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Viewing cable 10CHIANGMAI8, ROUND-UP: PAD CANCELS RALLY; RED-SHIRTS SPLINTERING?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10CHIANGMAI8 2010-01-15 14:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO9479
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0008/01 0151409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 151409Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1245
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1337
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000008 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI ECON TH
SUBJECT: ROUND-UP: PAD CANCELS RALLY; RED-SHIRTS SPLINTERING? 
 
REF: A. 09 CHIANG MAI 173 (DIALOGUE EXPANDS) AND PREVIOUS 
     B. 09 BANGKOK 3015 (ABHISIT CANCELS) 
     C. 09 CHIANG MAI 93 (U.S. ACADEMIC) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000008  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please handle accordingly. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
1.  (SBU) On January 9, the generally pro-government Peoples' 
Alliance for Democracy cancelled a  rally it planned to hold in 
Chiang Mai on January 16 in order to avoid violent clashes with 
anti- government red-shirts.  Meanwhile, the localized 
reconciliation effort brokered by academics and private sector 
representatives involving one of the Chiang Mai red-shirt 
factions began yielding results, even as local red-shirt leaders 
took steps to present a more  united front in the face of 
obvious internal divisions. 
 
 
 
2.  (SBU) Comment: For the second time in less than two months, 
local red-shirt groups have prevented their opponents from 
gathering in Chiang Mai.    Their violent rhetoric with intent 
to rally thousands first led to the cancellation of Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's planned November 29, 2009 visit to 
Chiang Mai (Ref B).  Now, in order to  avert violence with them, 
the local Peoples' Alliance for Democracy (PAD) had to cancel a 
key political  gathering.  We will stay alert for signs that 
these two  outcomes are having an  impact on the local 
reconciliation talks, which may not be sustainable over the 
long-term if the cards continue  to fall the red-shirts' way. 
 
 
 
3.  (SBU) Comment Cont.: On the other hand, increasingly violent 
rhetoric on the part of the red-shirts  may be a sign of 
weakness.  If they were able to draw large numbers to rallies, 
they might not have to  rely on a war of words designed to 
incite violence.  Similarly, although the cancellation of 
Abhisit's visit  and the PAD concert handed short-term victory 
to the red-shirts, the fact that dialogue between some local 
red- shirts, yellow-shirts, civil society and the Provincial 
authorities succeeded in averting violence this time is a very 
positive sign.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
PAD Cancels Rally; Red-Shirts' Move Ahead 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
4.  (U) On January 9, representatives of the PAD announced the 
cancellation of their planned January  16 "political concert," 
which had been scheduled to take place at Chiang Mai's main 
sports stadium.   Local PAD leaders cited several reasons for 
the decision: concerns over the safety of the audience given 
concurrent red-shirt activity at the same venue (several 
red-shirt groups will participate in the fireworks  festival, 
which will take place at the same time); a desire to prevent 
their event "falling victim to those  who want to use it to 
foment violence"; and concerns the police will be unable to 
provide adequate  security due to visits by several members of 
the Royal Family scheduled at the same time. 
 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Privately, PAD contacts told us they were concerned 
about the economic impact on Chiang  Mai had violence erupted 
during the concert.  (We note that January is the height of the 
tourist season in  Chiang Mai.)  A red-shirt leader told us on 
January 7 that violence would be unavoidable were the  PAD 
concert to go ahead as scheduled. 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Meanwhile, a red-shirt rally on December 29-30 at the 
same stadium went ahead as planned  with approximately 2,000 
participants.  This time, the atmosphere was more festive and 
less overtly  political, with entertainment seemingly taking 
precedence over content.  The rally was peaceful, with  only a 
handful of Bangkok-based speakers in attendance.  The only minor 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000008  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
inconvenience resulted when  participants created a traffic jam 
on their way to the event, which made sections of a key road 
used to  access some main local attractions impassable, angering 
some tourists. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
Red-Shirts Splintering? 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
7.  (U) In the meantime, just as Prime Minister Abhisit 
cancelled his November 29 visit to Chiang Mai  (Ref B), two 
competing red-shirt groups announced their formation, with both 
using the popular Three  Kings Monument as their pulpit.  On 
November 28, Peerapol Morakot launched the Chiang Mai Red 
Coordinating Center (AKA Democratic Red).  In his speech, he 
expressed strong opposition to the  current governing coalition, 
calling PM Abhisit a "puppet of dictators and aristocrats," 
while noting that his group would only express its views 
peacefully. 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU) A red-shirt leader with connections to this group told 
us its network currently spans over half  of Chiang Mai's 
districts.  He stated that most of its members view the three 
core red-shirt leaders  Veera Musikapong, Jatuporn Prompan and 
Nattawut Saikua as focused on short-term tactics, but  lacking a 
long-term strategy for change.  Among the 150-200 in attendance 
that day was the leader of  the Chiang Mai branch of the 
"Thaksin Lovers" group, who earlier participated in the 
reconciliation  dialogue, but withdrew in the face of threats by 
Rak Chiang Mai 51 (RCM51 -- the red-shirt group  with the most 
violent tendencies). 
 
 
 
9.  (SBU) The following day, approximately 50 supporters (RCM51 
leader Phetcharawat  Wattanapongsirikul among them) attended the 
rally launching the Lanna Red Council, which purports to 
represent all red-shirt groups in Thailand's eight upper north 
provinces.  Charut Pratwirakul was named  as its head, and the 
Council laid down five key principles that would guide its work: 
safeguard the  nation, religious institutions and the Monarchy; 
strive for a democracy free of intervention; fight injustice; 
protect "good citizens" who make "remarkable contributions" to 
the country; and defend good  governance.  According to military 
and police contacts, the Council enjoys the backing of key 
opposition Phuea Thai (PT) MPs, including Sanguan Pongmanee from 
Lamphun Province, Boonsong  Teriyapirom from Chiang Mai, and 
former PM (and Thaksin brother-in-law) Somchai Wongsawat. 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) Military contacts and a red-shirt leader affiliated 
with the Red Coordinating Center told us  the Lanna Red Council 
was formed to try to bridge the gap between northern red-shirt 
groups, which  they contend are repudiating violence in greater 
numbers.  Splits like this within the red-shirt movement  could 
weaken the PT support base in the north, our contacts opined, 
leading key PT MPs to support  the Council in an attempt to 
present a united front.  Separately, an RCM51 representative 
visited an  ailing member of the Chiang Mai Red Coordinating 
Center in the hospital, encouraging him to return to  RCM51 in 
an effort to unite all northern red-shirt groups under one 
umbrella.  (Note: RCM51 is not  involved in the Chiang Mai Red 
Coordinating Center (CRCC).  The ill CRCC leader used to belong 
to  RCM51.) 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
Dialogue Yields Results 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Coalition for a Peaceful and Livable 
Chiang Mai has met twice since  Abhisit's aborted November 2009 
visit to Chiang Mai.  New faces were present at the December 
meeting, including local media, representatives of the 
Government Workers' Association, and Chiang  Mai War Veterans. 
Participants exchanged views on prospects for avoiding political 
violence in 2010  in Chiang Mai, which pundits expect will be an 
active year for red-shirt protests nation-wide.  They also  set 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000008  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
about planning the coalition's activities for 2010. 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) Members agreed to involve religious leaders and 
academics to a greater degree in the  group's work, taking 
advantage of their ability to mediate and lay down ground rules 
for political  expression/conflict resolution.  They also 
discussed the idea of a year-long campaign on "Building a 
Mindful Democracy". Attendees were tasked with bringing specific 
proposals to the table by February  for the group to consider, 
with the key aim of involving all sectors of society as the 
dialogue moves  forward.  Toward the end of the meeting, PAD 
representatives raised concerns over lax law  enforcement, which 
they argue allows red-shirts to intimidate the PAD and prevent 
it from holding  gatherings.  (Note: This meeting took place 
before PAD's decision to cancel its January 16 concert.) 
 
 
 
13. (SBU) At a January 7 meeting between provincial authorities 
and several members of the coalition,  PAD representatives 
agreed to consult with their leadership in Bangkok about the 
possibility of  cancelling their January 16 concert in an effort 
to avoid violent clashes with red-shirt groups participating  in 
the fireworks festival.  Both events were slated to take place 
at the same venue. 
 
 
 
14. (SBU) Despite the eventual cancellation of the concert, PAD 
leaders continue to insist on respect  for their right to 
peaceful freedom of assembly.  Provincial authorities gave PAD a 
face-saving means of  cancelling its concert by agreeing to 
negotiate with the Sports Authority on PAD's behalf to have 
PAD's (generally non-refundable) deposit on the stadium 
returned.  Provincial authorities also  announced plans to hold 
a cross-cultural and inter-religious reconciliation-oriented 
event on January 23.   We will request information on this event 
from the Provincial Government at the earliest opportunity. 
 
 
 
15. (SBU) For its part, the Consulate collaborated with PA 
Bangkok to stage a DVC with Dr. Robert  Albritton from the 
University of Mississippi to share some lessons from the U.S. 
experience with  participants in the reconciliation process.  30 
politicians, NGOs and civil society activists joined the  event. 
 Dr. Albritton focused on the need for all parties to respect 
election results, and to work for  change without disrespecting 
the rule of law.  This program built on Dr. Larry Berman's very 
successful  presentation last year on the role of opposition 
parties and non-party political actors in a democracy (Ref C), 
and is the latest in a string of Consulate efforts to foster 
understanding and more open communication  between political 
groups in northern Thailand.  Members of both red-shirt and 
yellow-shirt groups  attended, as did local government 
officials, representatives of Muslim organizations and the 
media.  The  discussion was very lively, covering topics such as 
government accountability, minority rights, public  opinion, and 
sustainable decentralization. 
 
 
 
16. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
BARRASSO