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Viewing cable 10KHARTOUM98, SLM/MINNAWI LEADERSHIP EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER ELECTIONS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KHARTOUM98 2010-01-18 13:35 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0868
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0098 0181336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 181335Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0035
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000098 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SU CD
SUBJECT: SLM/MINNAWI LEADERSHIP EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER ELECTIONS, 
DARFUR PEACE 
 
REF: 09 KHARTOUM 1411 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a January 13 meeting with DCM, Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Minnawi (SLM/Minnawi) faction Head of Foreign 
Relations, Ali Traio, and Head of Policy, Hussein Arko Minnawi, 
asserted that Sudan would be better off without elections because 
they are "rigged" in favor of the National Congress Party (NCP). 
They lamented the lack of implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA), and chastised the United Nations/African Union-led 
peacemaking effort for failing to include their movement in ongoing 
peace talks in Doha.  While lauding the normalization of relations 
between Chad and Sudan, they expressed concern about its ancillary 
effects, in particular the destabilizing presence of Chadian rebels 
in North Darfur. End Summary. 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) On January 13, SLM/Minnawi Head of Foreign Relations Ali 
Traio and Head of Policy Hussein Arko Minnawi (brother of SLA 
Chairman Minni Arko Minnawi) called on DCM.  They voiced their 
dismay over the lack of implementation of the DPA, and the 
perceived failure of the international community to support the 
Agreement.  They also expressed concern that the USG in particular 
was abandoning the cause of the DPA, questioning why Special Envoy 
Gration has not met with SLM Chairman Minni Arko Minnawi on his 
past several trips to Sudan. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Traio and Minnawi also expressed concern about the 
upcoming national elections, noting that the entire process was 
"rigged in favor of the NCP," from the census, to demarcation of 
constituencies, to voter registration.   In Darfur specifically, 
the prospects for credible elections are dim, they said, noting 
that half of Darfuris are either internally displaced or refugees. 
The potential for the recently passed National Security Act to be 
misused in Darfur is extremely high, given that a State of 
Emergency declaration remains in effect there.  At the end of the 
day, "elections will not be free and fair, and it is our position 
therefore that they are not good for the country," they said. 
(Note: SLM has not been permitted to register as a political party 
(reftel). End Note.) 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) With regard to the ongoing Doha peace process, Traio and 
Minnawi expressed low confidence in the United Nations-African 
Union-led effort headed by Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole. 
"We think the mediation should be doing a lot more than what they 
are now," stated Traio. Minnawi further stated that SLM has 
repeatedly expressed a desire to be part of the peace process, to 
no avail. (Note: The Joint Mediation Support Team maintains that 
its mandate is to engage with Non-Signatories of the DPA, thus 
excluding SLM/Minnawi. End Note.)  Hussein further noted that he 
believed no serious discussions would take place prior to elections 
in April. Based on the result of the elections, the GOS would 
determine its course of action, he predicted. 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Traio and Minnawi also addressed the ongoing Chad-Sudan 
rapprochement, noting that while it is overall a positive trend, 
its ancillary affects pose "a major concern."  They noted that the 
presence of Chadian rebels in North Darfur threatened to 
destabilize an already volatile security situation (ref b), and 
claimed that the GOS was trying to separate Chadian rebel troops on 
an ethnic basis.  He urged that additional pressure be put on the 
Chadian rebels to put down their weapons, as well as on President 
Deby, who "is just the same as Bashir."  Minnawi also expressed 
concern that over the past several weeks the GOS has sought to curb 
the movement of SLA/Minnawi troops within their traditional spheres 
of influence, including south of El Fasher to Shangil Tobay. "The 
GOS is preparing for something, we don't know what" he said. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: While some of SLA/Minnawi's complaints ring true, 
it is disappointing that the movement is unable to articulate a 
plan for its future, either in Darfur or in Sudan as a whole. 
Weakened militarily and politically since the signing of the DPA, 
SLA/Minnawi will fade into oblivion if it does not find a way to 
remain relevant in the Darfur peace process or the Juba Alliance of 
opposition parties.  End Comment. 
WHITEHEAD