VZCZCXRO1729
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0746/01 3551124
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211124Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9751
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0058
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0736
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND PRM; BELGRADE FOR REFCOORD; 
GENEVA FOR MULREAN AND PITOTTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
TAGS: PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR
SUBJECT: CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON 
THE AGENDA FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE (CORRECTED 
COPY) 
 
REF: ZAGREB 728 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Foley for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The expert-level meeting between Croatia and 
Serbia in early December aimed at defining an agenda for a 
Belgrade-sponsored conference to address the lingering 
refugee issues in the region did not go well, according to 
contacts in Zagreb.  The only agreement the parties reached 
was to meet in mid-January to try again on setting an agenda 
for the conference, which is tentatively scheduled for late 
winter.  We judge there is little likelihood that the parties 
will be able to reach agreement in the near-term on the 
preparatory work that is essential to ensure the conference's 
ultimate success.  A poorly implemented conference that would 
only result in finger pointing would be a setback, not only 
for the resolution of lingering refugee issues, but also for 
Croatian-Serbian relations.  The best prospects for making 
progress on the refugee issues may instead come from 
attempting to develop a more comprehensive package of 
measures to resolve a myriad of the lingering and 
interconnected issues stemming from the war, which could have 
appeal to all sides.  Such an initiative could be a powerful 
factor in normalizing the relations between Croatia and 
Serbia, and help stabilize the rest of the region.  The 
aftermath of the inauguration of a new Croatian President in 
mid-February could be a propitious period for exploring 
elements of a comprehensive approach. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) Expert-level delegations from Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Montenegro met in Belgrade on December 7 and 8 to discuss 
the potential agenda for a regional conference proposed by 
Serbia and supported by the UNHCR to seek resolution of the 
remaining refugee issues in the region.  The Serbian 
government would like to hold the refugee conference in 
Belgrade in late February or early March.  The Croatian and 
Serbian delegations met bilaterally on the first day. 
According to Croatian participants, it was a wrangle over a 
myriad of contentious issues and made very little progress on 
defining a potential agenda.  The core issue is the Serbian 
demand that Croatia provide compensation for Croatian Serb 
refugees who fled during the war and would rather remain in 
Serbia or Bosnia than try to return and re-integrate into 
Croatia. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the end, the Serbian delegation provided each of 
the parties an extensive list of refugee-related issues that 
Belgrade considers unresolved and would like to be included 
in the conference agenda.  The Croatian delegation made a 
commitment to study the proposed topics and offered to host a 
follow-on expert-level meeting in mid-January to again 
attempt to define the conference agenda. 
 
¶4. (C) On the second day of the experts-level meetings, 
representatives from the Belgrade offices of the UNCHR and 
OSCE were invited to participate.  The UNCHR office in Zagreb 
is now pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an 
agreement on a conference agenda in January.  On substance 
there was reportedly little meeting of the minds in terms of 
the priorities for the conference and the sides could not 
even agree on a working title for the conference.  The 
Croatian side objects to a Serbian proposal that the 
conference title refer to the region's prospects for EU 
accession.  The GoC believes this is an effort by Serbia to 
make any commitments that emerged from the conference part of 
the EU accession benchmarks for each country, which could 
then threaten to delay Croatia's EU membership. 
 
¶5. (C) According to UNHCR, the Serbian delegation 
acknowledged it was important to find a common agreement on 
the number of refugees located in each country -- the UNHCR 
has noted some 10,000  refugees that are erroneously 
registered in more than one country -- but appeared unwilling 
to resolve this issue prior to the conference.  Croatia 
argues that before any discussion of the way forward on the 
protracted refugee situation can be productive there needs to 
be agreement on the numbers concerned.  UNHCR Zagreb's 
pessimism also reflects a recognition of deeply held, highly 
emotive, and discordant beliefs harbored by each side. 
Tellingly, the UNHCR read-out noted that at dinner on 
December 7 the two heads of delegation, Serbian Commissioner 
for Refugees Vladimir Cucic and Croatian Director General for 
Multilateral Affairs Mario Nobilo, had a heated exchange in 
which the Croat insisted Serbia must take responsibility for 
the destruction of Vukovar while the Serb insisted that 
 
ZAGREB 00000746  002 OF 002 
 
 
Croatia is obliged to pay compensation to Serbs who fled 
during the war (and were stripped of tenancy rights) and do 
not want to return to Croatia. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶6. (C) The deep sensitivity of this issue is further 
reflected in the arguments over the pending Croatian genocide 
suit and Serbian counter-suit at the ICJ.  This underscores 
the risk to U.S. objectives in the region of bringing the 
issue of refugees who have chosen to settle in Serbia under 
the penumbra of EU accession.  Not only could it delay 
Croatia's EU accession, it could end up complicating and 
delaying Serbia's own EU bid itself. 
 
¶7. (C) Who bears responsibility for the ethnic Serbs who fled 
Croatia during the war is the central irritant in 
Croatia-Serbia relations (reftel).  In that sense, the 
initiative to find a resolution to the remaining refugee 
issues is welcome on more than one account.  However, it is 
unlikely to succeed if it aims to compel Croatia to 
compensate refugees who refuse to return, in isolation from a 
discussion of Serbia's own responsibility for the damage and 
disruption caused by the war.  The budgetary implications for 
Croatia alone would make this a tough sell and the politics 
of paying people who do not want to return to Croatia are 
even tougher: Croatian politicians and public would 
immediately object that Serbia has never paid any damages to 
Croatia for the war.  The GoC would likely insist additional 
funds be spent on housing and re-integration of those who 
have returned or are still willing to return.  (An 
international fund to provide compensation to both refugees 
in Serbia and to victims of the war in Croatia might provide 
a way out of this impasse, but our understanding is that 
external donor funding for such an effort is unlikely.)  END 
COMMENT. 
 
A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
 
¶8. (C)  The linkages among these issues argue for a 
comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would 
also potentially include B-H and Montenegro).  The election 
of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an 
opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship 
forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the 
time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both 
to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue.  A 
better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to 
construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a 
number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s, 
potentially including refugees, genocide claims and 
reparations.  Such a comprehensive agreement would take time 
and need to be guided in part by the US and key European 
capitals.  But success would pay long-term dividends, as it 
would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's 
quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
WALKER