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DE RUEHNJ #0063/01 0291059
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O 291059Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7643
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY UN CD
SUBJECT: CHAD AND UN NEGOTIATING MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL 
OPTIONS: IMPACT ON USG INTERESTS IN CHAD 
 
REF: A. PARIS 084 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 049 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 048 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 043 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
----------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (C) MG Cammaert, head of the UN Technical Assessment 
Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension with the GOC, told Perm 
Five ambassadors here Jan 28 that his initial conversations 
with his GOC counterparts indicated that the GOC insisted on 
a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal in accordance with UNSC 
1861" for their discussions, and that he was prepared to 
discuss "options for withdrawal" on that basis.  The French 
and U.S. ambassadors offered advice on how best to approach 
the Chadians on MINURCAT issues, noting President Deby's 
personal protagonism on these issues, the need to respect the 
GOC's sovereign engagements under UNSC 1861, the 
inadvisability of trying to defend MINURCAT's shortcomings, 
and the wisdom of presenting the MINURCAT case positively 
with the GOC.  SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying 
that the question was no longer "the future of MINURCAT" but 
"the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the drawdown of 
MINURCAT forces," while managing the withdrawal scenario to 
consolidate results. "We are passing the ball to the 
Chadians," Angelo said, and called special attention to the 
CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an important element in 
its national security in NE CAR.  FORMIN Faki departed the 
morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect that the GOF 
will be pressing French concerns regarding MINURCAT on him. 
Cammaert is scheduled to outbrief the Perm Five, including 
the non-resident UK ambassador, on February 1. 
 
¶2.  (C)  USG interests in Chad would be served by a 
well-planned and well-executed graduated withdrawal over a 
timeline sufficient to consolidate MINURCAT goals regarding 
security of civilians in eastern Chad, human rights, and 
judicial and penal reform.  A timeline of six to 12 months 
would be adequate, especially if there were flexibility 
regarding the longer limit.  The future of the DIS is in 
doubt, partly because of its funding from the Trust Fund 
rather than assessed contribution.  If there is a way that 
the DIS could be preserved in the context of a negotiated 
MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until MINURCAT's definitive 
departure, this would be desirable.  A mechanism for 
extending DIS's institutional life beyond that limit would be 
even more useful. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Cammaert Mission's best chances for success here 
lie in finding a formula for withdrawal that respects the 
goals of UNSC 1861 and provides for the most orderly handing 
over of MINURCAT responsibilities to the Chadian Government. 
If Cammaert can convince the GOC that the UN is acting in 
good faith to make the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a 
positive outcome for the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline 
established for that transition could be long enough to 
ensure that MINURCAT's goals under UNSCR 1861 have been 
advanced as far as the situation in eastern Chad permits. 
 
¶4.  (C)  We do not agree completely with the GOF view (Ref A) 
that "significant numbers of NGOs and their personnel might 
consider leaving Chad if MINURCAT disappeared."  NGOs in Chad 
appear to us to be indicating that, while reductions in 
activities and personnel may be in order, it is not 
MINURCAT,s departure that is driving the calculation, but 
rather the inability or unwillingness of any security force, 
foreign or Chadian, to confront the primary threats they 
face, namely, armed robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping, 
and other deadly threats.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
---------------- 
CAMMAERT MISSION 
---------------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000063  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Major General Patrick Cammaert, head of the UN 
Technical Assessment Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension 
with the GOC, told Perm Five ambassadors here January 28 that 
his initial conversations with his GOC counterparts indicated 
that the GOC insisted on a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal 
in accordance with UNSC 1861" for their discussions and that 
he was prepared to discuss "options for withdrawal" on that 
basis.  Cammaert said that he could envisage several 
scenarios, all with more or less favorable consequences for 
the GOC and the situation in eastern Chad, including security 
there.  Cammaert said that he would stress to the Chadians 
the importance of a well-planned handover of MINURCAT's 
responsibilities to the GOC in any withdrawal scenario. 
Cammaert said that an "immediate withdrawal" would create the 
most problems, but that he had not detected a desire for such 
an immediate scenario from his initial discussions with GOC 
interlocutors.  Cammaert said some sort of "progressive 
withdrawal" would be a preferable scenario, perhaps with 
MINURCAT's civilian- and police-related functions becoming 
more important than military ones as the withdrawal 
proceeded. 
 
--------------- 
PERM FIVE VIEWS 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The French and U.S. ambassadors offered Perm Five 
perceptions of the current situation to Cammaert.  They noted 
that the question of MINURCAT extension was from the Chadian 
side a presidential initiative, which limited the GOC side's 
flexibility in any talks.  They stressed that the GOC was 
represented by Chadian military chiefs, who were increasingly 
effective in defending the country's security from external 
threat.  They said that the GOC had legitimate grievances 
regarding MINURCAT's performance which would have to be 
weighed carefully against Chad's sovereign engagements under 
UNSCR 1861.  They cautioned against trying to defend 
MINURCAT's shortcomings, and stressed the wisdom of 
presenting MINURCAT's case positively with the GOC, that is, 
underlining the benefits that an orderly and well-planned 
withdrawal scenario would bring to the GOC. 
 
¶7.  (C) The French ambassador stressed his view that the GOC 
was greatly underestimating the chances for a stable 
relationship with Sudan, which was entering a period of 
potentially huge internal instability to begin with.  He also 
underlined that the Chadian police component of MINURCAT, the 
DIS, could cease to exist without MINURCAT's support. 
Finally, he said that additional troop deployments should 
cease after March 15, 2010, because that would be a GOC sine 
qua non in any "withdrawal scenario." 
 
¶8.  (C) The positive side of the issue, the French ambassador 
continued, was that the GOC wanted to avoid a disorganized 
MINURCAT withdrawal and that the Chadian side understood the 
technical challenges that even a well-planned and structured 
withdrawal would present. The French ambassador said that 
Cammaert's mission could be successful if it kept in mind the 
broader political framework in which it conducted its 
technical discussions.  This meant exploiting the room that 
the GOC had left for maneuver carefully by stressing the 
benefits that would accrue to the GOC from a well-planned and 
"progressive" withdrawal scenario with a timeline 
sufficiently long to permit effective implementation of good 
planning.  It meant also to present the preferred option as a 
"win/win" scenario in which the GOC would be "guaranteed" 
that legitimate Chadian grievances were addressed. 
 
----------- 
SRSG ANGELO 
----------- 
 
¶9.  (C) SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying that 
the issue for decision was no longer "the future of MINURCAT" 
but "the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the 
drawdown of MINURCAT forces."  For the UN and MINURCAT, the 
important thing should now be "results," rather than "force 
 
NDJAMENA 00000063  003 OF 004 
 
 
figures," he continued.  "Our numbers must start to come 
down," Angelo announced, with his Force Commander at his 
side, visibly unhappy at this prospect.  The task now was to 
manage the withdrawal scenario as effectively as possible, 
with timing and consolidation key elements.  "We are passing 
the ball to the Chadians," Angelo said, and called special 
attention to the CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an 
important element in its national security in NE CAR. 
 
-------------------------- 
SEEKING HUMANITARIAN VIEWS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The Cammaert Mission also met January 27 with agency 
heads and deputies from the UN Country Team, followed 
separately by members of the Interagency Steering Committee 
(IASC), led by OCHA, with participation from humanitarian 
NGOs and non-UN IOs, as well as invited donors, including 
State/PRM.  In the meeting with IASC, Cammaert declined to 
brief on the current situation, asking instead for 
humanitarians' views on "what will happen if MINURCAT 
leaves."  NGOs declined to be drawn into speculation, noting 
only that the simple size of MINURCAT,s force meant its 
absence would be felt, though they could not predict how. 
MSF noted that it had been working along the Sudan border in 
areas where MINURCAT did not operate, and so the PKO,s 
presence or absence had not been relevant to the 
organization's activities.  The International Committee of 
the Red Cross pointed out that its staff had been victims of 
kidnappings despite MINURCAT,s deployment to Chad.  NGOs 
working in refugee and IDP camps within MINURCAT,s areas of 
operation noted that a more reasonable understanding of 
MINURCAT,s real capacities, faced with the threat of 
entrenched criminality vice rebel incursion, had led them to 
reassess their deployment in the field; some were planning to 
reduce activities and staffs regardless of MINURCAT,s fate. 
 
-------------------- 
FORMIN FAKI TO PARIS 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) We learned after the meeting that GOC FORMIN Faki 
departed the morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect 
that the GOF will be pressing French concerns regarding 
MINURCAT to him. 
 
---------------- 
MISSION OUTBRIEF 
FEBRUARY 1 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) General Cammaert is scheduled to brief the Perm 
Five, including the non-resident UK ambassador, on February 
1, at the end of his mission. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C) USG interests in Chad:  Our interests would be 
served by a well-planned and well-executed graduated 
withdrawal over a timeline sufficient to consolidate 
MINURCAT's goals regarding security of civilians in eastern 
Chad, human rights, and judicial and penal reform.  A 
timeline of six to 12 months would be adequate, especially if 
there were flexibility regarding the longer limit.  The 
future of the DIS is in doubt, partly because of its funding 
from the Trust Fund rather than assessed contributions.  If 
there is a way that the DIS could be preserved in the context 
of a negotiated MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until 
MINURCAT's definitive departure, this would be desirable.  A 
mechanism for extending DIS's institutional life beyond that 
limit would be even more useful. 
 
¶14.  (C) Success for Cammaert:  The Cammaert Mission's best 
chances for success here lie in finding a formula for 
withdrawal that respects the goals of UNSC 1861 and provides 
for the most orderly handing over of MINURCAT 
 
NDJAMENA 00000063  004 OF 004 
 
 
responsibilities to the Chadian Government.  If Cammaert can 
convince the GOC that the UN is acting in good faith to make 
the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a positive outcome for 
the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline established for that 
transition could be long enough to ensure that MINURCAT's 
goals under UNSCR 1861 have been advanced as far as the 
situation in eastern Chad permits. 
 
¶15.  (C) Humanitarian Assistance Equities:  We do not agree 
completely with the GOF view (Ref A) "significant numbers of 
NGOs and their personnel might consider leaving Chad if 
MINURCAT disappeared."  NGOs in Chad appear to us to be 
indicating that, while reductions in activities and personnel 
may be in order, it is not MINURCAT,s departure that is 
driving the calculation, but rather the inability or 
unwillingness of any security force, foreign or Chadian, to 
confront the primary threats they face, namely, armed 
robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping, and other deadly 
threats.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶16.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO