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Viewing cable 10AITTAIPEI95, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10AITTAIPEI95 2010-01-25 09:36 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0095/01 0250936
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250936Z JAN 10
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3198
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9663
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1047
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage January 23-25 on the year-end five city and county 
magistrates' elections; on developments in cross-Strait relations; 
and on President Ma Ying-jeou's scheduled visit to Honduras and the 
Dominican Republic.  All major Chinese-language and English-language 
papers in Taiwan reported on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 
January 21 speech on Internet freedom and President Barack Obama's 
follow-on remarks that he hopes China will provide answers to the 
allegation that Google was hacked.  In terms of editorials and 
commentaries, an op-ed in the China-focused "Want Daily" discussed 
changing U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and said there are still some 
hard to mediate conflicts among the three sides.  An op-ed in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" discussed Google's 
threat to quit China and said Google's step "is a courageous move 
that has prompted considerable rethinking" among Western companies 
and governments about how to approach China.  The Taiwan government 
should also do its own reflecting, the article commented.  End 
summary. 
 
 
A) "Conflicts Difficult to Mediate between Washington, Beijing and 
Taiwan" 
 
Dr. Cheng Tuan-yao from National Chengchi University's Institute of 
International Relations, opined in the China-focused "Want Daily" 
[circulation: 10,000] (1/25): 
 
"... Since the Ma Ying-jeou administration assumed office in May, 
2008, the ties between Washington, Beijing and Taipei have formed a 
triangle of positive and friendly relations, which was unprecedented 
over the past six decades -- both unique and extraordinary.  Yet it 
is undeniable that there are hard to mediate conflicts among the 
three sides, which not only were not alleviated because [the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait] tried to shelve their disputes but have 
become more evident with the rise of China's power and increasing 
exchanges among the three sides.  First, conflicts between 
Washington and Beijing over their values and power relations are 
expanding. ... 
 
"When it comes to U.S.-Taiwan relations, the positioning of the 
roles the two sides should play is getting vaguer and vaguer. 
Taiwan, which used to be a loyal ally to the United States, has now 
moved toward a middle-of-the road strategic line in an attempt to 
maintain a friendly interaction with both the United States and 
China.  It tries to befriend China for its economic interests while 
seeking U.S. support for its security interests.  As it turns out, 
Taiwan turned down the [import of] U.S. beef on the one hand but 
requests arms sales from the United States on the other.  For the 
United States, is Taiwan a liability or an asset for the U.S.-China 
relationship after all?  Without Taiwan as a burden, will the United 
States be able to further expand its cooperation with China?  Or is 
it that Taiwan still has the democratic and strategic value of 
helping the United States obstruct the expansion of China?  No 
matter what [the answers are], except for the arms sales and 
controversy over [U.S.] beef [imports], there does not seem to be 
any other issues between Washington and Taipei over the past year 
that show their bilateral cooperation.  It appears that the apparent 
smoothness in U.S.-Taiwan relations has failed to cover up the 
draining relations between the two sides. 
 
"In addition, regarding cross-Strait relations, both sides have yet 
to shorten their political gap because of their improved relations. 
... When we look ahead at the future, it is all right that we keep 
an optimistic attitude toward the triangular relationship between 
Washington, Beijing and Taipei.  Nonetheless, we must not hold 
unrealistic expectations for the relationship, because, after all, 
the conflicts which are hard to mediate among the three sides still 
remain. ..." 
 
B) "Google's Wake-up Call to the World" 
 
Nat Bellocchi, former AIT chairman and now a special adviser to the 
Liberty Times Group, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (/25): 
 
"... Google's step is a courageous move that has prompted 
considerable rethinking among businesses and governments around the 
world: People are losing patience with Beijing's heavy-handed ways. 
Many in the West are reconsidering the wisdom of engagement policies 
that assumed that economic development would lead to political 
liberalization in China.  Against this background, what are the 
implications of rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait? As has been 
stated before: Everyone is in favor of reduced tensions -- but under 
what conditions? Placating an aggressive neighbor could temporarily 
lead to reduced tensions, but in the long run it only temps the 
aggressor, aggravating the situation.  Three basic conditions that 
must be met in order for progress to made in the Taiwan Strait are: 
a clear consensus in Taiwan on the way ahead; equity, balance and 
transparency in cross-strait negotiations (with mutual respect for 
 
 
each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty); and the 
promotion of Taiwan's international standing and reduction of its 
international isolation. ... 
 
"While Western companies and governments rethink how to approach 
China, Taiwan's government should do its own reflecting. If it 
continues to drift toward China, it will meet increasing hesitation 
from Western governments and companies.  Until now, the West has 
been willing to maintain informal but solid ties with Taiwan. Closer 
links with China will widen the gap between Taiwan and the 
democratic West.  Much will also depend on how the US deals with 
these issues. The administration of US President Barack Obama has 
said it would lodge a formal diplomatic protest in Beijing over the 
cyber attacks against Google and other US corporate interests. But 
it needs to go further than that: It needs to engage China 
forcefully on the wide array of matters mentioned earlier, including 
cyber-security, Tibet and the climate. 
 
"Just as the shot heard around the world in 1775 marked the end of 
'business as usual' and the start of a new vigilance, Google's move 
should mark the start of a renewed emphasis on the principles of 
'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' This should factor 
into the US' -- and Taiwan's -- interaction with China." 
 
STANTON