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Viewing cable 10MUMBAI12, ANTI-MAOIST OPERATIONS IN CHHATTISGARH BEGIN: ACTIVISTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MUMBAI12 2010-01-11 10:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO4629
PP RUEHAST RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHBI #0012/01 0111057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111057Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7669
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8879
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1966
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 2179
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 2907
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY USAID PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 000012 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM ECON EAID EMIN ENRG SOCI PTER IN
SUBJECT: ANTI-MAOIST OPERATIONS IN CHHATTISGARH BEGIN:  ACTIVISTS 
WORRY ABOUT POTENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
REF: A. A. 2008 MUMBAI 325 
     B. B. 2008 MUMBAI 326 
 
MUMBAI 00000012  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1.   (SBU) Summary:  The Indian state is finally getting serious 
about tackling the Maoist insurgency in India's "Red Belt."  As 
it does so, NGOs and human rights activists working in southern 
Chhattisgarh, one of the areas worst affected by Maoist 
violence, are expressing concern that a concentrated, 
coordinated, paramilitary operation against Maoist insurgents - 
dubbed "Operation Green Hunt" by the media - may have a serious 
adverse impact on tribal people living in the area.  While India 
central government officials have downplayed these 
anti-insurgency efforts, state officials in Maharashtra and 
Chhattisgarh have announced aggressive anti-Maoist operations, 
involving police and central paramilitary units.  In tandem, 
state police in Chhattisgarh are also clamping down on access to 
Maoist-affected regions for activists.  NGOs claim that, under 
the guise of security, authorities are attempting to suppress 
reports of potential abuses.  NGO leaders in Chhattisgarh argue 
that the government's emphasis on major infrastructure 
development programs - such as roads, electricity, 
telecommunications, and industrial projects - at the expense of 
basic human development efforts - such as education and health 
-- are exacerbating the insurgency.  Overall, however, the main 
conflict continues to be over the control of land; tribals fear 
that the state plans to forcibly move villages and communities 
to make way for industrial projects, while officials claim that 
tribals have partnered with the violent Maoists.  Human rights 
activists point to potential risks of collateral damage to 
civilians during any expanded operations -- from the police, 
paramilitary troops, and the Maoists - in this poor and remote 
region.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
"Operation Green Hunt?" 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
2. (U) Media reports have indicated since September that the 
Government of India (GOI) plans to launch an anti-Maoist 
initiative, known as "Operation Green Hunt," in the seven states 
most affected by the Maoist insurgency - Maharashtra, 
Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal and Andhra 
Pradesh.  GOI officials have not discussed "Operation Green 
Hunt", but have indicated that a comprehensive approach to the 
Maoist insurgency - especially development efforts - is being 
coordinated with affected states.  Nevertheless, the Indian 
Express claims that 58 paramilitary battalions have been 
deployed to Maoist-affected states, mostly from the Central 
Reserve Police Force (CPRF), with 25 positioned in Chhattisgarh. 
 On January 2, Vishwaranjan, the Chhattisgarh Director General 
of Police, told media that joint operations between the state 
police and units of the Indo-Tibetan Border Forces (ITBF) and 
the Border Security Force (BSF) had begun in Kanker, north of 
Bastar.  These operations, he said, were designed to stabilize 
an area so that development initiatives could be undertaken. 
State police units plan to "intensify" their anti-Maoist 
operations elsewhere in the state.  NGOs and journalists who 
have traveled to the area have not seen signs of increased 
levels of paramilitary forces in these areas, and claim that 
police operations had been underway for months. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) In Maharashtra, State Home Minister R.R. Patil told the 
Legislative Assembly on December 9 that simultaneous operations 
with the Chhattisgarh police will be undertaken in the second 
half of December to flush out Maoists.  In addition, the 
Government of Maharashtra (GOM) heightened security measures for 
the Nagpur Assembly session December 8-December 22, with the 
newly-trained counter-terrorism unit, Force One, guarding the 
Assembly house and the residences of major ministers and 
opposition leaders.  On January 2, the Indian Express reported 
that the Maharashtra police, along with CRPF and other 
paramilitary forces, had launched anti-Maoist operations in the 
forests in Gadchiroli district, on the Chhattisgarh border, in 
order to "flush out" Maoists and cut their supply lines in 
Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh. 
 
 
 
MUMBAI 00000012  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
4. (U) Media reports from Chhattisgarh indicate continued 
low-level Maoist violence, including vehicles damaged by IED 
explosions, skirmishes between Maoists and security personnel, 
leading to a small number of casualties and the suspension of 
iron ore shipments from the Bailadila mines of National Mineral 
Development Corporation from December 2 to 8 during a general 
strike declared by the Maoists (dispatches resumed December 10). 
One NGO activist who was to meet with Congenoff in Raipur 
reported that he was forced off the bus and beaten by Maoists 
who suspected him of being a government sympathizer.  The level 
of sophistication of the Maoist training is beginning to come to 
light.  In the first week of December, a major Maoist leader, 
Rainu, surrendered to the Maharashtra State Police.  He told 
media representatives that in 2001, he received training from a 
Filipino rebel in the jungles of Bastar.  He also claimed to 
have received training from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
at a jungle training camp in Bastar. 
 
 
 
NGOs Fear Tribals Will Be Victims of Anti-Insurgency Efforts 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) The challenges of traveling to remote and 
conflict-ridden areas of southern Chhattisgarh make it difficult 
to assess the realities on the ground; moreover, many of those 
who have visited or tried to visit these areas hold strong, 
biased views, making objective assessments hard to come by.  For 
instance, in recent weeks, several groups of human rights 
activists have alleged that police in southern Chhattisgarh have 
impeded "fact finding" delegations to these areas and arrested 
peaceful tribal protesters.  On a visit to Dantewada in late 
December 2009, noted academic Nandini Sundar claims that police 
harassed her and a colleague, threatened hotel owners to not 
rent them rooms, and assigned armed groups of Special Police 
Officers (SPOs) to follow them, under the ruse of "protection," 
making inquiry into human rights violations difficult. 
Separately, 39 women seeking to investigate claims of rape 
against tribal women claim they were blocked by police from 
travelling to Dantewada.  (Comment:  It is not clear why the 
police stopped these visits and protests; while human rights 
activists allege that the police sought to impair peaceful 
inquiry, there are legitimate security reasons to prohibit 
highly visible travel into the most dangerous parts of 
Chhattisgarh.  The police also have a strong incentive to 
prevent known opponents of the state's approach to anti-Maoist 
operations from roaming freely in these areas.  Either way, the 
state police have been largely successful in preventing human 
rights activists from visiting this region, making it very 
difficult to ascertain what - if any - abuses are occurring. 
End Comment.) 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Indian human 
rights groups continue to voice concern about the risk of 
collateral damage to civilians during these operations.  In 
recent meetings in Raipur, NGOs working in Bastar expressed 
grave concern to Congenoff about the central and state 
governments' plans for a concentrated, coordinated, paramilitary 
operation against Maoist insurgents and its potential impact on 
tribal people living in the area.  According to NGO leaders, in 
Maoist-held areas of Chhattisgarh, villagers face the threat of 
violence from the Maoists, from police operations, and from the 
armed "Special Police Officers" (SPOs) -- villagers armed by the 
state -- and reportedly human rights violations have been 
committed by all three.  Meenakshi Ganguly of HRW warned that 
both the Government and Maoists, claiming to act on behalf of 
India's poor, undermine their legitimacy by committing 
atrocities against the people they claim to defend. "Local 
people are at risk of being caught in the middle - killed, 
wounded, abducted, forced to take sides and then risk 
retribution," she said. 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Sushanta Kumar Bhuyan, Deputy General Manager of Naandi 
Foundation, an NGO focusing on girl-child education in 
 
MUMBAI 00000012  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, said the Maoists 
blend into the community, making it difficult for government 
forces to distinguish the insurgents from villagers.  He argued 
that the villagers are in a "no-win situation," and must appease 
both sides by providing aid or information.  Other interlocutors 
expressed doubt that an anti-insurgency effort would be 
effective.  Pointing out that state institutions - such as the 
police, and health and education agencies -- have failed to 
penetrate the region in the 60 years since independence, they 
argued that central government forces, unfamiliar with the 
terrain or the people, could not hope to gain control of the 
region. 
 
 
 
It's the Land, Stupid 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) According to NGO activists, the fear of confiscation of 
tribal lands by the state for commercial enterprises continues 
to be the leading cause of conflict.  Manisha Sharma, head of 
the Raipur-based NGO Sankalp, claims that the government has 
uprooted entire villages and transferred the land to mining 
companies.  While the state provides some financial 
compensation, villagers with little contact with the cash 
economy and no education are unable to relocate and successfully 
change their livelihood activities, she said.  Maoists have 
taken up the cause of those who fear their lands are threatened 
by mining development.  Maoists attacks have often sought to 
prevent infrastructure development in tribal areas, destroying 
roads and telecommunications towers, which leads to accusation 
that they are "anti-development," she said. 
 
 
 
9. (U)  Himanshu Kumar, director of Vanvasi Chetena Ashram 
(VCA), an NGO implementing various foreign-funded projects for 
social development in Bastar - one of which is with UNICEF for 
primary education in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps -- 
told Congenoff that actions by the State Police and the "Salwa 
Judum" over the past five years to clear tribals from their 
homes and move them into camps has fueled the sense that the 
government plans to allocate these lands for mining and 
industrial projects.  His group has urged the state to work with 
civil society groups to understand the concerns of the tribals 
in a peaceful way; his group has not addressed, however, how to 
counter the militarized Maoist insurgents.  (Note:  Kumar is a 
vocal critic of Chhattisgarh's anti-Maoist efforts, and claims 
that the state ordered part of his facility destroyed in May 
2009.  On January 3, Kumar was detained by police in Kanker 
while escorting a woman who was injured in anti-Maoist 
operations to Raipur to receive medical treatment.  A 
previously-planned peace march was stopped by the tribals 
associated with the son of Mahendra Karma, the Congress party 
tribal leader most associated with the Salwa Judum anti-Maoist 
force. End Note.) 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) An Indian journalist who recently traveled to 
Maoist-affected areas in Orissa and Chhattisgarh described a 
scenario to Congenoff in which tribals in Orissa, who had 
earlier signed away or been swindled of their land, started 
organized efforts to reclaim their former properties.  Many of 
these lands were once remote, but are now of interest to 
landlords or business interests due to expanding settlements and 
farming areas, or due to potential resource finds.  These 
tribals, she said, had launched small political organizations to 
promote these efforts, which often attracted the attention of 
Maoists.  The Maoists, then, would express support for the 
tribals' cause and threaten local landlords, police, and 
government officials with violence should they attempt to 
reclaim the land.  The journalist claimed that few of these 
tribals were Maoists, but their political mobilization over land 
threatened local interests and, predictably, made it easy for 
the security forces to cast them as Maoists and justify their 
operations.  She said that many of these tribals knew only 
agriculture, and considered their lands essential for survival. 
While they wanted schools and health clinics, they did not want 
 
MUMBAI 00000012  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
them at the expense of their land. 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) NGOs and activists routinely claim that villages have 
been cleared to make way for major industrial projects in the 
resource-rich regions in Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and other states. 
 One journalist who has traveled in the region surmised that NGO 
claims stem from a habit of "expecting the worst" from the 
Indian state when matters of tribal land, resources, and big 
business collide in rural and remote areas.  However, activists 
in Chhattisgarh were not able to point to any specific instances 
of land re-allocation or forced resettlement by the state for 
industrial projects since June 2005.  Indeed, a coal power 
project planned by the American company AES has been stalled for 
years to obtain the consent of tribal villagers in northeast 
Chhattisgarh to purchase their land.  The Chhattisgarh Mining 
Development Corporation recently announced it will open a new 
bauxite mine in the Keshkal area of Bastar region, the fourth 
such project in Keshkal, but NGOs have not identified any 
illegal procedures used to obtain the land.  On the other hand, 
Indian companies employ resources - and aggressive tactics - 
that raise questions about the motivations of the Maoists.  A 
senior representative from Essar, a major industrial company 
with large mining and steel-related facilities in Chhattisgarh, 
told Congenoff that the company pays the Maoists "a significant 
amount" not to harm or interfere with their operations; when the 
Maoists occasionally break this agreement and damage Essar 
property or threaten personnel, Essar sets different Maoist 
groups against each other to suppress the situation. 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) Comment:  The facts on the ground in southern 
Chhattisgarh are, as always, foggy.  Some aspects of a 
coordinated, multi-state counter-insurgency effort are underway 
in Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra.  Since the police tend to 
exaggerate their efforts, and the press enjoys uncritically 
embellishing these exaggerations, it is difficult to determine 
the nature of police operations in these remote areas.  NGOs and 
human rights activists rightly fear that heavy-handed efforts to 
end the insurgency will cause suffering to the vulnerable 
civilian populations in these areas, though GOI and state 
officials have repeatedly emphasized the role of development in 
any coordinated operation.  Nevertheless, NGOs and human rights 
activists often idealize the lives of tribals, who often are 
struggling to survive on some of the least arable land in some 
of the most primitive of conditions, and wrongly condemn the 
real benefits of exposure to health and education facilities, 
local markets, and the non-agricultural jobs that development 
would bring.  Moreover, the Maoists pose a real threat to 
development and security in the region and efforts to bring 
these areas back into the orbit of the government is warranted. 
 
 
 
 
13. (SBU)  The potential for human rights abuses by state 
security forces in Chhattisgarh is high.  All the key 
ingredients are there:  the state police are preventing any 
oversight from civil society groups; the central government has 
surged large numbers of paramilitary forces unfamiliar with the 
language, communities, and terrain of the region; state 
authorities have given a free hand to security forces, who are 
suspicious that politically-organized tribals may be Maoist 
sympathizers; the Maoists and tribals are virtually 
indistinguishable to outsiders, making it extremely difficult to 
separate friend from foe; state efforts to recruit tribals as 
special police officers has stoked intra-tribal conflict, 
raising civilian casualties; and the Maoists for their part, 
have proven willing to use opportunistic brutality on civilians 
and security forces alike, provoking even more cycles of 
violence.  End Comment. 
FOLMSBEE