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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BK KK SR
SUBJECT: BALKAN POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSS KOSOVO AND 
BOSNIA IN BRUSSELS 
 
Classified By: USEU DCM Christopher Murray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Meeting in Brussels on January 11, Quint 
Balkans political directors - representing the U.S., Germany, 
France, Italy, the UK and EU Council Secretariat - met to 
discuss the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia.  On Kosovo, the 
EU Council Secretariat noted Serb hardening and suggested 
that the main tool to counter it was the EU perspective for 
both Belgrade and Pristina.  There was agreement that Quint 
members need to strongly discourage Belgrade from any attempt 
to return to the UN General Assembly to press for status 
talks.  France agreed to circulate draft talking points 
linking post-ICJ misbehavior to Serbia's EU perspective. 
Concerning parallel structures in the north, the Council 
 Secretariat reported that Belgrade has appointed 35 judges 
and 10 prosecutors to oversee Kosovo - both in the north and 
Serb enclaves in the south.  The Council Secretariat believes 
that a customs protocol is unnecessary and circulated a draft 
proposal for the restoration of full customs controls 
(e-mailed to EUR/SCE and EUR/ERA separately).  On 
electricity, the USG was isolated in calling for action to 
re-connect KEK line to Valac power station.  Others favored 
commercial negotiations, but it is not clear they understand 
what this means or what Pristina has offered in the past.  On 
Bosnia, all agreed prospects for agreement are dim but that 
they need to remain engaged as part of an election management 
strategy, and recognized the need to try to focus the 
Bosnians on issues instead of nationalism prior to elections. 
 The Quint acknowledged U.S. concerns about Bosnian Serb 
leader Dodik's lack of compliance with High Representative 
decisions, but offered no ideas for fixing the problem beyond 
French and Council Secretariat assertions that when the EU 
has taken a firm line such as in the case of visa 
liberalization, Dodik has backed down.  End Summary. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Quint Balkans political directors met in Brussels 
January 11 to discuss the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia. 
Hosted by outgoing Council Secretariat Director Zoltan 
Martinusz and acting director Jonas Jonsson, the meeting was 
also attended by EUR DAS Stuart Jones, Daniel Fearn (U.K), 
Antje Leendertse (Germany), Roland Galharague (France), and 
Luca Franchetti (Italy).  Before providing the Council 
 Secretariat's assessment of the situation in Kosovo, 
Martinusz announced his transfer to the cabinet of EU Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy where Martinusz will serve as 
foreign policy advisor. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Council Secretariat opened by providing an 
overview of the past year and challenges for the year ahead. 
Looking back, Martinusz noted progress on decentralization, 
Rule of Law (ROL), practical issues such as reintegration of 
Serb police officers in the south, and successful management 
of visits.  Looking forward, Martinusz reported seeing 
parallel structures in the north, ROL, good governance/fight 
against corruption, and the ICJ ruling as challenges.  He 
noted a hardening of the Serbian position on Kosovo and 
suggested that the main tool to counter this was the EU 
perspective for both Belgrade and Pristina.  Martinusz sees 
framing issues around this as the key issue moving forward, 
noting that technical issues quickly become political ones. 
While saying that Brussels must lead on issues, Martinusz 
underlined the importance of U.S. assistance, something that 
must be mirrored on the ground by cooperation between the 
EUSR office and U.S. Embassy. 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to the ICJ, DAS Jones agreed that our best 
leverage is the EU perspective and framework.  Jones said 
that the USG fears that Serbia may plan, after the ICJ issues 
its advisory opinion, to return to the General Assembly for a 
vote urging status talks.  Jones asked if it would be timely 
to send a message to Tadic that reviving the issue in the 
General Assembly would be seen by key EU Member States as 
unhelpful.  Jones suggested that Jeremic's fingerprints were 
all over this, but that Tadic might overrule him if apprised 
of the cost to Serbia's EU perspective. French representative 
Galharague agreed that any initiative in the UNGA was for 
Serbia and UN precedent generally.  He agreed that it would 
 
BRUSSELS 00000085  002 OF 004 
 
 
be useful to tell Belgrade not to go forward.  France 
suggested a P5 demarche to Belgrade, with Jones pointing out 
that Russia would likely be sympathetic to Belgrade and 
unhelpful.  The UK and Italy supported the idea of telling 
Belgrade this was a bad move, but favored national demarches. 
 
¶5.  (C) Martinusz added that while Serbia had applied for EU 
membership, its application has yet to be referred to the 
European Commission for its opinion.  He said that Serbia 
wants its application to be referred before the ICJ ruling, 
Germany reported its government would not support referring 
the application before the ICJ ruling.  France said that we 
are nearing a point at which Serbia's chance of moving 
forward on the EU is jeopardized by its attitude towards 
Kosovo, adding that France had not yet decided when or how to 
link the issues.  According to France, Serbia is considering 
only two options for approaching negotiations with the 
Kosovars, the first being an outright partition of the north, 
the other an "Inter German" model.  France said the latter 
would only be provisional and that we would have to make it 
clear to Serbia that it can not come into the EU without 
recognizing Kosovo.  The UK suggested that it would be key to 
build conditionality into the EU accession process early on. 
 
¶6.  (C) Jones said that he was encouraged by the discussion 
and voiced support for the idea of a coordinated approach and 
clear understanding of what we want from Serbia and Kosovo in 
the near and longer term.  In response to Jones' question as 
to what Pristina should be doing, France said that mutual 
recognition was the goal and that we should advise the GoK to 
enter talks with the understanding that this is the goal. 
Saying "we don't want a repeat of Cyprus," France asked if we 
wanted to make an opinion (on Serbia's EU candidacy 
application) contingent upon mutual recognition.  France then 
offered to draw up and circulate points that would tell 
Belgrade that it would not be helpful to go to the General 
Assembly and, in general terms, express the harm this could 
do to Serbia's EU candidacy.  Jones voiced his support for 
delivering this message early and often, with the UK adding 
that approaching Belgrade separately with a common scripts 
was the way to go. 
 
¶7.  (C) Concerning the judiciary, Jonsson reported that 
Belgrade had appointed new judges and prosecutors 
Serbia-wide, including Kosovo.  He noted that while the 
Council Secretariat was aware of the Serbian law requiring 
the appointments, it had been surprised by how swiftly 
Belgrade had moved, especially in light of the Serbian 
holidays.  Jonsson reported that the European Commission and 
Venice Commission found fault with the underlying Serb 
legislation.  Since it was not yet universally implemented, 
there was still time for a message to be sent to Belgrade. 
According to Jonsson, Belgrade appointed 35 judges and 10 
prosecutors for the north, with the North Mitrovica 
courthouse serving as the primary court for Kosovo, with 
branches in enclaves including Strpce.  He reported that 
EULEX wants Belgrade's appointments to be frozen and that 
EULEX and EUSR reps would be traveling to Brussels for a 
brainstorming session next week.  Kosovars were very 
concerned about the move and Sejdiu had called in EULEX Head 
of Mission de Kermabon and ICR deputy Burton on January 5. 
Jonsson suggested that given the Commission's unhappiness, 
this could be noted in the progress report if Member States 
approached the Commission and suggested that they consider 
it.  Concerning the UN report in January, Jones suggested 
that while it was too late to influence the report, 
objections could be raised in the Council. 
 
¶8.  (C) On customs, Jonsson reported that Belgrade has been 
signaling that it wants a customs protocol, adding that EULEX 
does not believe one is necessary.  The UK agreed, saying 
that a protocol provided no gain, only an opportunity for 
Belgrade to seek a repeat of the police protocol.  Jonsson 
said that money distribution remained the main hurdle to an 
understanding on customs.  The Council Secretariat circulated 
its paper and requested feedback (Note:  paper e-mailed to 
EUR/SCE separately).  After receiving Quint feedback, the 
plan would be to discuss the proposal with the Kosovars and 
then with Belgrade.  After asking for clarification of the 
language in the draft proposal, Jones said he needed to study 
 
BRUSSELS 00000085  003 OF 004 
 
 
it further, but stressed the U.S. could not support less than 
was in the plan, adding that customs revenues must go into 
the Kosovo consolidated budget.  Jonsson added that 
 
¶9.  (C) Turctiontegr`lishing a political presence in the north via the 
standing up of an "EU House" and placeent of Italian 
ambassador Giffoni at that locQtion.  On religious and 
cultural heritage, Josson shared that the Greek ambassador 
was fol,owing these issues on the ground and that Belrade 
was looking for an appointment or represQntative to follow 
these issues full time.  JoQsson said that the Decani bishop 
would probabQy follow matters (something that Pristina had no 
objection to according to Jonsson), adding that the political 
leadership in Belgrade waslikely trying to show sensitivity 
to the mattQr given the upcoming Patriarch election on 
January 22.  On reconfiguration of the international 
presence, the Jonsson said that the Council Secretariat 
wanted to signal a shift to the EUSR side.  He reported that 
the Council had the buy-in of Member States that double 
hatting is mutually reinforcing, with the UK suggesting that 
the European Commission needed to be more engaged on the 
ground and that this was something that new Enlargement 
Commissioner Fuele should be brought in on.  On regional 
cooperation, the CS said that things were at a stalemate. 
Belgrade continued to insist on a UN presence at every 
meeting, that the UN representative speak first on the behalf 
of Kosovo, and that the UN sign any documents.  The UK, with 
France agreeing, suggested that this be included in the 
Belgrade demarche. 
 
Bosnia 
------ 
 
¶11.  (C) The Quint agreed that prospects for agreement on 
Butmir were dim, but that we needed to remain engaged as part 
of an election management strategy.  France, citing a new 
development in the Finci case (the European Court of Human 
Rights having ruled that the Bosnian Presidency election 
process in the Bosnian constitution is in violation of ECHR 
obligations), favors pursuing the Spanish idea to press the 
parties to narrow the package only to address ECHR issues and 
an EU clause giving the state the lead on EU integration 
matters.  The UK argued that this would not gain support from 
the Bosniaks and further radicalize the Bosniak election 
dynamic.  DAS Jones said that we would have no objection if 
the parties decided amongst themselves to pursue such an 
approach, but that the USG would not pressure them to do so. 
He also made clear that while the U.S. opposes the proposed 
February Madrid meeting of Bosnian leaders, we did believe 
senior level U.S.-EU visit to Sarajevo would be positive. 
 
¶12.  (C) All recognized the need to try to focus the Bosnians 
on issues versus nationalism in the run-up to the elections. 
France and Germany argued that the only leverage we had to do 
so was the nature of the international presence.  The French 
 
BRUSSELS 00000085  004 OF 004 
 
 
proposed, with varying degrees of ambiguous support from 
Germany, the Council Secretariat and Italy, that the High 
Representative be decoupled from the EUSR, and possibly 
reside outside of Bosnia, arguing that removing OHR from 
day-to-day politics would force the Bosnians to reach 
agreement amongst themselves.  The French argued that the 
Bosnian parties would all look favorably on it - the Serbs 
because OHR would be phasing out and the Bosniaks because the 
Bonn powers would remain in force.  The UK expressed concern 
that this proposal risked dividing the international 
community and argued that it would exacerbate the political 
crisis, as the Serbs would be unhappy that OHR and the Bonn 
Powers remained in effect, while and Bosniaks would interpret 
it as IC abandonment.  The UK favored keeping the status quo 
through the elections, DAS Jones making it clear that that 
the USG could not support such a proposal.  He argued for 
keeping OHR while enhancing the EUSR with the "tool kit" 
Brussels had envisioned for  a post-OHR "enhanced" or 
"reinforced" EU mission. 
 
¶13. (C) Jones noted that High Representative Inzko's EU 
mandate expires in February asked whether Brussels had 
contemplated any changes.  Martinusz noted that EU High 
Representative Ashton is considering extending all EUSR 
mandates by six months while she decides what approach to 
take and said that the enhanced EUSR plan was in limbo due to 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  He noted that 
Ashton was very interested in Bosnia, but that it was unclear 
how that interest will manifest itself. 
 
¶14. (C) On NATO MAP, the Quint agreed that Bosnia needs to 
make more progress on reform before NATO could accept 
Bosnia's application.  DAS Jones urged others to engage 
Turkey, which had pressed for MAP for Bosnia in December, in 
advance of the April Ministerial to reiterate this position. 
The Quint also acknowledged U.S. concerns about Bosnian Serb 
leader Dodik's lack of compliance with High Representative 
decisions, but offered no ideas for fixing the problem beyond 
France and the Council Secretariat noting that when EU has 
taken a firm line (citing TRANSCO and visa liberalization as 
examples), Bosnian Serbs backed down. 
 
¶15.  (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Jones. 
 
KENNARD 
.