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DE RUEHMD #0069/01 0221609
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P 221609Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000069 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR P (BURNS, MULL), EUR/ERA (DEAN), EUR/WE 
(MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI), ISN (ELIOT KANG), ISN/RA (NEPHEW, 
ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO), ISN/MNSA (DAVIS), NEA (CATALANO), 
IO/GS (DETEMPLE) 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY, 
SAMORE, BRADLEY) 
FOR USUNVIE/IAEA 
FOR USEU (SIDHU) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR IAEA TRGY NPT SP EUN
UNSC 
 
SUBJECT: SPAIN INCREASINGLY LIKE-MINDED ON ADDITIONAL IRAN 
SANCTIONS 
 
REF: A. 09 MADRID 1240 
     ¶B. 09 MADRID 1196 
     ¶C. 09 MADRID 1133 
     ¶D. 09 MADRID 1087 
     ¶E. 09 MADRID 1006 
 
Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Ambassador Stephen Mull, Special 
Advisor to P, on January 15 briefed Spanish diplomats 
regarding key updates in the USG's engagement track with Iran 
and the need to begin focusing on a UNSC resolution for 
additional sanctions if Tehran refuses to engage.  Mull 
emphasized the need for the USG and Spain - as rotating EU 
President during the first half of 2010 - to  coordinate 
closely on this issue.  The Spanish reacted positively to the 
USG proposals on the types of new sanctions that could be 
implemented (see Septel), stated that the USG can count on 
Spain's full support as EU President, and invited Mull to 
return to Spain for further talks.  Post has ramped up its 
engagement with Spain on the Iranian nuclear issue in recent 
months (see Refs) and notes the MFA's stance has evolved into 
a more supportive policy for additional sanctions.  Spanish 
officials who just a few months ago were skeptical on the 
value of additional sanctions - especially if done without 
the umbrella of a new UNSC resolution - are now telling the 
U.S. that they are in sync with USG contingency plans for 
targeted unilateral sanctions and, as EU President, are 
willing to cooperate in whatever way they can.  END SUMMARY 
AND COMMENT: 
 
¶2. (U) Mull spoke with Carmen Bujan, Director General (DG, 
A/S-level) for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, and Fidel 
Sendagorta, DG for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and Near East, 
who were joined by Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Special 
Ambassador for Disarmament, and Gonzalo de Salazar, Deputy DG 
for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. 
 
//Bujan: "The U.S. Can Count on Us"// 
 
¶3. (C) Bujan agreed on the timing to have the UNSC begin 
debating additional sanctions in February under the French 
leadership of the UNSC, noting that beginning this debate 
early in 2009 could help to make progress on the issue.  She 
indicated her preference for debating and resolving the Iran 
sanctions issue by April to prevent the matter from being a 
front-burner issue in May, when it could detract from efforts 
to hold a successful Nuclear Non-Poliferation Treaty Review 
Conference. 
 
¶4. (C) Bujan suggested that the level of ambition at the UNSC 
regarding a possible resolution will hinge a great deal on 
how much the U.S. and Russia see eye to eye and opined that 
China would be unlikely to use a veto that would put it at 
odds with all other P5 members.  Bujan then remarked that if 
the level of ambition at the UNSC is not high, then others 
such as the EU would step forward to support additional 
sanctions.  She stated that, with London and Paris prodding 
Madrid, Spain - as EU President - "would not be shy about 
matching" the USG's enhanced unilateral sanctions designed to 
avoid harm to the Iranian people.  Bujan said that the USG 
can count on the support of Spain as EU President for 
whatever we need. 
 
//Sendagorta: Support for Various Types of Additional 
Sanctions// 
 
¶5. (C) Sendagorta began his remarks by stating that President 
Obama's policy of engagement with Iran has been very well 
received by the Zapatero Administration, which also agrees 
that there has to be some kind of deadline to this outreach 
if Tehran continues to choose not to engage.  Describing the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as an opaque regime whose specialty 
is engaging in talks in bad faith just to drag out 
negotiations and buy time, Sendagorta argued that the 
international community cannot allow Tehran to stall any 
further because the "nuclear clock is ticking." 
 
¶6. (C) On the prospect of additional sanctions, Sendagorta 
assessed, "Some action is better than no action at this 
point, that's for sure" although he questioned whether the 
sanctions would achieve their economic goal.  The important 
thing is that they would show the international community is 
united and that the threat of sanctions is not a bluff.  In 
response to Mull's overview of the types of sanctions the USG 
is currently considering, Sendagorta responded, "We can go 
along with many of these ideas."  Sendagorta asserted that 
the key is how the international community can help the 
Iranian people, "especially those who think like us."  He 
opined that additional sanctions "do not have to be very 
destructive right now" and suggested that perhaps being more 
demanding of Tehran on human rights issues - and keeping 
these demands separate from the nuclear issue - could be an 
effective strategy.  He admitted that the Iranian public's 
reaction to increased sanctions remains an unknown and 
acknowledged that they could even backfire by awakening 
popular support for the regime. 
 
¶7. (C) Sendagorta appreciated word of USG efforts to convey 
to Asian countries - such as China - the importance of not 
seeking to profit on new market opportunities that would 
arise if the US and EU implemented additional unilateral 
sanctions.  He also expressed concern about the Gulf 
countries, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  He related a 
story in which Zapatero traveled to Saudi Arabia in November 
¶2009.  According to Sendagorta, the Saudi King urged Zapatero 
to be "extremely aggressive" against Iran, to which Zapatero 
replied that Spain was ready to do so, but when Spain 
inquired what Saudi Arabia was prepared to do eliminate 
export control loopholes regarding its trade with Iran, the 
King said nothing, which Sendagorta found very disturbing. 
 
¶8. (C) Following a question by Bujan to Mull on how best to 
engage with Israel to calm tensions in the region, Sendagorta 
told Mull that Spain constantly tells Israel that it 
understands the threat that Iran's nuclear program poses to 
Israel and assures Israel that Spain will do its part to help 
resolve the issue.  Sendagorta further stated that Spain 
tells Israel that there are things that Israel can do, too. 
For example, Spain tells Israel that if it entered into 
negotiations with the Palestinians and/or Syrians, Israel 
would undermine Iran's policies.  Sendagorta said that Spain 
is currently telling Israel, "If you have cards to play, use 
them now." 
 
¶9. (U) Ambassador Mull cleared this cable. 
SOLOMONT