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P 290955Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5869
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUANDA 000785 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA'S OPPOSITION: WEAK PILLAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
EDIFICE 
 
REF: A. LUANDA 750 
     ¶B. LUANDA 751 AND PREVIOUS 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Jeff Hawkins, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  While Angola's political opposition faces 
many institutional obstacles, considerable internal 
weaknesses also prevent it from playing fully its role in a 
democratic system.  Whereas the ruling MPLA, albeit with all 
the advantages of decades of incumbency, is well organized, 
united, and nationally ubiquitous, the opposition is none of 
these things.  The opposition parties have weak, and 
increasingly fractured, leadership.  The parties have failed 
to identify political agendas that resonate with the Angolan 
people.  The opposition parties have largely remained 
regional, rather than national, in scope, and even in 
traditional strongholds organization appears weak.  Finally, 
these parties have failed to find a voice or establish a 
means of communication with the Angolan electorate.  The 
opposition can rightfully point to many advantages the MPLA 
enjoys; nevertheless, these parties must also put their own 
houses in order if the democratization process in Angola is 
to move forward.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The MPLA's recent congress put the power, prestige, 
and organization of the ruling party on display for the 
Angolan people.  Thousands of delegates from every corner of 
the country came together in an impressive showing of unity 
and support for the party president.  The party, in power 
since independence, has vast resources and truly national 
reach.  An MPLA flag flies over just about every village in 
the country. 
 
¶3. (C) This stands in stark contrast to the opposition.  The 
parties that make up Angola's parliamentary opposition - 
UNITA, PRS, FNLA, and Nova Democracia - are relatively minor 
actors on the political scene.  UNITA and FNLA, given their 
history as members of the triumvirate of resistance movements 
to the Portuguese, are household names.  UNITA represented a 
significant force during the long years of the civil war, and 
continues to be the most important opposition party.  But 
these parties no longer have any role in the executive 
branch, play a secondary role in parliament, and often seem 
unable to shape in any meaningful way the political processes 
of the country. 
 
¶4. (C) The opposition would argue that there are powerful 
institutional obstacles to their development, and they have a 
point.  The MPLA holds Cidade Alta (the Angolan White House) 
and has huge majority in the parliament.  The state controls 
much of the media and has set up limits to the independent 
media, particularly radio, which tends to keep opposition 
figures and issues out of the news.  The government and party 
have a number of carrots and sticks to use on potential 
opponents.  Even Angola's electoral law seems to conspire 
against the opposition.  In 2009, the Constitutional Court 
dissolved many minor parties - a few of which were led by 
leaders with some measure of local notoriety - as parties 
that won less than 0.5% in the 2008 parliamentary elections 
were required by law to disband. 
 
¶5. (C) However, the opposition is responsible, at least in 
part, for its own weakness.  In particular, we have 
identified four major failings. 
 
-------------------------- 
Weak, Fractured Leadership 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The opposition does not have strong leadership, and 
there are significant internal divisions in nearly all of 
them.  For the opposition, the days of charismatic 
independence movement leaders is over.  UNITA head Isaias 
Samakuva is an articulate Embassy interlocutor with excellent 
English, but he has neither the stature nor the presence of 
former UNITA supremo Jonas Savimbi, killed in 2002.  Samakuva 
did not provide effective leadership in the 2008 elections 
and has failed to re-energize his party since its crushing 
electoral defeat.  Weekly independent "Seminario Angolense" 
listed Samakuva in its latest edition as one of the failures 
of 2009.  For the moment, Samakuva appears to have control 
over UNITA, but there may be challengers in the wings, 
particularly Abel Chivukuvuku.  As for the FNLA, headed from 
its creation until 2007 by independence leader Holden 
Roberto, the party is in meltdown.  In a drawn out battle for 
party leadership, the courts recently decided in favor of 
Lucas Ngonda, a decision liable to create a schism with 
former president Ngola Kubango's supporters.  PRS leader 
Eduardo Kuangana is a low-key figure with a modest regional 
(read ethnic) base whose party has also recently witnessed a 
messy parting of the ways between senior leadership.  Nova 
Democracia head Quintino de Moreira - considered by some to 
 
LUANDA 00000785  002 OF 003 
 
 
be a shill for the MPLA - is a political non-entity largely 
unknown before the 2008 elections. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Failure to Articulate a Meaningful Agenda 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The opposition has not found an issue set that speaks 
to the Angolan people.  To the extend that there exists some 
groundswell of discontent with the decades of MPLA rule and 
Angola's poor social indicators, the opposition has failed to 
tap into it.  In recent months, UNITA has focused on Dos 
Santos's failure to hold 2009 presidential elections and on 
the constitutional process.  The elections issue has not 
gained much traction - perhaps because at least one IRI poll 
last year gave a much higher popular favorability rating to 
Dos Santos than to Samakuva or any other opposition figure - 
and the constitutional debate may be too complicated and 
arcane to appeal to a wide cross-section of voters.  On 
occasion, UNITA reps speak out publicly regarding the 
failures of MPLA government, as UNITA's parliamentary whip 
did in the October opening session of the National Assembly, 
but without offering any credible alternative program.   PRS 
is a strong proponent of a federal system, but in a country 
visibly working to knit itself together after years of civil 
war this has only limited, regional appeal.  FNLA seems 
focused on internal problems, and Nova Democracia tows the 
MPLA line. 
 
------------------------------- 
Lack of National Representation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The MPLA is the only truly national party in Angola. 
While UNITA maintains offices in many parts of the country, 
its presence in a number of provinces is beginning to 
atrophy; the other parties are not present across Angola. 
The 2008 election results suggest none of the opposition 
parties have been able to generate even modest support 
nationwide and that in their traditional strongholds 
opposition parties have lost ground.  During the elections, 
UNITA's best showing was in the southern and western 
provinces that essentially made up its power base during the 
war (Huambo, Bie, Benguela, Cuando Cubango, Moxico), but 
generally these were only in the 12-18 percent range.  UNITA 
failed to score even in the low single digits in many other 
provinces.  The one surprise score in the 2008 elections - 
UNITA's 31% showing in Cabinda - is probably a result of a 
protest vote by Cabindans with separatist sympathies, not a 
reflection of UNITA's organization in the province.  The PRS 
did well only in its base in the Lundas, and the FNLA only in 
its northern stronghold of Zaire.  On our travels up-country, 
we generally try to meet with representatives of the major 
political parties; we rarely, if ever, encounter dynamic, 
thoughtful opposition leaders in the provinces.  The 
opposition's talent and political savvy, such as it is, is 
Luanda-based. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Inability to Reach the Electorate 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The opposition has difficulty communicating with 
voters.  Limits on independent media certainly make this 
challenging.  UNITA supporters do control Luanda-based Radio 
Despertar, although it has periodically been a target of 
government restrictions.  A number of weekly newspapers, 
admittedly with circulations in the low thousands, also cover 
opposition positions, as does the influential Luanda-based 
Radio Ecclesia.  The opposition, however, has largely failed 
to take advantage of these limited outlets, and there is no 
consistent, targeted message to the audiences available.  For 
a variety of reasons - some to do with government controls 
and others to do with internal organizational problems - the 
opposition rarely resorts to more popular means of 
communication, like mass meetings or rallies, door-to-door 
campaigning, or distribution of leaflets.  Samakuva told DCM 
this fall that UNITA had considered demonstrations on the 
constitutional issue but had ultimately decided against doing 
so, "in the interests of public security."  UNITA presumably 
has enough support in some Luanda neighborhoods to gather a 
good crowd, but the party's decision to avoid doing so may 
suggest fears about low turnout as much as concerns about 
possible violence. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment.  For democracy to take firm root in a 
post-conflict country like Angola, a strong, vibrant, 
self-assured opposition is vital.  There are many external 
reasons why Angola's opposition has yet to fully assume this 
role, but many of its failures are internal.  Longer term, 
therefore, political development in Angola may depend as much 
on democratization within the MPLA as it does on further 
 
LUANDA 00000785  003 OF 003 
 
 
development of Angola's weak opposition parties.  End 
Comment. 
HAWKINS