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DE RUEHAK #0014/01 0051638
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O 051638Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1604
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0208
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3329
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0463
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6761
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4209
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020 
TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US
SUBJECT: CYPRUS TALKS: TURKISH MFA PLUGS NEW PROPOSAL ON 
CROSS-VOTING 
 
REF: 09 ANKARA 1718 
 
Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman, for reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu on 
January 5 passed the Charge a copy of the Turkish Cypriots' 
latest proposal on Governance and Power-Sharing that includes 
a cross-voting provision to enable Greek Cypriots to have a 
10-20 percent weighted vote on Turkish Cypriot candidates for 
President and Vice President in the new federation. 
Sinirlioglu described this as a significant concession, and 
indicated that it had come over the objections of "TRNC Prime 
Minister" Eroglu and his National Unity Party (UBP).  He also 
noted that the proposal contains a "caveat" of granting 
Turkey the EU Four Freedoms on Cyprus after a solution -- a 
condition likely to be a complicating factor.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) On January 5 MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu convoked 
the Charge, accompanied by POL Counselor, to convey a copy of 
the Turkish Cypriot proposal on Governance and Power Sharing 
that was passed to Greek Cypriot leader Christofias the 
previous day.  Deputy Undersecretary Halit Cevik and 
Greece/Cyprus Deputy Director General Kerim Uras sat in. 
Sinirlioglu noted that the T/C proposal had been handed over 
to Christofias in UNSYG Special Advisor Downer's presence. 
He said Ankara also had passed a copy to the Spanish EU 
Presidency and to the UK, but had asked them to keep it 
confidential and not to pass it along to other EU members. 
He also asked the USG to maintain the confidentiality of the 
package. 
 
¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu noted that Talat (and, by implication, 
Ankara) is trying to keep "one step ahead" of the ROC in the 
negotiating process, and therefore had decided to yield to 
the Greek Cypriot insistence on the principle of cross-voting 
-- something which has never existed on Cyprus since its 1960 
founding.  He said the Turkish Cypriot proposal would allow a 
10 percent weighted voting in the first election of the 
President and Vice President.  This percentage would 
ultimately rise to 20 percent.  (Note: The proposal's actual 
wording states that "the Greek Cypriot votes for the Turkish 
Cypriot candidates shall be weighted so that they form the 
same percentage as the percentage of the Turkish Cypriot 
registered voters in the total number of the Turkish Cypriot 
electorate and Greek Cypriot electorate together."  End Note) 
 Sinirlioglu commented that the principle is more important 
than the actual percentage, and that Christofias had said 
earlier that even one percent would be sufficient. 
 
¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu added that the "caveat" in the proposal is 
that Turkey should also be granted the EU Four Freedoms after 
a solution.  (Note: These are the EU Freedoms of Movement of 
Goods, Capital, Services and Persons -- distinct from the 
Three Freedoms of Movement, Settlement and Property which 
have been laced into the Cyprus talks since the late 1970s. 
End Note)  He said the granting of EU membership to the Greek 
Cypriots in 2004 had altered the balance of power on the 
island.  Any settlement should reinstitute the original 
balance, with a derogation for Turkey to enjoy the EU Four 
Freedoms.  This point would have to be "negotiated" with the 
EU, Sinirlioglu said, but argued that the new proposal 
"deserves support" from the USG. 
 
¶5. (C) We asked if "TRNC Prime Minister" Eroglu and his 
National Unity Party (UBP) now supported this cross-voting 
concept, since we understood that earlier they had strongly 
opposed it.  Sinirlioglu conceded that UBP "were against it 
but have been fully informed" about the latest package.  Uras 
interjected that the Governance and Power-Sharing proposal 
should be seen as a "significant sacrifice" by Turkish 
Cypriot leader Talat and the Turkish Cypriots because it was 
viewed as such a sensitive issue in the north. 
 
¶6. (C) The Charge said the US has been closely following the 
negotiating process and remains cautiously optimistic about a 
settlement.  He promised to consult with Washington on the 
latest proposal.  He asked if Ankara has seen any movement on 
the calls for a trilateral (Greece, Britain, Turkey) or 
quadrilateral (Greece, Turkey, T/C, G/C) meeeting. 
Sinirlioglu said the Spanish have been working on the latter 
and are optimistic after getting positive initial reactions 
from the Greek Cypriots and Greece.  On the former, he said 
Ankara is still talking to the British to get clarity on 
 
their intentions.  "We don't want to give an excuse to anyone 
to derail talks on the island."  Now is not the time to 
discuss issues such as the Treaty of Guarantee, he said. 
"Let us first see a light at the end of the negotiating 
tunnel."  Issues of Governance and Property are more 
concrete, he noted. 
 
¶7. (C) A non-paper attached to the draft proposal states that 
it contains "other elements which are forward leaning," such 
as:  changing the T/C position on numerical equality in some 
important economic institutions; giving some additional 
competences (such as health and antiquities) to the federal 
government; giving the federal executive the right to suspend 
an agreement of the Constituent States and refer it to the 
Constitutional Court, even if this agreement is on a matter 
that falls within the competence of the Constituent States. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  It is instructive, and laudable, that Ankara 
seems to have supported Talat in this package over the 
objections of "PM" Eroglu and his UBP colleagues.  The GOT 
seems both determined to bridge key differences on this 
Governance and Power-Sharing chapter, and also to get credit 
from us and the EU for being "forward leaning."  The caveat 
on granting to Turkey the EU Four Freedoms on Cyprus will 
almost certainly be a complicating factor. 
 
¶9. (C) We will scan and transmit the Proposal and non-paper 
to EUR/SE. 
 
 
           "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s 
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey" 
 
 
SILLIMAN