VZCZCXRO2065
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHNO #0595/01 3551502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211502Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3750
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000595 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA:  SECRETARY GENERAL'S TRIP TO MOSCOW 
 
USNATO 00000595  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U)  Below is a written summary provided by Secretary 
General Rasmussen of his December 15-17 visit to Moscow.  The 
SecGen's schedule included meetings with President Medvedev, 
Premier Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Security 
Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Russian 
Parliamentarians.  He also visited NATO's Information Office 
and Military Liaison Mission in Moscow and gave a speech at 
the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO).  We will report septel regarding how Allies will 
follow-up on the SecGen's visit. 
 
¶2. (U) Text of written summary: 
 
¶3. (SBU) My visit to Moscow took place in a constructive and 
forward-looking atmosphere. I met with President Medvedev, 
Prime Minister Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, the Secretary 
of the Security Council Patrushev, the Chairman of the 
Federation Council Mironov, and the Chairman of the State 
Duma Gryzlov. I found my interlocutors well disposed to 
cooperation with NATO, and ready for a constructive dialogue 
on a wide range of issues, including on those where we 
disagree. 
 
¶4. (SBU) I delivered the following messages to Moscow: Russia 
is one of my top priorities as NATO Secretary General. Allies 
remain committed to improving relations, as well as 
broadening cooperation in the NRC. NATO and Russia are now 
facing common threats and challenges, in particular in 
Afghanistan and stemming from issues such as terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy. 
Therefore, we need to unite our efforts in order to face them 
more efficiently. The Joint Review on 21st Century Common 
Security Challenges will allow us to identify our common 
threats. Based on the Review, we can proceed to broaden our 
practical cooperation using the new and reinvigorated NRC 
structure. I underlined that timely and efficient 
implementation of the three Ministerial deliverables will be 
crucial and that we rely on the full and productive 
engagement of the Russian side in this process. 
 
¶5. (SBU) My interlocutors underscored their commitment to the 
full-fledged resumption of NATO-Russia relations and their 
intention to quickly and effectively implement the three 
deliverables agreed by NRC Foreign Ministers on 4 December. 
Russia seems ready to broaden and deepen cooperation with 
NATO, including in the military sphere, despite current 
disagreements on some key issues. 
 
¶6. (SBU) With regard to Afghanistan, I underscored the need 
to strengthen our cooperation and asked Russia for further 
contributions in three concrete areas: 
 
¶7. (SBU) First, a comprehensive helicopter package: I asked 
my interlocutors to consider donations of helicopters to the 
Afghan National Army. Training of Afghan helicopter pilots by 
Russian instructors within the NRC framework could be an 
additional useful contribution. Additionally, I proposed that 
Russia consider the provision of helicopter spare parts, 
maintenance and fuel as part of such a package. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Second, based on the on-going Russian assistance to 
Afghan security forces, I asked Moscow to consider expanding 
training of Afghan police forces in its centers of 
excellence, within the framework of the NRC. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Third, building on the successful experience of the 
NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and 
Central Asian Personnel, consider expanding further the scope 
of the Project by following up on the Afghan authorities' 
request for longer in-country training of counter-narcotics 
personnel. 
 
¶10. (SBU) I underlined that a positive reaction by the 
Russian Federation would underscore our joint commitment to 
contributing to the Afghan Government's efforts aimed at the 
stabilization of the country, as well as highlighting the new 
and constructive atmosphere in the NATO-Russia Council. I 
also urged the Russian side to consider NATO's June 18 
invitation to re-deploy one ship in Operation ACTIVE 
ENDEAVOUR. 
 
 
USNATO 00000595  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and 
Minister Lavrov all agreed with the need to do more on 
Afghanistan, and underscored Russia's determination to 
support the NATO's ISAF mission (sic). President Medvedev 
tasked the relevant Russian agencies to consider my concrete 
proposals for additional contributions. Minister Lavrov was 
optimistic about possibilities related to joint training of 
Afghan police, and an eventual extended in-country 
counter-narcotics training of the Afghan security forces. He 
was, however, more cautious on the feasibility for a positive 
decision on the "helicopter package". Prime Minister Putin 
underlined that if NATO expected donations, this would have 
effect on the budget of the Ministry of Defence, something 
which would take time to sort out. Still, he affirmed that 
the proposals would be given serious consideration. 
 
¶12. (SBU) All interlocutors asked NATO to consider positively 
CSTO's request for establishing formal relations with NATO, 
and referred to the fact that several allies already 
participate as observers to CSTO's annual drug interdiction 
operation "Kanal" conducted on Afghanistan's Northern border. 
Furthermore, Minister Lavrov signaled that Russia would 
expect to participate in relevant meetings, such as those 
conducted in the 28 5 1 format, although he did not 
explicitly mention participation in ISAF meetings. Lavrov and 
President Medvedev further suggested possible joint logistics 
cooperation in repairing the tunnel on the Uzbek-Afghan 
border. Minister Lavrov underlined that next year's London 
conference should be used better in terms of raising more 
tangible contributions for Afghanistan, and in terms of 
emphasizing the regional dimension also by broader inclusion 
of China and India. 
 
¶13. (SBU) President Medvedev underscored Russia's interest in 
pursuing cooperation on counter-piracy with NATO, but did not 
specify how. On Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, Minister Lavrov 
reiterated that there are no political obstacles to Russia's 
reintegration, although a deployment has not been envisioned 
in 2010 for budgetary reasons. However, ships transiting the 
Mediterranean for anti-piracy duty off Somalia could possibly 
participate in OAE on short-term basis. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Turning to more contentious issues in our 
relations, I reiterated the Alliance positions on Georgia, 
CFE and NATO's Open Door policy. I maintained that the Open 
Door Policy has actually benefited Russia by providing 
stability along its Western borders and increased economic 
opportunities. I emphasized the need to be creative and 
forward-looking in seeking mutually acceptable solutions to 
these issues. I pointed out that activities, such as the 
recent large scale military exercises did not contribute to 
the climate of transparency and confidence building we have 
been aiming for since our joint decision to re-launch NRC 
relations. 
 
¶15. (SBU) President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and 
Minister Lavrov all spoke about what Russian authorities 
perceive as continued military build-up by Georgia, with the 
assistance of some Allies, which, they claimed, undermined 
stability in the region. Prime Minister Putin pointed out 
that the Russian troops that had "suppressed" the Georgian 
aggression had long left the territory of Georgia beyond 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and, that Russia had fulfilled 
its commitments under the cease-fire agreement. Further, he 
maintained that the EU commissioned report had concluded that 
Georgia started the August 08 war. Approximately 100 Russian 
peacekeepers had been killed, and in his view Russia had had 
no option but to act. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On NATO's Open Door policy, Minister Lavrov pointed 
out that while Russia respected the OSCE principle that all 
states are free to choose their security affiliations, 
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a product of the 
run-up to the Cold War and NATO should consider its 
implications in the current European context. Georgia's 
perception, rightly or wrongly, that the country was well on 
its way to NATO membership had only encouraged irresponsible 
behavior. The Foreign Ministers' recent decisions on MAP with 
regard to Bosnia Hercegovina and Montenegro were not 
mentioned by any interlocutors. 
 
 
USNATO 00000595  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) As regards the new Russian draft 'Agreement on 
Basic Principles governing Relations Among NRC Members in the 
Security Sphere', presented by Minister Lavrov at the NRC 
Foreign Ministers' meeting, as well as the draft European 
security treaty initiated by President Medvedev, it struck me 
that Minister Lavrov appeared to be very well-informed about 
the contents of our confidential discussion at 28 that we had 
at the beginning of this week. I informed the Russian side 
that Allies were now examining closely these drafts. I also 
pointed out that Allies questioned the need to re-cast in a 
legally binding form already existing joint commitments, such 
as the indivisibility of security, which are contained in 
documents such as the 1999 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE 
Charter, as well as in the Founding Act and the Rome 
Declaration. Therefore, the existing security arrangements in 
Europe provide a comprehensive and sufficient framework in 
which each country's security interests can be addressed 
effectively. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin explained that Russia 
was seeking legally binding documents, as, in their view, the 
existing political assurances were not sufficient in 
preventing, for example, last year's Georgian aggression on 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In relation to the draft NRC 
agreement, Minister Lavrov pointed out that Russia had long 
sought to define "substantial combat forces" referred to in 
the Founding Act. Following the Alliance's long-standing 
reluctance to do it, Russia felt compelled to suggest a 
starting point for such negotiations. He added that Russia 
would be ready to renew negotiations on the Parallel Action 
Package and the future of the CFE regime. Minister Lavrov 
also noted, however, that Russia was not considering a 
resumption of its obligations under the CFE at the current 
time. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Prime Minister Putin, in his turn, tied the need 
for progress on CFE to the proposed European Security Treaty. 
He led me to understand that lack of progress on the CFE 
front had forced Moscow to table the proposed treaty on 
European Security, as it in his view was clear that Allies 
have no legal reason not to ratify the CFE treaty, but had 
made a political decision not to do so. END TEXT. 
HEFFERN