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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 000051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: TRANSIT CENTER RENEWAL AND U.S. COMMITMENTS LOOM 
LARGE IN U.S.-KYRGZYSTAN RELATIONSHIP 
 
REF: (A) 2009 BISHKEK 1006 (B) 2009 BISHKEK 987 (C) 
     2009 BISHKEK 1148 (D) 2009 STATE 35762 (E) 
     2009 BISHKEK 1247 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (U) See para 18 for action requests. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  The U.S. must inform the Government of 
Kyrgyzstan of its intent to renew the Transit Center 
agreement for another year by April 14.  Since the agreement 
went into effect in July 2009, U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations have 
improved significantly and Kyrgyzstan seems interested in 
further strengthening our partnership.  The rise of President 
Bakiyev's son, Maksim, may also contribute to improving 
bilateral relations.  There has been no indication that the 
Kyrgyz intend to ask for renegotiation of the current 
agreement.  However, it is clear that they are following 
closely the agreement's implementation, judging not only how 
well we are able to meet its letter and spirit, but also how 
much concrete benefit Kyrgyzstan is getting from its 
cooperation with the U.S.  We have concerns about the results 
of their assessments, which we highlight below.  End Summary. 
 
Traffic Jam at the Transit Center 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On the weekend of January 9-10, an increase in USG use 
of Transit Center Manas and a little bad luck led to Manas 
International Airport being temporarily over capacity. 
Civilian flights experienced delays and airport management 
exhibited frustration with the Transit Center as the 
operation experienced its first overload since the beginning 
of the force plus-up intended to move substantially more 
troops and equipment into Afghanistan over the coming months. 
 The Transit Center served some 24,000 transiting coalition 
forces per month in 2009 and some 450 short tons of cargo. 
Some 30,000 personnel and 600 short tons of cargo will pass 
through the Transit Center this month, and it will likely 
remain at capacity over the next six months.  The Transit 
Center also provides 30 percent of the air refueling over 
Afghanistan and may play a critical role in expanding the 
Northern Distribution Network in Kyrgyzstan, serving as a 
base of operations for contracting and shipping. 
 
¶4.  (C) What was effectively a traffic jam at the airport 
illustrates several important points.  First, virtually every 
U.S. and coalition soldier stationed in Afghanistan passes 
through Transit Center Manas, most of them twice.  At 
present, there is no route which competes with Manas for 
transportation of military forces into battle.  Second, the 
Transit Center at Manas, despite its excellent management and 
solid cooperation from the host government, can still be a 
bottleneck for our logistical support into Afghanistan.  And 
third, our operations in Manas are high visibility and have 
the potential to create significant irritations and 
frustrations in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
¶5.  (C) During the first six months of the Transit Center 
agreement, the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan partnership has improved 
significantly as the Government of Kyrgyzstan moved closer to 
the U.S.  In a matter of months, Kyryzstan went from its 
decision to close the Manas Airbase to signing the new 
Transit Center agreement, a very successful and public 
September 11 visit to the Transit Center by President Bakiyev 
(ref a), and the returning to the U.S. of weapons which had 
been seized in August 2008 by Kyrgyz uthorities (ref b). 
The October 2009 arrest and detention of two Embassy FSN 
employees (ref c) and the two month delay of the Transit 
Center rent payment did not derail relations.  The cordial 
tone of the Ambassador's recent meetings with senior 
government officials, including with the President's son and 
 
BISHKEK 00000051  002 OF 005 
 
 
brother, have demonstrated that for now key figures in the 
government are interested in working with the U.S. and 
building a closer relationship. 
 
¶6.  (C) The rise of President Bakiyev's son, Maksim, and his 
allies in the government seems to have played a key role in 
the warming of U.S.-Kyrgyz relations.  As we reported ref e, 
Maksim Bakiyev is very interested in seeing Kyrgyzstan's 
relationship with the U.S. broadened and deepened.  In 
meetings with us he appears to be struggling to determine to 
what extent the U.S. might be interested in making its 
military presence permanent and its relationship with 
Kyrgyzstan closer. 
 
Renewing the Agreement 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Transit Center Agreement requires that the U.S. 
notify Kyrgyzstan by April 14 if it intends to renew the 
agreement for another year.  We have received no indication 
from the Kyrgyz that they are looking to renegotiate the 
Agreement this year.  However, it is clear to us that they 
are following very closely our compliance with its terms and 
with other commitments we have made, reviewing the benefits 
they derive from their cooperation with the U.S., and judging 
our long-term commitment to the region.  If they decide their 
interests are not being served by the agreement as it stands, 
there is no doubt that they will open it up again.  The key 
issues in the Kyrgyz appraisal will likely be the $15 million 
quarterly payment, the construction projects at the 
airport/Transit Center, the air traffic control project, the 
Economic Development Fund, levels of continuing U.S. 
assistance, implementation of joint security at the Transit 
Center, promised counternarcotics and counter-terrorism 
funding, and economic benefits from contracting for both the 
Transit Center and the Northern Distribution Network. 
 
Paying the Rent 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The first $15 million payment came more than two 
months after the end of the quarter.  We understand that DOD 
is working to make the payment for the second quarter, which 
ended January 14, more quickly.  The Foreign Minister raised 
this issue with us in numerous meetings over the past three 
months. 
 
Construction at the Airport 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) One of the great accomplishments of the team that 
negotiated the Transit Center Agreement was turning the $30 
million dollar ramp project, something the USG had been 
asking Kyrgyzstan to accept, into a deliverable seen as 
partial payment by the USG for use of the facilities.  During 
his visit to the Center in September, President Bakiyev told 
the Transit Center Director that he wanted the ramp completed 
as soon as possible.  Unfortunately, the tender for the ramp 
project was protested by the losing bidders, resulting in a 
delay of several months.  The project is moving forward again 
and is in the design stage, with construction about to begin, 
but is behind schedule. 
 
Air Traffic Control 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The U.S. Congress has appropriated $30 million to 
provide a new air traffic control system for Kyrgyzstan.  The 
USAF,s Electronic Systems Command engineering team and 
interagency representatives who visited in August told Kyrgyz 
officials that they would provide a report with technical 
recommendations for using the funds in December.  That report 
has not been delivered, and the Foreign Minister has asked us 
 
BISHKEK 00000051  003 OF 005 
 
 
about the status of the project. 
 
The Economic Development Fund 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) We are better off on the Economic Development Fund. 
We understand, and have reported to the Kyrgyz, that the full 
$20 million has now been identified.  We are discussing a 
structure for the management of the fund with the Central 
Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovation and hope 
to move forward with specific proposals very soon. 
 
Assistance Levels 
----------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Kyrgyz have followed the funding of the Economic 
Development Fund very closely, scrutinizing the information 
we have provided and keeping an eye on appropriations 
processes in Washington, focused mostly on the issue of 
"additionality."  Their concern with ensuring that the $20 
million for the Fund was new money is rooted in a Kyrgyz 
perception that under the previous agreement the U.S., by 
adding together its ongoing assistance programs and tying all 
of them to the Base Agreement, amounted to some kind of 
"shell game."  As erroneous as this analysis may be, it 
clearly taints the thinking of President Bakiyev and 
motivates the actions of officials, such as the Foreign 
Minister, who must present to him the results of the current 
agreement.  We expect that the Kyrgyz will be very tuned into 
assistance levels in forthcoming budgets and that they will 
have a strong impact on Kyrgyz perceptions of the U.S. 
commitment to the relationship.  Currently proposed cuts of 
more than $8.5 million in our USAID program for FY11 could 
cost us much more than they save if they precipitated a 
renegotiation of the Transit Center Agreement next year. 
 
Joint Security 
-------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The Kyrgyz have identified the Ministry of 
Interior's Internal Defense Forces as the organization tasked 
with providing joint security for the Transit Center.  To 
implement joint security, the Transit Center needs a 
mechanism to allow it to provide services (food, for example) 
to the unit assigned to its security.  CENTCOM has now 
authorized negotiation of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement with Kyrgyzstan, and expects to send a delegation 
soon to conclude such an agreement.  This issue is on track. 
 
Counternarcotics and Counter-terrorism Funding 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶14.  (C) In the Transit Center Agreement the USG committed to 
providing $21.5 million in counternarcotics and $10 million 
in counter-terrorism funding.  Over the past few weeks the 
Embassy has received two diplomatic notes requesting funding 
under these programs for two agencies and numerous contacts 
from other agencies, apparently orchestrated by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, to request counternarcotics and 
counter-terrorism assistance.  These approaches clearly 
targeted funding under the Transit Center Agreement 
commitments.  At a meeting on January 15, we provided the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Central 
Agency for Development with a breakdown of the expenditures 
already made under these programs.  In fact, we have already 
expended more than the promised $31.5 million on equipment 
and training requested by the Kyrgyz Government.  We promised 
to consider the new requests as new funding becomes available 
and noted that we usually get some funding for both these 
purposes each year.  Our interlocutors seemed satisfied with 
the status of this commitment.  We are concerned, however, 
with conflicting reports that funding for both 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism may fall significantly 
 
BISHKEK 00000051  004 OF 005 
 
 
in FY11. 
 
Contracting for the TC and NDN 
------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (C) From President Bakiyev during his visit to the 
Transit Center, to our contacts in the Kyrgyz Parliament, to 
business and NGO representatives, everyone in Kyrgyzstan is 
interested in selling to the Transit Center and/or the 
Northern Distribution Network (NDN).  The Transit Center has 
done an excellent job at expanding its purchases, especially 
of food, from the local economy and has earned a great deal 
of good press and good will as a result. 
 
¶16.  (C) The Foreign Minister has raised with us on numerous 
occasions his concern that the NDN is contracting with 
Tajiks, rather than Kyrgyz, for trucking into Afghanistan. 
We have been unable to obtain from the Department of Defense 
information on the identity and nationality of the actual 
carriers transporting goods from Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan 
(as opposed to the international companies which serve as 
contractors and sub-contractors).  The Foreign Minister 
contends that currently all the trucks traveling the route 
are Tajik.  If we are unable to give some of this work to the 
Kyrgyz, that will become a serious thorn in the side of the 
relationship. 
 
Transit Center and Embassy Actions 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) The Transit Center and the Embassy have worked 
aggressively to deepen and broaden the bilateral relationship 
and to build public support for the Transit Center. The 
Transit Center has $2.9 million in humanitarian assistance 
either provided or in the pipeline. Families and groups 
related to the airmen have mobilized to offer donations to 
counter the effects of the harsh winter months. Transit 
Center airmen have personally donated over $1 million in cash 
and volunteer hours.  Transit Center medical cooperation is 
making a profound difference to the Kyrgyz military and the 
region around the Center. The coordinated public diplomacy 
effort of the Transit Center and the Embassy, including such 
successes as Transit Center/local team basketball games and 
visits to the Transit Center by parliamentarians and 
journalists are making important inroads into the deep 
suspicion of the Transit Center which was the backdrop of 
last year's decision to expel the U.S. Airbase. 
 
Comment and Action Requests 
--------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (C) Great progress has been made over the past six 
months in improving the bilateral relationship and the 
attitude of both elites and the public toward the United 
States, the USG, and the Transit Center.  The attitude of 
both the Kyrgyz government and population toward the Transit 
Center and the USG could perhaps best be described as 
positive, but still wary.  The government, in particular, is 
actively seeking evidence of USG commitment to a long-term 
relationship.  The more such evidence we can provide, the 
more secure we will be in the use of the Transit Center and 
in our ability to make a difference in this country.  With 
that in mind, Post requests: 
 
--  DOD seek to speed approval and transfer of quarterly 
payments under the agreement, to the extent possible. 
 
--  DOD provide a letter from Electronic Systems Command 
explaining to the Kyrgyz the delay in the air traffic control 
system report and estimating the date by which it will be 
prepared. 
 
--  DOD provide information on contracting for transportation 
 
BISHKEK 00000051  005 OF 005 
 
 
in Kyrgyzstan under the NDN to dispel Kyrgyz concern that 
they should see benefit from their agreement to transit. 
 
--  State seek to ensure that U.S. assistance levels not fall 
significantly in 2011. 
 
--  State and DOD seek opportunities for high-level visits or 
meetings with Kyrgyz officials. 
 
We also recommend that the USG submit its request for 
extension of the current Agreement as soon as possible, as 
the current good mood augurs well for a positive response. 
GFOELLER