Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10PRISTINA47, KOSOVO: SERBIAN MINISTERS CHALLENGE OFFICIAL VISITS POLICY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10PRISTINA47.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10PRISTINA47 2010-01-28 17:11 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pristina
VZCZCXRO0620
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHPS #0047/01 0281711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281711Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9658
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1335
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1873
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PGI, INL, DRL, PRM, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SR KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBIAN MINISTERS CHALLENGE OFFICIAL VISITS POLICY 
 
REF: PRISTINA 25 
 
PRISTINA 00000047  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Recent travel by Serbian government ministers to 
Kosovo in contravention of the EU's official visits policy is a 
direct challenge to the GOK and the EU.  The official visits policy 
provides for GOK approval unless there are indications visits might 
be abused for political purposes, and involves the Quint and EU in 
the decision-making process.  The procedure in place since March 
2009 has been largely successful to-date: of 112 visits requested, 
103 were approved.  GOS officials have challenged the policy by 
traveling to Kosovo without prior permission.   Measured against the 
established procedures the GOS objections to the visit procedure are 
baseless.  We are concerned by rumors the GOS is planning to flood 
the GOK with official visit requests to break the system and by the 
GOK's propensity to shoot itself in the foot when it moves to 
intercept a Serb official in Kosovo without permission.  We will 
work with the GOK and EUSR to prevent over-reactions.  We urge 
similar efforts be made by Washington and Belgrade to discourage the 
latter from escalating the issue further.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SERBIAN GOVERNMENT MINISTERS CHALLENGE VISITS POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (SBU) The arrest and subsequent expulsion from Kosovo on January 
26 of Serbian Assistant Minister for Kosovo, Branislav Ristic, by 
Kosovo Police (KP) in Dresnik/Drsnik village, Kline/Klina 
Municipality, is the latest in a series of attempts by Serbian 
government officials to challenge a European Union-brokered policy 
on Government of Serbia (GOS) official visitors to Kosovo.  Ristic's 
detention follows the expulsion from Kosovo of Serbian Minister 
Goran Bogdanovic on January 13 (Ref A) while on an unapproved 
official visit to Shtrpce/Strpce municipality. 
 
BACKGROUND: AGREEMENT ON GOS VISIT PROCEDURES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On January 28, the office of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) shared with us the nine point agreement used 
by EU offices for handling requests from GOS officials to visit 
Kosovo.  The full text follows: 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
-- 1) The following procedure could be applied to official visitors 
of the Government of Serbia to the Republic of Kosovo. 
 
-- 2) The Government of Serbia should inform the EU Office in 
Belgrade about planned visits of government officials to Kosovo at 
least 72 hrs before entering Kosovo. 
 
-- 3) The EU Office in Belgrade forwards this request to the 
ICR/EUSR.  A copy will be send to the HOM of EULEX for information. 
 
-- 4) The request should be forwarded by the ICR/EUSR to the Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Kosovo. 
 
-- 5) The Government of Kosovo takes the decision on the request. 
In the process of reaching a decision, it may ask the ICR/EUSR or 
other members of the international community for further advice. 
 
-- 6) The Government of Kosovo will take its decision based on a 
clear statement of the purpose of the visit and assuming there are 
no strong indications that the visit might be abused for political 
propaganda or in any other inappropriate way. 
 
-- 7) The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister informs the Ministry 
of Interior of the Government of Kosovo of its decision; the 
Ministry of Interior will then inform the Kosovo Police of the 
upcoming visit and ensures that appropriate measures for the 
visitor's security are taken. 
 
-- 8) The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister should also no later 
 
PRISTINA 00000047  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
than 24 hours in advance of the scheduled visit inform the ICR/EUSR 
of the decision. The ICR/EUSR will forward the decision to the EU 
Office in Belgrade.  The HOM of EULEX will receive a copy of this 
communication. 
 
-- 9) If there are indications that the planned visit involves 
serious security risks, and the Kosovo government nevertheless 
agrees to such a visit, EULEX stands ready to provide an escort for 
the visitors. The decision on the need to escort visitors is taken 
by the HOM of EULEX, upon request by the Government of Kosovo. 
 
END TEXT 
 
VISIT PROCEDURES VIEWED FROM KOSOVO 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The EUSR Office in Pristina told us the nine points had 
been tacitly accepted by all parties in March 2009 as a modest 
framework for GOS official visits, after months of unsuccessful 
talks.  The procedures apply to all official GOS visitors to Kosovo, 
and make no mention of rank, status or citizenship.  In practice as 
a matter of course the EUSR automatically forwards requests that are 
sensitive in nature to Quint embassies and KFOR for their advice as 
representatives of the "international community."  As laid out in 
the nine points, the GOK bases its decision on the visit's purpose 
and whether there are indications the visit might be abused for 
political purposes.  If the visit is approved, the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kosovo Police (KP) are informed of the decision in 
order to make security arrangements, if necessary.  The EUSR office 
told us the GOS had not signed the framework, but had never pushed 
back either, and had made use of the procedures for GOS officials on 
20 occasions since March 18, 2009.  (NOTE: Although not listed 
specifically in the nine points, persons or groups who are not GOS 
officials but who wish to have a KP or EULEX police escort, such as 
religious pilgrims, also use the procedure.  END NOTE) 
 
SERBIA'S USE OF THE PROCEDURE 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Since March 18, 2009 the GOS has submitted 112 visit 
requests under this procedure, including 20 for official GOS 
visitors.  Of 112 applications, 103 were approved by the GOK while 
nine were denied.  Seven official visits have been denied by the GOK 
because GOS officials had made statements that suggested their trip 
would encompass untoward political activities.  The two other 
disapproved visits were for groups of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) to Gjakova/Djakovica, an area heavily affected by the 1999 
conflict, following interventions by the mayor, who asserted that 
the population had to be prepared for such visits and was not yet 
ready to receive Serb IDPs. 
 
NATURE OF VISIT       APPROVED      DENIED 
---------------       --------      ------ 
Serbian Officials        13            7 
IDPs                      9            2 
Pilgrims                 54            0 
Students/NGOs/others     25            0 
Serbian Orthodox Church   2            0 
 
TADIC AT CHRISTMAS: AN EXAMPLE OF HOW IT CAN WORK 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6. (SBU) Serbian President Tadic's Orthodox Christmas visit to 
Visoki Decani Monastery in Kosovo provides an example of how the GOK 
tried to balance between a legitimate GOS request that could also be 
used for overtly political and anti-GOK purposes.  Tadic's official 
request stated he wished to travel to Decani in the Christmas spirit 
to attend mass, and to visit Serb returnees in the village of 
Osojane.  Before the GOK's approval, Tadic announced his trip 
publicly, treating the visit procedures as notification only, and 
stating he was visiting Kosovo to "fight for the province."  The 
statement was viewed as unacceptably political and was clearly at 
odds with the stated purpose of the visit.  The EUSR's office told 
us COMKFOR had argued that Tadic's request should be denied as a 
 
PRISTINA 00000047  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
consequence.  However, the Kosovars accepted the recommendation of 
the EUSR and Quint not to deny the whole visit but rather to agree 
to the visit to Decani.  In the end the GOK agreed to an overnight 
visit to the Monastery without the side trip to Osojane. 
 
RESPONDING TO SERBIAN OBJECTIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In a letter to the EUSR office in Belgrade (shared with us 
by EUSR Pristina) and in public statements, GOS officials raised 
several objections to GOK actions with regard to visits.  Both the 
EUSR and the Quint found that these objections are baseless in view 
of the established SOPs.  The objections, and our responses, 
include: 
 
-- The procedures do not apply to GOS deputy or assistant ministers. 
 RESPONSE: The EUSR's nine points do not mention rank, and apply to 
all GOS officials even if they are minor officials; 
 
-- GOS staff are also Kosovo residents and may thus travel to Kosovo 
as they please.  RESPONSE: The EUSR's nine points do not mention 
citizenship/residence, and apply to all GOS officials entering 
Kosovo on official business for Belgrade, even if they are Kosovo 
citizens or residents.  To the best of our knowledge, the GOK has 
never attempted to apply these procedures to non-official visits. 
Indeed, many Belgrade officials with homes in Kosovo appear to 
travel here routinely (although no one attempts to track such 
visits). 
 
-- GOS ministers have travelled to Kosovo in the past without 
following the procedure.  RESPONSE: Prior travel without GOK 
authorization does not amount to GOK consent.  Success at 
circumventing the established procedure does not legitimize the 
circumvention. 
 
-- Visits are private in nature.  RESPONSE: See above.  However, 
when Minister Bogdanovic was asked to leave Shtrpce/Strpce he 
claimed to be on a private visit, but in fact had just visited a 
GOS-funded school and met with representatives of the illegal 
parallel structures in his official capacity.  Bogdanovic's claim is 
not truthful. 
 
-- Serbia does not recognize the procedures or only views them as 
requiring notification by the GOS of planned visits.  RESPONSE: 
During the January 26, 2010 EU-GOS Ministerial in Brussels Serbian 
Foreign Minister Jeremic did not deny the procedure's existence or 
substance.  Rather he asked for changes ostensibly intended to 
improve the process.  This, as well as President Tadic's decision 
both to use the procedure and to abide by the conditions set by the 
GOK, is a de facto recognition of both the procedure and the need 
for approval. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) ICO sources tell us the EUSR's office in Belgrade has heard 
rumors the GOS plans to attack the official visit procedures by 
submitting a flood of requests for visits by GOS personnel and 
hoping the GOK flounders.  A spate of GOK visit denials would make 
the GOS allegation that the procedure is not working appear to be 
founded, and bolster GOS attempts to skirt the procedure.  We 
believe the procedures are fair, transparent, and benefit both the 
GOK and the GOS.  Abandoning them or allowing GOS officials to 
travel without asking permission from the GOK risks hindering 
legitimate and necessary travel from Serbia to Kosovo.  The number 
of successful approvals shows the procedures have been a success 
when followed, including on two occasions for President Tadic. 
While approving visits by the Serbian president is likely to remain 
politically difficult for the GOK, the existing procedures provide 
for approval when the visit is appropriate.  We will work with the 
GOK and EUSR to prevent over-reactions, and ensure the visits 
procedure operates transparently and efficiently, including when GOS 
officials must be respectfully escorted back to the border for 
non-compliance.  We urge similar efforts be made by Washington and 
 
PRISTINA 00000047  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Belgrade to discourage the GOS from escalating the issue further. 
END COMMENT. 
 
DELL