VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRO #0025/01 0111643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111643Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3090

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC XI XG IT
SUBJECT: THREAT OF KIDNAPPING IN MAGHREB 
 
REF: SECSTATE 769 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Barbara A. Leaf, 
 Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Poloff delivered reftel points to Massimiliano 
D'Antuono, Deputy Director of the Italian MFA's Unita di 
crisi, Italy's "ops center" or situation room equivalent. 
 
¶2. (U)  With regard to travel warnings, D'Antuono said that 
Italy has issued alerts via the MFA website recommending 
against travel to Mauritania, Niger and certain areas of Mali 
(in the north of the country, and near the borders with 
Algeria, Niger and Mauritania). 
 
¶3. (SBU)  D,Antuono noted that this week, FM Frattini is 
undertaking a major Africa trip, which had been long planned 
(i.e., planned prior to the kidnapping of Italian tourist 
Sergio Cicala, 64, and his Burkina Faso-born wife, Philomene 
Kabouree, on December 20).  The only change to the program in 
recent days was the addition of Mali to the visit.  Frattini 
will be traveling to Mauritania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, 
Uganda and Tunis (where he will visit the gravesite of former 
PM Bettino Craxi on January 19th, the tenth anniversary of 
his death).  Frattini's visit will include the signing of 
agreements concerning development assistance for both 
Mauritania and Mali.  (In the press, Frattini has 
characterized his Africa trip as focused on defending Italy's 
national interests and resolving the problem of illegal 
immigration "at the roots," and said on January 11 from 
Nouakchott that he "will do everything possible for the 
release of the Italian as well as the other hostages," but 
would not provide details because the kidnappers are 
"probably tied to Al Qaeda.") 
 
Recovering Italian Hostages 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Regarding Italian activities to recover the kidnapped 
citizens, D'Antuono said GOI Ambassadors 
have spoken with the governments of Burkino Faso, Mali and 
Mauritania, and that the GOI is very active in pursuing the 
hostages' release.  Based on the experiences of Spain and the 
UK, and on advice from these countries, he said the GOI is 
attempting to work through only one country, Mali, which is 
where the GOI believes the tourists are currently being held 
(based on information gleaned from Al Qaeda-related 
websites), and is attempting to get the Malian government to 
coordinate on this issue with the government of Mauritania. 
Getting the two countries to coordinate is, he commented, "a 
difficult task," but this is the strategy being pursued based 
on the advice of Spain and the UK.   D'Antuono said the GOI 
has had no direct contact with the kidnappers or the 
kidnapped, and noted that Italian intelligence services are 
in direct contact with the intel agencies of both Mali and 
Mauritania. 
 
Press Blackout is Key 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) D'Antuono emphasized that a key to the GOI strategy is 
to keep the kidnapping out of the press headlines, and noted 
that the families involved now understand the importance of 
this.  He said that if the kidnappers "perceived weakness" on 
the part of the Italian government, the situation would turn 
into a "nightmare."  Therefore the GOI strategy is to avoid 
escalation through any type of "media standoff." 
 
 
Italy Firmly Opposed to Ransoms but Wants "Flexibility" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (C) Poloff delivered points regarding the making of 
concessions to terrorists or hostage takers; D'Antuono 
insisted the GOI was firmly against such practices.  FM 
Frattini has said in recent statements that "anyone who has 
anything to do with terrorists helps them," and that "even if 
we were to say 'we'll talk' just this one time, we would be 
legitimizing a terrorist organization."  Nonetheless, 
D'Antuono said, the GOI resisted signing the proposed G8 
statement against kidnapping because it believes that in 
such situations, "maintaining flexibility" is crucial, and 
that the notion of what constitutes "ransom" is not entirely 
clear. 
 
¶7. (C) D'Antuono shared four maps (which he said were 
classified though they are not marked) concerning the hostage 
situation and the activities of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. 
Poloff will provide these maps to relevant USG agencies at 
post. 
 
¶8. (SBU) D'Antuono was not familiar with the "Festival du 
Desert," but took note of the information and the 
Department's concerns. 
DIBBLE