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DE RUEHBO #0091/01 0271322
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0008
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/27 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR ECON PTER PINR CO VE CU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION CANDIDATE PARDO DISCUSSES ELECTIONS AND BILATERAL 
ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: 09 BOGOTA 3097 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Liberal Party Director and presidential candidate Rafael 
Pardo predicted that:  the Uribe coalition would maintain its 
congressional majority in the March 14 election, independent Sergio 
Fajardo would have a tough time winning the presidency due to a 
lack of congressional support, President Uribe would win reelection 
in the first round if allowed to run, and if Uribe did not run, any 
of his coalition candidates would be forced to a second round in 
the May 30 presidential election.  Pardo lamented that opposition 
candidates had been unable to agree on inter-party presidential 
primaries, but said that parties could still join forces after the 
congressional election or the first presidential round.  He 
complained that if the Constitutional Court allowed the reelection 
referendum to proceed, opponents would not have time to campaign 
against it. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Pardo told the Ambassador he supported Plan Colombia and the 
U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, but would increase the 
GOC's focus on agricultural and land issues to improve 
consolidation efforts if elected.  Pardo advised that declarations 
about Venezuela by USG officials visiting Colombia were unhelpful. 
He hoped to pull Colombia out of USG-BRV tensions.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
AMBASSADOR ENGAGES TOP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) On January 15, the Ambassador hosted a private breakfast 
for Liberal Party (PL) Presidential Candidate Rafael Pardo, who is 
also the head of the PL (by far the largest opposition party in the 
country).  Pardo was accompanied by PL Senator Juan Fernando 
Cristo.  This was the last in a series of individual breakfasts the 
Ambassador hosted with the seven leading candidates to replace 
President Uribe:  Juan Manuel Santos (U Party), Sergio Fajardo 
(independent), Noemi Sanin (Conservative Party, PC), Gustavo Petro 
(Alternative Democratic Pole, PDA), Andres Felipe Arias (PC), 
German Vargas Lleras (Radical Change, CR), and Pardo.  These 
private meetings provided an opportunity to lay the groundwork for 
continued collaboration with Colombia's next Administration, as 
well as to discuss election politics. 
 
 
 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: 
 
URIBE COALITION WILL HOLD 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Citing polls and political trends, Pardo predicted that 
President Uribe's coalition would keep its congressional majority 
in the March 14 election (which will elect all 102 members of the 
Senate and all 166 members of the House).  His predictions, as well 
as each party's share of seats (combining House and Senate) after 
the 2006 elections and after the September 2009 party-switching, 
are in the following table: 
 
 
 
PARTY     Pardo Est.     Sept 2009     March 2006 
 
U+PC        40-50%          48%             36% 
 
 
PL          20-25%          22%             20% 
 
PDA            10%           7%              6% 
 
CR            7-8%          11%             13% 
 
Others      10-18%          13%             25% 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Pardo noted that congressional elections are much easier 
to predict than presidential elections, as Colombians mainly vote 
along party lines for Congress but vote for individual 
personalities for president.  This explains why congressional 
campaign slogans and ads focus on party membership rather than 
issues. 
 
 
 
NO OPPOSITION COALITION FOR NOW 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Given President Uribe's 70% popularity and election polls, 
most analysts agree that opposition candidates must band together 
in order to stand any chance to win the Presidency in the May 30 
election.  However, Pardo confirmed press reports that attempts to 
negotiate an inter-party primary had failed.  He had directly 
approached PDA's Petro, CR's Vargas, and even the Green Party, but 
ideological differences and personal ambitions had prevented 
agreement. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) While there would not be inter-party primaries, Pardo said 
that an agreement after the congressional elections or after the 
first round of presidential elections could be possible.  He said 
party leaders could strike a deal amongst themselves or could 
instruct their voters to support another candidate once their 
candidates were eliminated from contention.  Another option would 
be a mixed ticket with a presidential candidate from one party and 
a VP from another, something that is permitted under Colombian law 
but has never been used. 
 
 
 
FAJARDO WILL FIZZLE, URIBE 
 
OR SANTOS MOST LIKELY TO WIN 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Pardo said that although independent Fajardo was doing 
relatively well in the polls, no candidate had ever won the 
Presidency in Colombia without first having strong congressional 
support.  This included Uribe in 2002, who as an independent 
candidate had the support of large swaths of legislators before he 
was elected President for the first time.  Pardo felt that 
Fajardo's new "Citizen Commitment" movement would win at most 8% of 
congressional seats if it had a "miraculous showing."  This weak 
congressional backing coupled with his lack of party infrastructure 
would stop Fajardo from getting the votes necessary to win a 
presidential election.  He also noted that polls show that Fajardo 
does well in big cities, but less so in rural areas or nationwide. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Pardo agreed with conventional wisdom (and poll predictions) 
that if Uribe is allowed to run for a third term, he would win in 
the first round.  If Uribe does not run but blesses a successor, 
Pardo thinks the election would go to a second round.  He said 
Santos would fare best among the pro-Uribe candidates (possibly 
 
 
getting 40% of the vote in the first round), but would not get all 
the votes from the PC, independents, and others that were loyal to 
Uribe but not to Santos or the U Party.  Pardo was trying to place 
himself as close to the center as possible, hoping to draw votes 
from both the right and left and refraining from criticizing any 
competitors or parties who were also opposed to reelection. 
 
 
 
REELECTION REFERENDUM COMPLAINTS 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Like most other opposition candidates, Pardo complained 
about the lack of guarantees designed to level the playing field 
between a sitting president-candidate and opposition aspirants.  He 
did not fault Uribe for not declaring himself a candidate, as Uribe 
could not legally do so unless the Constitution were changed.  But 
he said the uncertainty was stifling campaigns, and that if the 
Constitutional Court allowed the referendum to go forward, the 
referendum would be rushed with little opportunity for 
anti-reelection forces to campaign against it.  Pardo echoed 
worries that Colombian institutions had already been harmed by the 
2006 reelection's damage to checks-and-balances, and would be 
further weakened if the referendum process proceeded. 
 
 
 
PLAN COLOMBIA, CONSOLIDATION, LAND, & IDPs 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Pardo, who was named Peace Commissioner in 1988 and then 
President Cesar Gaviria's Minister of Defense until 1994, called 
Plan Colombia a success.  If elected, he would increase linkages to 
agricultural policies in order to improve consolidation and prevent 
future conflicts.  He would also appoint a special envoy to each 
region, in order to centralize consolidation efforts.  For regions 
with good local governance, the envoy would be a direct link to the 
central government, while in regions with inept or criminal 
leaders, the envoy would coordinate GOC programs more directly. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) Like PDA candidate Gustavo Petro, Pardo is a strong 
proponent of improving land titling and redistributing land from 
large criminal "mafias" to small farmers.  The Ambassador and Pardo 
also discussed Colombia's 4 million displaced individuals, with 
Pardo agreeing that different policies were needed for those who 
had permanently settled into new areas versus those who still hoped 
to return to their homelands. 
 
 
 
DCA, VENEZUELA & CUBA 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) Pardo reiterated his support for the U.S.-Colombia Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), as well as his views that DCA 
communications could have been handled better and that the DCA 
should have been approved by the Colombian Congress.  Pardo advised 
that declarations about Venezuela by USG officials visiting 
Colombia were unhelpful.  He hoped to separate the USG's tensions 
with Venezuela from Colombia's issues with Venezuela.  He also 
noted that bellicose Venezuelan statements often came during or 
just after Chavez visits to Havana. 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) Senator Cristo, from the border department of Norte de 
 
 
Santander, requested that the USG focus more attention on areas 
near the Venezuelan border.  Calling drug trafficking and crime 
virtually unchecked in those areas, he suggested increased USG 
counternarcotics and development activities. 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) Pardo was frank, accepted political realities and 
demonstrated a mastery of polling data.  His lack of confidence in 
his PL doing better in upcoming elections reflects the weak turnout 
for the PL's presidential primaries (reftel) and Uribe's steady 
high popularity.  Pardo cannot easily veer to the left with Petro 
or to the right with Vargas or others without alienating a portion 
of the PL base.  He is publicly outspoken in his opposition to the 
Uribe coalition, hoping to capture as many anti-reelection votes as 
possible.  While Pardo seems to have concluded that he will not win 
the Presidency, he is focused on helping the PL in the 
congressional elections and is open to joining forces with other 
parties.  Given his experience as minister and senator, Pardo asked 
informed questions regarding USG policies.  Although his knowledge, 
experience and political savvy would make him a great minister, 
advisor or campaign manager, his elite background and lack of 
charisma make him a relatively weak presidential candidate. 
BROWNFIELD