VZCZCXRO9405
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTH #0041/01 0271442
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 271441Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1396
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0061
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000041 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/27 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS GR TU CY
SUBJECT: MFA TALKS TURKEY 
 
REF: ANKARA 57 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  MFA interlocutors were wary of Turkish motives in 
the Aegean yet intent on finding ways to improve relations in a 
January 19 meeting.  While they attributed some of the positive 
gestures from Turkey toward the tail-end of 2009 as posturing in 
advance of the December 2009 European Council meeting on EU 
accession progress, they did feel that Turkey was looking to make 
2010 a good year in bilateral relations.  They acknowledged a 
decrease in the amount of Turkish overflights of Greek Aegean 
islands compared to the first nine months of 2009, but said 
overflights continue.  The challenge in bilateral relations, they 
noted, was how to turn warm atmospherics into concrete results; 
they observed with concern the continuation of Turkey's troubling 
behavior and claims in the Aegean, and PM Erdogan's recent linking 
of progress on the Halki Seminary to issues involving Greek muslims 
of Turkish descent in western Thrace.  They downplayed the 
cancellation of a January 16 trip by Alt/FM Droutsas to Turkey, 
noting it will happen at some point, and anticipated a meeting with 
Turkish FM Davutoglu on the margins of the London Conference on 
Afghanistan.  On Cyprus, they resisted the notion that negotiations 
should be deadline-driven, and again lamented Turkish pressure on 
the Turkish Cypriots.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) PolCouns and Pol-Mil Chief met Counselor Pericles Boutos 
and First Secretary Lili Grammatika of the MFA's Turkey Desk on 
January 19, covering a range of issues in the wake of the contact 
between Greek President Papoulias and Turkish PM Erdogan on the 
margins of the World Future Energy Summit January 18 in Abu Dhabi, 
and the announcement by Erdogan that he intended to visit Greece 
soon. 
 
 
 
a.  (C) GREECE-TURKEY:  Greek press had speculated earlier in 
January that the cancellation of Alternate FM Droutsas' January 16 
trip to Ankara had been a sign of Greek disillusionment with its 
relations with Turkey.  Our interlocutors downplayed such 
speculation, noting that a visit will come at some point in the 
future.  They took PM Erdogan's announcement of a visit to Greece 
prior to being invited in stride, noting that it would have 
happened "sooner rather than later" in any case.  Both indicated 
the MFA working levels had played an insignificant role in the 
formulation of PM Papandreou's reply to PM Erdogan's October 30 
note on bilateral relations (note: the letter was ultimately sent 
on January 25), but stated they had been tasked to devise 
strategies for improving Greek-Turkish relations over the coming 
year, which they had just started working on.  Though they 
dismissed some of the warmth coming from Ankara in late 2009 as 
posturing in advance of the early December European Council review 
on accession progress, they did express their belief that Turkey 
was interested in making 2010 a positive year for bilateral 
relations.  Their primary concern was how to turn these positive 
atmospherics into concrete results, particularly in the Aegean. 
 
 
 
b.  (S/NF) AEGEAN:  Boutos and Grammatika acknowledged that Turkish 
Air Force overflights of Greek islands in the Aegean were occurring 
- albeit less frequently now compared to the first nine months of 
¶2009.  (Comment:  this comment is in line with those reported 
reftel, as well as a series of Athens DATT reporting of Hellenic 
Air Force statistics over 2009 and into 2010 that detailed the 
increase in overflights and the subsequent decrease.  End Comment.) 
In response to a question as to whether or not Turkey was showing 
more initiative of late in resolving Aegean squabbles, specifically 
the Erdogan note and the slow Greek reply, Grammatika responded 
that it was easy for Turkey to put forward initiatives, as Turkey 
was the one seeking to change the Aegean status quo that is based 
on international treaties.  Both interlocutors noted Greek 
willingness to examine Turkish ideas, but were wary on whether they 
 
ATHENS 00000041  002 OF 002 
 
 
were just more of the same non-starters questioning Greek 
sovereignty that had been proposed over the years. 
 
 
 
c.  (C) HALKI:  Both expressed concern at PM Erdogan's recent 
public statements that sought to link progress in reopening the 
Patriarchate's Halki Seminary in Istanbul with issues involving the 
Greek Muslim minority in western Thrace.  (Comment: news reports 
January 26 of Papandreou's response to Erdogan highlighted that 
Papandreou reportedly rejected any linkage between Halki Seminary 
and Thrace Muslim minority issues, underlining that the respect of 
all Greek citizens - regardless of their religious beliefs and 
cultural or ethnic origin - is the exclusive responsibility of the 
Greek state, and that human rights cannot be the object of 
negotiations.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
d.)  (C) CYPRUS:  PolCouns noted our belief that time was vital and 
that negotiations had reached a critical juncture, and encouraged 
Greece to play a positive role.  Boutos acknowledged the pending 
"Presidential" elections in the north, but pushed back against the 
idea of negotiations being driven by a deadline.  He stated that 
Turkey needs to give Talat more freedom, and as always, is too 
heavy-handed. 
Speckhard