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INFO RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0359
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000573 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
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SUBJECT: WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: PLENARY REPORT DECEMBER 2-3 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 522 - GENERAL WORKING GROUP REPORT OCTOBER 
     ¶B. UNVIE 559 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON PLENARY 
        DECISION ON EXTENSION FOR HEAD OF 
        SECRETARIAT 
     ¶C. SECSTATE 123508 - GUIDANCE FOR DECEMBER 
        WASSENAAR PLENARY 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Changes to the controls lists continues to be 
the strong success story of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 
Plenary meetings.  Russian intransigence on policy issues 
remains the stumbling block to progress on Best Practices. 
The Russian head of delegation (Grigory Mashkov) refused to 
approve a one-year extension of the current head of 
secretariat, surprising the assembly by instead asking for a 
two-year extension, to be approved through a silence 
procedure because extension needed approval from Moscow.  On 
a positive note, the Plenary approved a U.S. proposal to 
conduct a briefing on changes to the control lists, after the 
U.S. delegation obtained Russian agreement.  End Summary. 
 
Head of Delegation Pre-Meeting 
 
¶2. (C) The WA Plenary began inauspiciously at a December 1 
Head of Delegation (HOD) meeting called by the Plenary Chair 
to determine whether there was agreement on a number of 
General Working Group (GWG) proposals that in October were 
close to agreement.  In October only France had objected to 
Japan's proposed Best Practices on Internal Compliance 
Programs, but expected to resolve these issues by the 
Plenary.  Japan posted a revised text on November 19 that 
contained minor grammatical fixes, but at the HOD meeting 
Russian Head of Delegation Grigory Mashkov claimed it had 
been "70% changed" and therefore Russia needed more time to 
review.  A Danish proposal on transportation of arms that had 
been held pending U.S. clearance, but subsequently approved 
by the U.S., was also blocked by Russia based on its view 
that the proposal went beyond the WA's mandate. 
 
¶3. (C) With respect to the Russian proposal on Best Practices 
on Re-Export Control, Poland took the lead in saying it was 
working on a revised text that it thought would take into 
account the concerns of all parties.  Mashkov responded that 
the EU statement at the May GWG created problems, because the 
statement was a "take it or leave it" proposition and as such 
was unacceptable.  Furthermore, Russia objected to having an 
entity (the EU) that is not a member of the WA dictate policy 
in Wassenaar.  (Note: At the May GWG, the Czech delegation, 
as then EU president, issued a statement saying all EU 
countries that are members of the WA objected to the Russian 
draft of the Best Practices document; instead they supported 
the Polish edits.  Ref. A, para 3.  End note.)  Russia 
believes that licensed production is not a bilateral issue; 
it is an export control issue.  Russia wants to prevent 
weapons of Russian origin (based on Russian technology) from 
being used to kill Russian soldiers.  Mashkov asked that the 
EU renounce its statement from May; otherwise, it was not 
worth continuing the discussion.  He went on to say that 
re-export controls would be an important element of an Arms 
Trade Treaty and if the EU could not agree to a politically 
binding document, it was unlikely to get agreement on a 
legally binding Arms Trade Treaty that must include re-export 
controls. 
 
¶4. (C) The HOD meeting briefly touched on the question of 
extending the current Head of Secretariat for one year. 
Mashkov stuck to the position that names of possible 
successors must be put forward before Russia would agree to 
an extension.  While belaboring the issue, Mashkov noted that 
Russia felt this was an insignificant issue that had been 
given too much attention and took time away from substantive 
discussions.  Mashkov then indicated Russia objected to a 
one-year extension as that would mean changing the Head of 
Secretariat in the middle of an Assessment year.  He 
suggested extending the current Head of Secretariat for a 
longer period - possibly 18 months or 2 years. (Note: During 
a pre-meeting bilateral with the U.S., Mashkov reported that 
he had been demarched by the Swedish Ambassador on the 
extension question, as had his deputy minister in Moscow.  He 
said that, though he was not making linkages, he pointed out 
to the Swedish Ambassador that, while acting as the current 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000573  002 OF 004 
 
 
EU president, the Swedish Ambassador was asking a favor of 
him ) to agree to extend the current Head of Secretariat, 
who is a Swedish diplomat ) when the EU had killed the 
Russian proposal on Re-Export Controls.  End note.) 
 
Plenary Discussions 
 
¶5. (SBU) After adoption of the agenda, Russia issued an 
opening statement.  Georgia was again Russia's primary 
concern with a repeat of the claim that the conflict in 
Georgia showed that the WA was unable to meet its primary 
focus of preventing destabilizing accumulations of arms. 
What is more, nothing was done to improve the situation and 
WA Participating States were re-arming Georgia.  Russia noted 
it was not inclined to discuss the issue of Re-Export 
Controls, based on the rejection by the EU of the proposal in 
May.  In summary, Russia felt that the WA had stopped being a 
platform for discussion and if this did not change then 
Russia would re-evaluate its participation. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Agreement was reached to continue discussions on all 
GWG policy issues in 2011.  There were three successes at the 
Plenary: 45 changes to the controls lists, including 20 U.S. 
proposals, were agreed; a U.S. proposal for a seminar on 
changes to the control lists for select non-participating 
States, and a Russian proposal for a side discussion group on 
the issue of destabilizing accumulations were both agreed to 
on a trial basis.  The general theme of the rest of meeting 
was Russian recalcitrance. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Sweden noted it was going to hold a meeting in 
Stockholm in January 2010 to discuss how to move its proposal 
on ammunition reporting.  The Russian delegation noted at the 
table that it did not see the point in informal consultations 
if agreement could not be reached in Vienna; it was not worth 
sending experts to Stockholm when Wassenaar had bigger 
problems with regard to destabilizing accumulations, and 
Russia did not want to divert attention away from major WA 
issues.  So, Russia asserted, unless there was agreement on 
broader conventional arms issues, it was not willing to take 
time to discuss ammunition reporting.  The U.S. delegation 
talked to Sweden on the margins to make it clear that the 
U.S. could not support ammunition reporting, but indicated we 
may attend the Stockholm meeting. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UK expressed the hope that progress could be 
made in 2010 on its proposal for arms denial reporting and 
denial consultation.  It believed the proposal would 
strengthen the organization.  Russia responded that the 
situation in Georgia showed that this idea would not work. 
Due to concerns about the arms build-up in Georgia, the 
Russian president issued an arms embargo on Georgia, yet 
Participating States still sent arms to Georgia for political 
reasons and did not consult with Russia.  Also, the proposal 
had commercial implications: without a 'no undercut' policy 
agreed between producing countries, this proposal could 
result in financial implications for exporters. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Japan's proposal for Best Practices on Internal 
Compliance Programs was also blocked by Russia.  The Russian 
delegation raised a number of questions that it had not 
brought up at previous meetings.  Russia said it was willing 
to continue to work on the proposal in 2010. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Denmark's proposal on Guidelines for Controlling 
Transportation of Conventional Arms in Order to Prevent 
Destabilizing Accumulations was blocked by Russia with the 
claim that the proposal was outside the mandate of the WA 
because it discusses transfers between third parties most of 
which are outside the WA.  Russia also pointed out that 
Wassenaar does not deal with illicit trafficking.  Rather, 
its basic task is to prevent destabilizing accumulations of 
arms in zones of conflict.  There are other fora that discuss 
illicit trafficking.  Finally, Russia noted there was no 
common definition of "brokering" so care needs to be taken in 
using the word. 
 
Re-Export Controls 
 
¶11. (C) In an effort to try to mitigate the repercussions 
from the May EU statement on the Russian Re-Export Control 
proposal, Poland took the floor to announce it was working on 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000573  003 OF 004 
 
 
new language for the proposal that will potentially meet the 
concerns of all parties.  However, work still remained before 
the document could be shared with Participating States. 
Romania and Bulgaria chimed in to say they looked forward to 
constructive dialogue on the issue in 2010.  This was a 
coordinated response; the document was not ready to be 
shared, because not all the countries most impacted by the 
Russian proposal had yet agreed to the revised Polish 
language.  Some EU country representatives informally advised 
the U.S. delegation that the five countries impacted by the 
Russian proposal had been pressed by the EU to make progress 
because the Czech-sponsored statement had significantly 
impacted the work of the WA. 
 
¶12. (C) Russia responded that it hoped that these assurances 
(which had not come from all the countries that blocked the 
Russian proposal) would lead to more constructive progress. 
Russia also noted that there was movement away from the 
"consolidated" position from May.  Russia was offended by the 
EU statement in May and expressed appreciation for the 
Participating States that were "bold enough" to express 
support for Russia's proposal.  If agreement was not reached 
soon there would be a serious implication for the future of 
the WA.  The Russian delegation also stressed that an 
essential element of an Arms Trade Treaty ) which was being 
promoted by many of the countries blocking the Russian 
proposal ) would be re-export controls. 
 
Plenary Success Stories 
 
¶13. (SBU) Experts Group: The changes to the control lists 
proposed by the Experts Group (EG) sailed through without 
comment.  The Plenary endorsed EG requests for mandates to 
pursue controls on robotically controlled vehicles in 2010 
and to continue to refine controls on night vision related 
items.  The Plenary also endorsed an EG request that the 
Secretariat make control lists from previous years and the 
list of changes each year available on the WA website. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Technical Briefing: The U.S. proposal to hold a 
briefing on changes to the control lists for select 
non-Participating States reached consensus.  The U.S. 
brokered a compromise with the Russian delegation that the 
briefing would be held on a trial basis to determine interest 
in the briefing.  The briefing would be held in Vienna in 
conjunction with either the Spring EG meeting in April or the 
EG intersessional meeting in June.  Belarus, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, the Peoples Republic on 
China, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Serbia, Singapore and the United Arab 
Emirates would be invited. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Destabilizing Accumulations: Russia expressed 
frustration that there was no discussion in the GWG on the 
new agenda item of destabilizing accumulations.  The Russian 
delegation had proposed in May that the WA work towards 
defining the term and look at how Participating States 
reviewed applications for exports of arms to regions of 
conflict.  The U.S. counter-proposal noted that the WA had 
attempted to define the term in 1998, but the consensus was 
that the definition of what was "destabilizing" would change 
depending on a specific situation.  In reviewing the papers 
from 1998, there did not appear to be any new arguments to 
make.  However, the U.S. delegation suggested having a 
mechanism for convening ad hoc meetings to discuss crisis 
situations when they arose.  These meetings could be held on 
the margins of a GWG; would not require or expect attendance 
by all Participating States; and would be informal with no 
official reporting back to the GWG unless agreed by 
participants. 
 
¶16. (C) At the Plenary, Russia proposed formalizing the 
meeting process proposed by the U.S. by establishing an 
open-ended ad hoc working group, and having the meeting 
discuss how to define "destabilizing accumulations"; how 
Participating States apply the basic principles of the WA; 
and possibly prepare recommendations for the GWG.  In making 
its case, Russia repeated that the Georgia situation had 
proven that the WA had not met its primary focus of 
preventing destabilizing accumulations.  Russia took this to 
mean that Participating States did not want to discuss 
Georgia and that States were trying to push Russia out of the 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000573  004 OF 004 
 
 
region.  However, the transfer of weapons to "hotbeds" 
presents a grave danger; proof of this was the number of 
Russian peacekeepers killed in the Georgia conflict.  Russian 
head of delegation then proceeded to read the list of Russian 
soldiers killed as well as their birthdates, noting that some 
were the same age as his son.  The U.S. head of delegation 
expressed her personal sympathy to the families who lost 
service members in Georgia, as well as other conflicts. 
However, speaking on behalf of the U.S., she indicated that 
the Russian proposal needed more clarity before it could be 
accepted, and sought a written proposal.  Russia prepared a 
written proposal and, after significant debate and 
compromise, Participating States agreed to establish the ad 
hoc working group on a trial basis for one year. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Outreach: Discussion on 2010 Outreach activities 
was limited.  Russia again objected, asking why by Brazil, 
India, and Peru were recommended for outreach when at least 
Brazil and India have previously said they were not 
interested.  Argentina advised that Peru had expressed 
interest, and compromise was reached to approach only Peru 
and to leave open contact with the other two countries should 
they express interest either to the Secretariat or to 
Participating States on a national basis. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Membership: The EU again read its statement 
expressing support for Cyprus; the U.S. expressed support for 
Cyprus' eventual membership; and Turkey again blocked Cyprus' 
application.  On the other applicant countries, Russia 
questioned including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chile in 
countries targeted by the Friends of the Chair on Membership 
(FOC-M) when neither had submitted an application.  The FOC-M 
chairman replied that both had sent letters saying they 
intend to apply.  Russia objected to including these two 
countries because including them now showed Wassenaar was 
more interested in rushing applications than in substance. 
The Plenary agreed to add both countries to the FOC-M process 
when their applications are received. 
 
Administrative Issues 
 
¶19. (SBU) Head of Secretariat: No candidates to replace the 
current Head of Secretariat have come forward.  Russia 
continued to block agreement on extending the mandate of the 
current Head of Secretariat without the identification or 
nomination of potential replacements.  (Note: U.S. delegation 
understood that the UK and Japan were initially willing to 
indicate they had candidates to put forward, but neither 
country did so because of Russian posturing during the 
pre-plenary meeting.  End note.)  Russia then objected to a 
one-year extension, as this would require a change in the 
Head of Secretariat in the middle of 2011, an assessment 
year.  As a way forward, Russia proposed extending 
Danielsson's mandate for two years, but also required that 
this recommendation be agreed to by a two-month silence 
procedure, saying it needed its proposal approved by Moscow. 
The Plenary Chair consulted Danielsson, who agreed in 
principle to the extension, but was concerned that logistical 
matters would be complicated if he did not have a decision 
now.  After further Russian objections and Plenary Chair 
efforts at reconciliation, Danielsson agreed to wait to 
mid-February for a decision on the extension.  As reported 
(ref. B), the Plenary has initiated a silence procedure until 
February 15.  If silence is not broken, then Ambassador 
Danielsson will be extended for two years. 
 
DAVIES