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Viewing cable 10KHARTOUM74, GOS AND MEDIA COMPLAIN ABOUT ENHANCED U.S. AVIATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KHARTOUM74 2010-01-13 13:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6813
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0074/01 0131304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 131301Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0015
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000074 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAIR KPAO OIIP PREL PTER SU
SUBJECT: GOS AND MEDIA COMPLAIN ABOUT ENHANCED U.S. AVIATION 
SCREENING; SERVE NOTICE OF POSSIBLE RECIPROCITY 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Government of Sudan (GOS) officials and 
state-controlled media have reacted negatively to the news of 
enhanced airport security screening for U.S.-bound Sudanese 
nationals.  Complaints centered on Sudan's inclusion on the list of 
countries receiving increased scrutiny by the U.S. Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA).  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Undersecretary Mutriff Siddiq informed Charge d'Affaires that the 
GOS may reciprocate with similar screening for U.S. passengers 
entering Sudan.  He urged that the U.S. provide clarification on 
what the new procedures entailed.  Reaction to news of enhanced 
screening was further complicated by a January 8 Warden Message, 
issued by U.S. Embassy Khartoum, warning of a potential attack 
against  Air Uganda flights between Juba and Kampala. Noting that 
the GOS was not notified of the message prior to its posting, 
Siddiq urged that in the future such information be communicated to 
the GOS in advance. End Summary. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
GOVERNMENT THREATENS RECIPROCITY 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) On January 11, CDA Whitehead called on MFA Undersecretary 
Mutriff Siddiq by mutual agreement to discuss a range of issues, 
including enhanced screening requirements for Sudanese nationals 
traveling to the United States following the  December 25 attempt 
by Abdul Farouk Umar Abdulmutallab to blow up a Delta flight. 
Siddiq expressed confusion over the new security directives - "it's 
not clear to us what these new procedures are." Regarding Sudan's 
inclusion for such scrutiny due to its being on the U.S. State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List, Mutriff argued that Sudan should not 
have been singled out, noting that the GOS continues to cooperate 
closely with the USG on counterterrorism issues. Siddiq warned the 
CDA that the GOS reserves the right to reciprocate with 
proportionate enhanced security for U.S. nationals traveling to 
Sudan. "We have been quite lenient in the past [towards Americans], 
but we will have to accord you the same treatment," he said. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Siddiq also expressed concern over whether official 
delegations or government ministers would be subjected to the new 
security procedures, given the upcoming trip to Washington for 
consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by GOS 
Finance Minister Awad Aljaz, a regime hardliner with a well-known 
anti-U.S. bias. Asked whether Aljaz should be advised to cancel his 
trip, CDA responded that while government ministers were exempted 
from enhanced screening under TSA guidelines, he could make no 
guarantees for treatment of Aljaz by security personnel in transit 
countries. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
LOCAL MEDIA REACTS 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Local media, especially those with pro-government views, 
reacted angrily to the news of enhanced screening.  Pro-government 
Sudan Vision reported that "the American administration is 
tightening security measures at all of its airports against Arabs 
and Muslims, besides setting up new systems to screen passengers in 
grave violation of human rights." Following President Obama's 
January 7 remarks on "Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation 
Security," media reaction to the news of enhanced screening was 
further complicated by a January 8 Warden Message issued by U.S. 
Embassy Khartoum. The message alerted Americans to a "potential 
threat against commercial aviation transiting between Juba, Sudan 
and Kampala, Uganda by regional extremists."  After the Embassy 
placed the Warden Message on the Consular website, the Public 
Affairs section received a flurry of inquiries from local and 
international media as to whether there was any link between the 
security threat and the President's remarks. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000074  002 OF 002 
 
 
5. (SBU) The issuance of the Warden Message caught the GOS by 
surprise. MFA Undersecretary Siddiq complained to the CDA that the 
MFA, Civil Aviation Authority and National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) had not been informed prior to its posting. 
While Siddiq did not question the integrity or utility of the 
message, he urged that in the future such information be shared 
beforehand. CDA agreed on the need for better communication in the 
future. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
HEIGHTENED SECURITY AT JUBA AIRPORT 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Following dissemination of the Warden Message, both the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Air Uganda took steps to 
heighten their security posture. On January 10, Air Uganda 
suspended its service into Juba pending a review of its security 
procedures, while on January 11 the GOSS changed procedures at the 
airport, requiring cars to park across the street from the 
terminal, checking all tickets and IDs before allowing people to 
enter terminal, and restricting access to the runway. The Southern 
Sudan Police Service (SSPS) has been deployed to Juba airport to 
carry out the new security policy; the GOSS Minister of Internal 
Affairs reportedly oversaw the operation himself for approximately 
three hours on January 11. However, authorities were still not 
screening passengers taking flights via the VIP Lounge at Juba 
Airport or scanning their hand-carry luggage.  Post intends to 
explore how it can provide the GOSS with FAA or TSA technical 
assistance and advice on how to improve security at Juba 
International Airport.  Air Uganda is planning to resume 
Juba-Kampala flights as soon as possible, but is asking Sudanese 
security officers carry out additional screenings of passengers 
before boarding Juba-Kampala  flights. 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: Negative reaction to the enhanced security 
screening and possible reciprocity are hardly a surprise, but will 
likely contribute to the belief by many  Sudanese that they are 
being unjustly singled out for political reasons.  While the new 
measures are unlikely to deter ordinary Sudanese from applying for 
U.S. visas, it remains to be seen whether the enhanced screening 
will change the travel plans of some senior government officials 
such as Aljaz. Post requests specific information that we can share 
with the GOS on what the new TSA procedures entail and how they 
will be applied. End Comment. 
WHITEHEAD