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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001053 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/22 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EC IR PREL MNUC PARM KNNP
SUBJECT: Ecuador Gradually Solidifies Relationship with Iran's Export 
Development Bank 
 
REF: STAT...



id: 241300
date: 12/22/2009 19:22
refid: 09QUITO1053
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination: 09QUITO875|09QUITO943|09STATE120453
header:
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #1053/01 3561922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 221922Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0583
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001053 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/22 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EC IR PREL MNUC PARM KNNP
SUBJECT: Ecuador Gradually Solidifies Relationship with Iran's Export 
Development Bank 
 
REF: STATE 120453; QUITO 943; QUITO 875 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Heather M. Hodges, Ambassador, U.S. Department of 
State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
---------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) continues to make 
inroads in Ecuador, according to press reports, although it appears 
to face resistance at mid-levels in the Ecuadoran government and 
Central Bank - and even more so in the private sector.  In 
delivering Ref A demarche on EDBI, and following up on previous 
such efforts (Refs B & C), EconCouns spoke with Central Bank, 
Ministry of Finance, MFA, and private financial sector contacts. 
Many of these individuals have tried and mostly failed to raise 
awareness of the dangers of doing business with EDBI, and with Iran 
in general.  They argue that the only person who can make the 
decision to walk back the EDBI arrangements is President Correa 
himself.   The Secretary's recent warning to Latin American 
countries about Iran - and Venezuelan President Chavez's response 
-- received significant coverage in local press, but the reality is 
that there is general skepticism that Ecuador will actually face 
any negative repercussions if it moves forward with implementing 
its agreements with EDBI.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Press Reports on EDBI Developments 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Local press reported extensively over the last month on 
Ecuador's relationship with Iran, and particularly efforts to 
implement the 2008 MOU between EDBI and Ecuador's Central Bank 
(BCE).  Much of this reporting was prompted by the November 18-20 
visit of EDBI officials to Ecuador, during which they reportedly 
discussed providing trade financing, investment in hydro and 
thermal electricity projects, and other credits, as well as 
accelerating the establishment of an EDBI branch in Quito.  (This 
visit was followed shortly by Iranian President Ahmadineyad's visit 
to Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela.  Ahmadineyad was rumored to also 
visit Ecuador, but for unclear reasons this leg of the trip did not 
materialize.)  Iran's Ambassador to Ecuador, Majid Salehi, and the 
BCE's ex-President, Carlos Vallejo, stoked the issue with separate 
interviews, in which both dismissed concerns about EDBI and 
highlighted the benefits of expanding commercial relationships 
between the two countries.  Over the last year, Vallejo has 
consistently been the loudest public advocate for expanding 
relations with Iran and with EDBI in particular. 
 
 
 
Turmoil at Central Bank Linked to Concerns about Iran 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3. (C) To date, our main support on EDBI issues has come from a 
surprising source: the BCE's now ex-General Manager, Karina Saenz. 
Despite being personally recruited to the job by President Correa, 
Saenz has become increasingly concerned about the BCE's 
relationship with EDBI.  During a meeting with EconCouns on 
December 8, Saenz said that no management-level BCE officials 
wanted anything to do with the EDBI MOU.  She also said she had 
sent a memo to the President bluntly laying out her concerns and 
arguing that Ecuador, and specifically the BCE, should have no 
contact with EDBI.  She acknowledged this was risky, but expressed 
frustration that increasingly in the GoE no high-level officials 
seem willing to give the President bad news or disagree with 
existing policy.  She acknowledged that BCE President Vallejo was 
her main opponent on this and many other sensitive issues, but 
thought she retained continued support from Coordinating Minister 
for Economic Policy Diego Borja.  (As reported Ref B, Saenz 
arranged a meeting for EconCouns with Borja, who agreed at the time 
that the GoE should find ways to develop a commercial relationship 
with Iran without resorting to EDBI.) 
 
 
¶4. (C) Under pressure from President Correa on a separate issue 
related to the local investment of official BCE reserves (septel), 
Vallejo, Saenz, and the entire BCE management team resigned 
December 9 (septel).  So, in a single stroke, the Embassy lost both 
its biggest supporter (Saenz) and one of its principal opponents 
(Vallejo) on EDBI/Iran issues.  A widespread rumor was that Saenz 
and her management team resigned over concerns about Iran.  This 
was unfounded, although Saenz is not the only BCE official worried 
about EDBI.  Many of our BCE contacts erroneously believe they 
could eventually end up in jail if they signed anything related to 
EDBI.  Emboffs have not corrected this misconception.  Some BCE 
officials also wonder whether the U.S. Department of Treasury will 
try to go after BCE-owned Banco Pacifico, a U.S. bank based in 
Miami. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) In an unexpected move, the President appointed Minister 
Diego Borja as acting BCE President, and Borja's two top aides were 
appointed as the BCE General Manager (Christian Ruiz) and Deputy 
General Manager (Andres Arauz).  Therefore, Borja, who rumor had it 
was in the doghouse with the President because of his rowdy 
behavior during Correa's October trip to Russia, has now basically 
taken over the BCE and greatly expanded his control over GoE 
economic policy. 
 
 
 
Engaging the Finance Ministry 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) After five tries to obtain a meeting with Finance Ministry 
officials, EconCouns met December 10 with Undersecretary Carolina 
Portaluppi to discuss ongoing reform efforts within the Ministry 
and the status of the 2010 budget (septel).  Ex-BCE GM Saenz 
informed EconCouns that Finance officials were ducking meetings 
with the Embassy in the past because of the Iran angle.  When 
Portaluppi admitted that Ecuador was finding it more difficult than 
expected to obtain large-scale funding from its new "strategic 
friends" China, Russia, and Iran, EconCouns briefly summarized USG 
concerns with Iran and EDBI and left Ref A non-paper.  Portaluppi 
agreed to review the non-paper and meet again to discuss the issue. 
 
 
 
MFA's North America Director Advises, "Take it up with Correa" 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) EconCouns delivered Ref A demarche and presented non-paper 
on December 16 to Ambassador Juan Salazar, Director General of the 
MFA's North America office.  In strict confidence, Salazar 
(PROTECT) presented the two-inch thick binder that his office had 
put together on Iran, including press reports, readouts of USG 
demarches in Washington and Quito, and details about the USG's 
designation of EDBI and the UN and FATF's various warnings about 
Iran.  Salazar said he had prepared the binder for Foreign Minister 
Falconi to review and send to the President, and he briefly showed 
the letter drafted to President Correa for Falconi's signature, 
summarizing the contents of the binder and explaining concerns. 
Salazar said that Falconi's office returned the entire package to 
the North America office unsigned and without comment, but with the 
clear message that this was not an issue Falconi wanted to hear 
about again from Salazar.  When EconCouns described the often 
difficult discussions EmbOffs have had on Iran with our main MFA 
interlocutor on the issue, Multilateral Affairs Director General 
Lourdes Puma Puma, Salazar agreed that raising Iran issues with her 
was a completely useless exercise.  He added that discussing it 
with anyone in the MFA was unlikely to achieve positive results. 
He concluded that if the U.S. really wanted Ecuador to reconsider 
its relationship with Iran it would need to talk directly to 
President Correa. 
 
 
Private sector increasingly concerned, but confused about possible 
repercussions 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Citibank's local country manager Diana Torres (PROTECT) is 
extremely concerned about Ecuador building connections to Iran and 
EDBI.  She told EconCouns December 17 that she also understood 
Wachovia/Wells Fargo, which is the dominant player in providing 
trade finance in Ecuador (through local banks), was worried about 
how this was playing out locally.  Torres said local bankers were 
frightened by the possible implications of "U.S. Treasury 
sanctions," and the private bank association was looking for ways 
to support the USG position.  If helpful, Torres said, the bank 
association was prepared to start raising the issue with GoE and 
BCE officials, but they were worried about undermining their 
credibility if there was really nothing backing the U.S. 
expressions of concern. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Torres asked for details on what the possible consequences 
could be for Ecuador, and noted that other countries with deeper 
(Venezuela) or faster developing (Brazil) relations with Iran did 
not seem to be facing negative repercussions beyond USG political 
pressure.  (Torres noted that Citi and most other major 
international banks still do business in Venezuela, despite the USG 
designation of EDBI-owned Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, a 
financial institution operating in Venezuela.)  Other private 
sector contacts have reiterated this point, noting that Iran is a 
frequent topic of conversation in financial and political circles, 
but the general consensus is that the U.S. will not take any 
serious action against Ecuador if it moves forward in its dealings 
with EDBI.  Despite these doubts, some bankers are beginning to 
speak out publicly about their concerns over Ecuador's burgeoning 
relationship with Iran and EDBI in particular.  For example, 
Abelardo Pachano, Executive President of ProduBanco, Ecuador's 
fourth largest bank, noted December 21 during a popular morning 
radio show the USG's recent, massive fine of CreditSuisse over its 
dealings with Iran and other sanctioned countries.  Pachano 
highlighted this as evidence of the dangers of doing business with 
Iran, and also commented that the Secretary's recent warning to 
Latin American countries about doing business with Iran were 
further proof of how serious the USG was taking this issue. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
----------- 
 
¶10. (C) Secretary Clinton's recent words of caution to Latin 
America about dealing with Iran received significant local media 
coverage, as did President Chavez and Bolivian President Morales' 
critical responses.  The Secretary's warning of potential 
consequences was a useful message, supporting mission expressions 
of concern.  However, without more explicit details of consequences 
our warnings appear unlikely to be acted upon.  Furthermore, 
despite the misgivings of many in the bureaucracy, President Correa 
is clearly behind Ecuador's Iran policy and GoE Ministers seem 
disinclined to try to dissuade him.  Borja, especially with his new 
role as BCE President, seems the best bet to steer Ecuador away 
from EDBI.  Considered by some a leftist hardliner, by others a 
political opportunist, and by most corrupt, Borja appeared 
approachable on this issue during our last meeting with him (Ref 
B).  Therefore, the Embassy will reengage with him and the BCE's 
new General Manager - who reportedly studied in the U.S. - in early 
January. 
HODGES 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================