal guidance, 
gps/ins precision with collateral damage control capability, and 
data-link support for battle damage assessment.  AARGM provides a 
lethal capability against current and projected integrated air 
defenses and time critical strike targets.  The weapon complement 
other U.S. systems the UAE has or is currently acquiring.  The 
system requested would be employed from F-16 block 60 aircraft, 
which currently use the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) 
missile, operated by the UAE. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (u) The following country team assessment is provided in 
support of the UAE request for AARGM missiles, associated 
equipment, and training.   This assessment supports the release of 
the full capability of the system to the UAE to include the ability 
to engage the maximum number of threats releasable to foreign AARGM 
partners. The UAE has not requested a quantity, but two-hundred 
(200) has been mentioned. 
 
 
 
    a.  (c) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services. 
The UAE views this system as a crucial requirement to defend its 
military and civilian air, sea, and ground assets and critical 
infrastructure  in the event of an attack by enemy forces. The 
AARGM provides superior destruction of enemy air defenses 
capability above the legacy High speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) system 
currently in the UAE inventory.  It will provide a significant 
improvement to the UAE capability when combined with the F-16 block 
60 aircraft in support of allied operations. The intended users of 
AARGM will be the UAE Air Force and Air Defense. 
 
 
 
    b.  (c) How the articles or services would affect the 
recipient's force structure.  AARGM is anticipated to be fielded 
with significant improvement in capability but have minimal effect 
on force structure.  It will compliment or replace the UAE 
 
 
inventory of HARM. 
 
 
 
    c.  (c) How the articles or services would contribute to both 
the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals.  The AARGM is 
a logical addition to the existing defense systems that UAE has 
been operating for several years and is procuring.  AARGM is 
interoperable with U.S. equipment.  It would have the immediate 
ability to augment U.S. actions in the region by bolstering defense 
for co-located U.S. and UAE forces at Al Dhafra, Minhad, and 
Fujairah Air Bases and at the ports of Jebal Ali and Fujairah. 
UAE Special Operations Forces also serve alongside U.S. Forces in 
Afghanistan.  AARGM missiles would serve to minimize collateral 
damage compared to HARM. AARGM will enhance overall defense 
capability in the GCC Region. 
 
 
 
    d.  (c) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or 
services requested.  The UAE has not submitted an LOR specifically 
requesting a quantity. Based on discussion with us industry, the 
UAE may request two hundred (200) AARGM missiles, associated 
equipment, and training. This is justified by the number of 
critical locations that are in the United Arab Emirates. 
 
The country team supports this transfer request as appropriate 
based on the threat and the defensive cover the UAE could provide. 
 
 
 
 
    e.  (c) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction 
of a new warfighting capability to the nation or region. As the 
CENTCOM representative, USLO concurs with the introduction of this 
capability to UAE.  The AARGM would bolster UAE defense and that of 
co-located U.S. Forces in the UAE.  The AARGM capability would be a 
useful compliment for CENTCOM CONPLANs. 
 
 
 
    f. (c) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations.  As this 
represents a defensive system, there are no anticipated reactions 
from neighboring nations. 
 
 
 
  g.  (c) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles.  Having 
signed a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of 
Agreement (CISMOA signed in 2001), a General Security of Military 
Information Agreement (GSOMIA signed in 1987), and a Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) case for U.S. communication security 
custodians, the UAE has the required agreements and doctrine in 
place for the security of U.S. classified material.  The UAE 
continues to demonstrate its capability to provide the required 
security for classified items released to the UAE. It is 
anticipated that the UAE will continue to provide the required 
level of security and maintenance for these articles.  Early trends 
are developing with regard to timely payments, LOA processing, and 
response to vital program management correspondence that would 
indicate the UAE is having difficulty handling the exponential FMS 
program growth.  While the situation is under control at this time 
there is potential to degrade the FMS program at large if trends 
worsen. The UAE is aware of these issues and has the resources 
within its control to address them. 
 
 
 
      h. (u) Training required either in-country or in the united 
states and anticipated restrictions resulting from the presence of 
U.S. trainers in-country.  Specialized training either in country 
or in the U.S. is estimated to be minimal, but some specialized 
 
 
training will be required to fully utilize the AARGM's capability. 
AARGM is an upgrade to the HARM system. Since the UAE is already a 
HARM user it is anticipated that only 3 U.S. personnel will be 
required for two years for the implementation of the AARGM system. 
These three would be trainers and as trainers would operate under 
the United States Embassy chief mission. This is not anticipated to 
generate an adverse reaction.  The in-country trainers will require 
NSDD-38 authorization and ICASS support (basic package and housing 
pool at a minimum).  The Ambassador shall remain the authority for 
NSDD-38 decisions. The AARGM in conjunction with the UAE's 
additional procurements cannot be supported within the existing 
U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi.  Approving this system is contingent 
upon further interagency progress on creating a new platform to 
support expanded defense cooperation programs. 
 
 
 
    i. (u) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that 
might be required as a result of providing the article.  In concert 
with other programs at or near implementation there will be 
additional U.S. presence in country.  Several technical 
representatives may be required on a TDY basis to implement and 
sustain this case. It is not anticipated that there will be a 
significant level of in-country U.S. presence caused by 
incorporation of the AARGM alone. 
 
 
 
    j. (u) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition.  This transfer will be funded by a FMS, DCS 
or a hybrid case and there is no anticipated economic impact to the 
UAE.  While not untouched by the global economic downturn, the UAE 
is still able to fund major civil and defense projects and 
purchases.   The UAE FMS Management shortfalls may soon necessitate 
that they direct and fund a reasonable increase for management. 
The UAE is a cash customer. 
 
 
 
    k  (u) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed 
acquisition.  There are no human rights considerations relevant to 
the proposed acquisition. 
 
 
 
    l. (u) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced 
war fighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance 
verification.  End use monitoring (EUM) and compliance verification 
will be conducted in accordance with current regulations, 
directives, and guidelines.  USLO UAE currently has an end use 
monitoring program in place with the UAE armed forces which 
includes AIM-120 AMRAAM and RGM-84 Harpoon Block II missiles 
previously acquired by the UAE.  This acquisition would increase 
the number of EUM items for accountability.  The USLO is at the 
minimum manning level needed to conduct effective EUM. 
 
 
 
    m. (c) Recommendations whether the USG should approve transfer 
of the article and justification.  The country team recommends that 
the acquisition of the AARGM be approved.  Consideration should be 
given to requiring additional UAE funded management for this case 
and the group of cases related to air defense that are about to be 
implemented.  If unwilling to demand a UAE-funded improvement, then 
a U.S. funded improvement is highly recommended to preserve program 
integrity and the us relationship with the UAE.  AARGM is a logical 
addition to the existing and planned improvements to the UAE 
defensive structure.  The U.S. operates extensively from UAE ports 
and air fields and would receive the immediate benefit of this 
defense system as a result. 
 
 
¶4.  (c) The country team supports the UAE request for transfer of 
AARGM and associated items named in the request.  The country team 
recommends that the release of this system be completed in order to 
augment the UAE with the introduction of its defense system. 
 
 
 
¶5.     (u) USLO primary point of contact is LtCol Jeff Hancock, 
USMC.  Comm tel:  971 (2) 414-2504, STE III: 971 (2) 414-2382, 
siprnet hancocjg@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil .  Alternate contact Maj 
Troy Alexander, USA. Comm tel:  971 (2) 414-2637, STE III: 971 (2) 
414-2382, siprnet alexandertv@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil . Cpt Mathew 
Paulick, USA. Comm tel:  971 (2) 414-2298, STE III: 971 (2) 
414-2308, siprnet paulicmh@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil. 
OLSON