VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHOS #0487/01 3630745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD03DEE3 MSI1629-695)
R 290745Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1132
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0438

UNCLAS LAGOS 000487 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - LAGOS 
 
REF A: 08 STATE 74840; B: 09 STATE 57623 
 
------------------ 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Background:  Nigeria covers 356,669 sq miles and has a 
population of approximately 149 million.  The major languages are 
English (official), Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa.  Approximately 60% of 
the population is below the poverty line for Nigeria.  The current 
GDP is 1,500 dollars, and the inflation rate is 8.2%.  This high 
poverty rate, coupled with the population pressures, induces 
large-scale migration.  Post's adjusted refusal rate for NIVs is 
31.25%, for IVs it is 44% (including adoption and DV cases, which 
make up 1/3 of post's IV workload). 
 
¶2.  (U) Nigeria has all of the high risk factors for passport and 
visa fraud, including lax identity document control; poor or 
nonexistent records for feeder documents such as birth certificates; 
powerful pull factors such as poverty and a large expatriate 
diaspora that encourage emigration; and endemic fraud and corruption 
at all levels of society. 
The lack of controls and a high incidence of bribery that permeates 
every level of society create an environment where anything and 
everything is available and for sale.  With enormous hunger for 
visas as an escape route, documents that cannot be trusted, and 
internal security conditions that make post anti-fraud investigative 
travel expensive and difficult, Lagos is a high-fraud Post. 
 
--------- 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶3.  (U) The NIV Unit continues to see a wide variety of fraudulent 
documents submitted to create the impression of an established 
travel history as well as financial and familial stability. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The most common fraud is simple document fraud.  Fake 
employment letters, bank statements, conference registrations and 
educational certificates are found on a daily, almost hourly basis 
on the NIV line.  The suspicious documents button could be selected 
for most applicants.  Effectively the Conoff will elicit 
inconsistent and unconvincing statements and applicants are refused 
at the window.  Only 2% of Lagos FPU cases are referred by NIV. 
 
¶5.  (U) Post continues to aggressively pursue a program for 
discovery and prosecution (arrest referral) of applicants holding 
fraudulent third country visas and fake entry stamps.  By collecting 
and disseminating detection points and equipment (loops and UV 
lights) to line officers, Post has discovered cases of third country 
visa fraud.  Working in tandem with RSO, these cases have ended in 
the arrest of the applicants by the Special Fraud Unit of the 
Nigerian Police.  All face prosecution under local fraud statutes. 
 
¶6.  (U) These fake third country visas run the gamut of 
counterfeiting tactics and print sophistication.  In some of these 
cases the applicant was able to travel to the target country using 
the fraudulent document.  Genuine civil and identity documents are 
relatively easy to acquire by fraudulent means here in Nigeria, but 
falsifying a record of foreign travel remains more difficult.  As 
such, these TCN visas remain one of the most consistently reliable 
mechanisms for detecting fraudulent applicants and applications. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Chinese, Australian, Indian, Malaysian, Turkish, Kenyan, 
Equatorial Guinean, and Brazilian fake visas have all also been 
discovered at Post, and most of these on multiple occasions.  In 
many cases, applicants admit in secondary interviews with FPU to 
having paid substantial sums, in one case several thousand U.S. 
dollars, for the visas.  In other cases, applicants contend the 
visas were provided in exchange for favors, to be determined upon 
issuance. 
 
¶8.  (U) Post maintains an extensive exemplar library of these finds, 
scanned and ready to share with other missions and agencies on 
request.  Post continues to strengthen ties to other Missions in the 
community in order to verify suspicious documents. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) F1 Fraud:  Student visas remain a popular target for those 
seeking entry to the U.S.  Counterfeit West African Examination 
Council (WAEC) certificates (WAEC is roughly equivalent to the SAT, 
and is the main basis for demonstrating educational qualification 
for a DV, for example) continue to be a tactic for fraudulent 
students looking to establish their bona fides.  Typically someone 
else will take the exam under the applicant's name.  Questioning the 
applicant remains the primary means of exposing the imposter test 
taker.  Post also continues to verify WAEC scores online. 
 
¶10.  (U) This reporting period, Post saw one U.S. SAT imposter.  The 
applicant confessed and the SAT agent was exposed.  The case was 
referred to the Nigerian Special Fraud Unit for further action. 
 
¶11.  (U) In another student visa case, an applicant posed as a 
government employee on scholarship.  Documents purportedly from 
Local Government Authorities were confirmed fraudulent by FPU.  The 
Local Government Council confirmed that the applicant was not and 
has never been an employee, as claimed. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) During the reporting period, Diplomatic Security and ICE 
investigated a marriage fraud/smuggling ring operating out of the 
U.S.  The applicants applied for B-1/B-2 visas to attend a 
conference with Allied Consulting and Educational Partnership in 
conjunction with the Globe Program.  When the applicants obtained 
visas and arrived in the U.S., they were matched up with American 
wives and filed to change status.  They successfully did this for 21 
applicants last year, none of whom returned to Nigeria.  The subject 
in the U.S. is affiliated with the University of North Texas.  Post 
has compiled a list of course participants and samples of the 
invitation letters and placed a lookout in CLASS.  ARSO-I interviews 
revealed that most of the applicants are low level government 
employees who claimed a higher position or more skills than they 
actually have. Five applicants confessed and were arrested by the 
Nigerian Police; the police investigation continues.  Applicants 
admitted paying upwards of $5,300 for the document package and 
services. 
 
-------------------- 
NIV VALIDATION STUDY 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In early 2009, Lagos FPU conducted a validation study of 
B1/B2 visas.  The study looked at over 1000 randomly selected cases 
dating from 2005.  Of those cases, 90% returned, 5% overstayed and 
1.4% adjusted status.  The remaining cases were inconclusive or 
unused visas. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The percentage of B1/B2s that returned in the study was 
higher than expected, suggesting that Post may need to refine 
NIV-related interviewing and anti-fraud training to focus on 
narrower categories of greater-risk applicants.  Post's overall NIV 
refusal rate remains at approximately 30%, due to a continuing high 
level of document fraud and large numbers of weak F-1 applicants. 
This was the first validation study post conducted in four years. 
Post plans an aggressive schedule of NIV validation studies over the 
coming year to help us refine our NIV adjudications. 
 
¶15.  (U) Post has compiled the information for these studies using 
the methodology standardized by CA/FPP and the reporting functions 
of CCD and the AdHoc system to generate the appropriate reports. 
The reports have been submitted to the ADIS/USVISIT system through 
the appropriate channels. 
 
--------- 
ACS FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶16.  (U) Financial scams - known as '419' scams, after the section 
of the Nigerian penal code relating to financial crime - continue to 
be an issue for ACS and a major burden to the correspondence unit at 
Post.  The ACS Unit receives a daily average of 13 inquiries through 
e-mail and telephone from American citizens as well as citizens from 
other countries who have been defrauded by Nigerians posing as 
romantic interests, Americans in distress, or lawyers trying to 
disburse a settlement or inheritance.  Some of these American 
citizens have sent large sums of money to Nigeria.  Post has 
developed FAQs and a script to help duty officers and others handle 
419 calls and has shared these with OCS.  We provide resources for 
419 victims on our website and track 419 calls using the Crisis 
application. 
 
¶17.  (U) U.S. passport fraud continues to be a moderate risk.  The 
great majority of DS-11 applicants are dual-national minors. 
Typical profiles are first-time applicants born in Nigeria; 
U.S.-born first-time applicants in their late teens or early 
twenties, who have never been issued a U.S. passport; and U.S.-born 
renewals whose only passport was issued when they were an infant. 
For such applications post requests original birth certificates, 
photos of the applicant showing age progression, and questions 
applicants and parents separately. 
 
¶18.  (U) A German consular attach at the Lagos airport caught a 
Nigerian woman attempting to use a U.S. passport to board a 
Germany-bound flight.  Upon questioning, the woman was not able to 
describe the passport application process, her life in the United 
States, the lengths of the flights to and from Germany or the U.S., 
or other details.  The official seized the passport and turned it 
over to the ConGen Lagos. The true passport holder, reached in the 
U.S., later confirmed that her passport had been stolen a few weeks 
previously, and seemed shocked that her passport had turned up in 
Nigeria; the Germans, noting the resemblance between the fraudulent 
bearer and the photograph, suspected the true bearer had lent it to 
a relative.  Unfortunately the impostor fled the airport and no 
picture or identity was obtained from her. 
 
¶19.  (U) The majority of CRBA applications are for children with one 
American citizen parent, often who is resident in the United States, 
not present to apply, and who has minimal evidence of a relationship 
with the mother.  Post encountered no instances of outright CRBA 
fraud, but unreliable local vital records documents and the fact 
that the Amcit parent is rarely available for interview make this a 
continuing risk for post. 
 
-------- 
IV FRAUD 
-------- 
¶20.  (U) Marriage into the large Nigerian-American community in the 
U.S. has been by far the most common path to American residency for 
Nigerians seeking legal and illegal emigration.  An overwhelming 
percentage of post's petition-based IVs are marriage-based (IR-1 and 
K-1s especially).  Nigerian law and custom recognizes three types of 
marriage - traditional, religious and civil - all of which are valid 
for immigration purposes and which involve different customs, 
procedures and participants.  These factors, in addition to poor 
civil records, corrupt courts that issue divorce decrees, and 
Nigerian naming conventions that permit applicants to add or drop 
names easily, make such cases extremely susceptible to fraud. 
¶21. (SBU) Post's IV Unit referred a total of 480 IV cases (3 %) to 
FPU in FY09.  As such, Post recommends 1.5% of all IV cases for 
revocation.  Cases reported fraudulent are refused under section 
212(a)(6)(c). 
¶22. (U) Marriage fraud can involve entire communities.  Family 
members are informed of the pending application and collaborate to 
deceive consular investigators.  To elicit facts, investigators 
employ courtesy and easily blend in with communities.  The questions 
asked by investigators must constantly change.  Therefore, 
investigators cannot rely on the same formula for every case. 
¶23.  (SBU) Investigators are creative in finding evidence of a 
hidden marital relationship at the applicant's true residence.  For 
example, in a CR1 case, the investigator found a Bible in the 
applicant's home inscribed "Mr. and Mrs. (and the family name)" 
inside.  Further evidence included other books with her listed as 
Mrs., she wore a wedding ring and men's clothing in the closet. 
¶24.  (U) So that investigators can more easily blend into the 
communities where they work, FPU consciously recruits investigators 
with regional linguistic skills.  Interviews are mostly conducted in 
English; however, confessions and stories are often obtained in 
another language. 
¶25.  (U) Document fraud, especially divorce decrees, is a 
significant element in IV marriage fraud (Ref B) FPU continues to 
verify divorce decrees when it is a determining factor for a 
relationship. 
 
¶26.  (U) In the reporting period, FPU assisted DOJ with a pending 
naturalization case in Pennsylvania.  Through several visits t 
sites throughout Lagos, FPU was confirmed that the divorce documents 
provided by te subject at the court hearing were not genuine, and 
that the subject was still married in Nigeria.  With this 
information DOJ was able to deny the naturalization and the subject 
faces deportation. 
 
-------- 
DV FRAUD 
-------- 
¶27.  (SBU) Nigeria is one of the top diversity visa (DV) countries 
worldwide.  In FY08, Lagos adjudicated 5,678 DVs, over 1/3 of post's 
IV workload.  In DVs as in other IVs, relationship fraud is the 
chief vulnerability.  In particular, Lagos line officers are 
confronted with many "clip-on" spouses: sudden "marriages" which 
occur after an applicant is notified that they have won the DV 
lottery.  From March to August, Post found 108 DV applicants 
ineligible under 212(a)(6)(e) for claiming fraudulent spouses on 
their DV applications. 
¶28. (SBU) FPU has developed several techniques to uncover fraudulent 
DV marriages and the facilitators behind them.  Before the 
interview, line officers examine the forms.  Fraud indicators to 
watch are a "care of" address - which is often that of the visa 
fixer -- the mailing address, the contact address in the U.S., and 
the handwriting.  Late night calls to the applicant's home often 
prove to be an effective investigation technique, as the "married" 
couple often lives separately. 
¶29.  (U) Another highly successful investigative tool is Lagos FPU's 
collection of wedding albums filled with staged wedding photographs 
submitted by applicants.  By spotting the actors repeatedly posing 
as guests and family members at supposedly unrelated marriage 
ceremonies, FPU has been able to identify several DV fraud 
facilitator cells.  Post had adopted a pre-interview "album check" 
so adjudicating officers have the benefit of this intelligence 
before the applicants were called to the IV window.  Unfortunately, 
the facilitators quickly adapted and have largely moved away from 
staged photos, so the mandatory check was dropped, though suspicious 
photos may still be compared to the album library. 
¶30.  (U) Where do clip-on spouses come from?  From touts operating 
out of internet cafes and other parts of the well-established local 
DV assistance service industry.  As internet penetration is still 
relatively low in Nigeria and costs are high, the gap has been 
filled by a proliferation of commercial cyber cafs.  Cyber cafs 
advertise for people, usually single, to pay to have an agent assist 
them to submit a DV entry.  An agent will then submit his/her own 
address instead of the applicant's true return address on entry 
form.  If the entrant wins, he/she is contacted by the agent, who 
matches them with a spouse. 
¶31.  (U) The touts collude with the cyber cafes and even advertisers 
and the media to vary computers to ensure certain IP addresses are 
not overly used, to attract new customers, and ward off competition. 
 For example, post recorded a podcast on how to apply for the DV 
program, stressing that applicants did not need to hire agents to 
apply and warning against fraud in DV applications.  We hoped to get 
it run as a public service announcement on Nigerian radio.  The 
radio stations turned it down, however, because they could get paid 
advertising from the touts and cyber cafes. 
¶32.  (U) Post is constantly on alert for the little details that can 
expose a fraudulent case.  A backdated marriage certificate was 
proven fraudulent by examining photographic evidence of the 
ceremony.  DV1 was interviewed separately in FPU, claiming a bona 
fide marriage to DV2.  In examining her wedding album, the 
investigator observed with the aid of a magnifying glass that her 
traditional marriage pictures were taken with a 2009 calendar in the 
background, disproving her claim that the couple married in April 
¶2008. 
 
¶33.  (U) The FPU daily conducts split interviews with the principal 
applicant and the derivatives, and the results are remarkable.  This 
allows a more in-depth analysis of the claimed relationship, while 
at the same time freeing up time for the IV officers to handle more 
cases.  Short of a field investigation, the split interview 
technique continues to provide the most facts regarding applicants' 
claimed relationships. 
 
¶34.  (U) Post made administrative changes in scheduling FPU split 
interviews.  As there is a heavier caseload at the end of the DV 
year, Lagos now schedules immediate interviews until space is 
filled, instead of having applicants return at a later date.  The 
FPM also added the responsibility of interviewing to the analyst 
position thereby increasing staff availability.  These changes 
ensured timely adjudication throughout the DV year.  In FY09 49% of 
IV cases referred to FPU were found fraudulent.  Conoffs continue to 
be effective in their decisions of which cases to refer. 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶35.  (SBU) Since March, Lagos has conducted 70 Nigerian IR-3 
adoption field investigations.  Almost half were in the 
Igbo-speaking eastern region.  This is the home region of the 
majority of Nigerian-Americans and, as a predominantly Christian 
area, state authorities tend to be more amenable to adoption than in 
Muslim-dominated states.  Travel to the entire region is dangerous 
and expensive, and requires COM approval for three of the states. 
Given the number of cases and priority post places on adoption 
investigations, we hope to arrange trips at least twice per year. 
Although in the past it has been a restricted area, FPU will also 
accept cases from security level four states.  This period, 20 
adoption cases were closed out from this region, in some cases after 
pending as long as two years. 
 
¶36.  (SBU) FPU's adoption-related caseload has fluctuated in recent 
years: 33 cases in FY 07, 148 in FY 08, 109 in FY09.  There are 
several reasons: an overall rise in adoption case numbers in 
Nigeria; in early 2008, post made it a priority to clear out a 
backlog of pending I-604 investigations; and post streamlined 
procedures for line officers to refer cases to FPU.  Security 
restrictions highlighted in the Nigeria Travel Warning make travel 
to Nigeria's eastern states is expensive: a September 2009 trip to 
do ACS outreach and adoption-related fraud investigations for four 
days cost post over USD 14,000.  Post strives to plan quarterly 
trips to the region, but these are not always possible for 
logistical or budgetary reasons.  Post has designated two line 
officers and an FPU investigator to specialize in Nigerian adoption 
procedures in an effort to resolve those cases that can be done 
without a full field investigation. 
 
¶37.  (U) In June, FPU Investigator Ijeoma Ndurue traveled to four 
eastern Nigeria states to conclude 30 adoption cases; he found fraud 
in 11 of them. 
 
¶38.  (U) The adoption fraud seen at post generally does not involve 
falsified documents or outright baby selling.  Typical cases involve 
relatives attempting to adopt a well cared for nephew, niece or 
sibling who would not meet the INA orphan definition.  We do 
occasionally encounter more egregious cases. 
 
¶39.  (U) In one case, the guardians of two legitimately adopted 
children added their own child to the adoption orders.  The 
investigator visited the guardians' home and discovered the 
guardians lived with the two adoptive children and one child of 
their own.  The neighbor corroborated that the guardians intended to 
send their own daughter to the U.S. 
 
¶40.  (U) In another case, post confirmed that local authorizes 
improperly issued genuine adoption orders.  The court registrar 
verified the papers.  The issue of whether it is permissible for an 
unmarried person to adopt children of the opposite sex was put to 
the registrar.  She stated that such an adoption is not allowed by 
law and suggested that the girls are his blood relatives and he is 
adopting them for immigration purposes.  There is also the issue of 
the Petitioner being a Catholic Reverend Father.  It is inconsistent 
with the status of a Reverend Father to purport to be a parent by 
way of adoption.  Further, Abia State Law says that it is 
unacceptable for an unmarried man to adopt girls.  In conclusion, 
the adoption is not valid and the applicants are ineligible for a 
visa.  This request for investigation came from the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
 
----------- 
DNA TESTING 
----------- 
 
¶41.  (SBU) DNA testing has proven an invaluable tool in the 
deterrence of fraud.  There are many instances where the evidence of 
relationship that would allow officers to make their decisions is 
unreliable, destroyed, or simply not available. Family photography, 
aside from the occasional posed studio portrait, did not become 
widespread until the late 1970s and early 1980s, and birth 
certificates have no security features to speak of and can be 
obtained easily.  During this reporting period, the buccal swab 
samples were collected by an IV LES at the clinic where the required 
visa medical examinations were conducted.  This duty rotated around 
the section.  The Consulate sent the samples to the laboratory and 
the notarized results were returned directly to the Consulate via 
courier.  Over a six month period in 2008, DNA testing was suggested 
for roughly 1,004 visa applicants.  In the last year, less than 10 
negative DNA results came in.  Post does not anticipate a 
significant change in DNA testing results due to the new guidelines. 
 The only changes that will impact the applicants are the location 
and the payment procedure.  Payments for DNA are now made through 
banks as opposed to clinics. 
 
¶42.  (U) The need for DNA testing is illustrated in this example.  A 
DV applicant brought in a clip on spouse and new baby.  The line 
officer requested DNA testing for mother and baby.  While at the 
clinic to pick up the results, an LES happened to see another woman 
breastfeeding the baby.  The DNA results were confirmed negative for 
both the DV1 and DV2.  The applicant confessed and was found 
ineligible under 212(a)(6)(E) for attempting to smuggle a DV3. 
 
¶43.  (U) DNA testing has been especially useful in IRs/CRs and F4 
cases and less useful in IR5 cases.  Few if any IR5s returned with 
negative DNA or unfinished testing.  The section is currently 
undergoing a statistical analysis of DNA findings.  A tracking 
spreadsheet has been created and is being updated to show the 
processing of each case in the first half of 2008 in which DNA is 
requested.  As a result of this study, we hope to produce accurate 
statistics to show how many applicants do not proceed with DNA and 
also the percentage of negative DNA results.  We hope to have this 
study finished in the next few months.  Applicants who know their 
relationship is not bona fide, in general, do not follow through 
with the DNA testing.  Post has encountered several recent cases 
where a principal applicant was asked to do a DNA test with a 
derivative child, only for the principal applicant to return to the 
Consulate and say that they changed their mind - they don't want the 
child to travel after all.  As the principal applicant (PA) has by 
this point executed a visa application for the derivative, the PA is 
told there will be no visa issuance until the requested DNA testing 
is completed.  In some cases, the principal applicant acquiesces and 
the DNA results are negative, resulting in a 6E finding.  Other 
principal applicants attempt to remove the problematic child by 
'killing them off' on paper - bringing in a fraudulent death 
certificate.  FPU investigation into these documents reveals the 
fraud, and the end result is still a 6E. 
 
--------- 
DHS FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶44.  (U) DHS Transportation Letter requests now average about 10 per 
month.  Previously, most applicants presented letters stating that 
they were robbed or lost them.  Lately, they commonly claim to have 
left their Green Cards in the U.S.  Three applicants who were issued 
Transportation Letters this summer applied for new Transportation 
letters at post in September.  They traveled to the U.S., returned 
to Nigeria without obtaining new Green Cards, but all presented 
documentation that they applied for replacements.  Post enjoys a 
good relationship with DHS in Accra and receives quick responses to 
LPR status inquiries. 
 
¶45.  (U) FPU receives and processes investigation requests from 
USCIS District Adjudicating Officers to verify documents, mostly 
divorce decrees, submitted for many different types of petitions in 
the United States.  Lagos closed 112 DHS cases this period. 
Forty-five percent of these resulted in a report of fraud. 
 
------------------------------- 
ALIEN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING 
------------------------------- 
 
¶46.  (U) In both the IV and NIV section we see frequent attempts at 
alien smuggling, whether through a sham marriage or the addition of 
an extra child to an existing visa application.  In some cases it is 
merely a member of the extended family who does not have a legal 
claim to the immigration benefit.  However, in some cases, such as 
the frequent DV "clip-ons", there is a financial motivation; someone 
has agreed to pay in order to have that person added to an 
otherwise-legitimate application.  From March to August, 108 
applicants were found 6e. 
 
----------------- 
DS INVESTIGATIONS 
----------------- 
 
¶47.  (U) The Consular Section in general and the FPU in particular 
work closely with the ARSO-I assigned to Lagos.  Unfortunately, the 
reporting period saw a gap between the departure of the outgoing 
ARSO-I in early June and the arrival of the current ARSO-I in late 
August.  ARSO-I Cases are referred to the ARSO-I from the IV, NIV, 
and ACS units, with the referral documented in the notes for the 
case.  The ARSO-I has aided us in pursuing marriage fraud rings 
stateside through his U.S.-based DS contacts, and here in Lagos he 
has been pursuing the vendors of the fraudulent documents presented 
in interviews.  His close working relationship with the Special 
Fraud Unit and the Special Intelligence Branch of the Nigerian 
federal police has resulted in the arrest of a number of fraudulent 
applicants.  Through spot reports he keeps the consular section 
informed of the outcomes of the referred cases.  The ARSO-I also 
takes referrals from the FPU in cases requiring complex 
investigations, those with a criminal nexus in the U.S., or cases 
requiring liaison with local law enforcement.  The ARSO-I and the 
FPM have a strong working relationship and often collaborate on 
interviews, investigations and training.  The ARSO-I and the FPM 
also benefit from the strong support of the Consular Chief and the 
Regional Security Officer. During the reporting period, Diplomatic 
Security authorized and post approved the creation of a new 
FSN-Investigator position to be filled in FY2010.  The new FSN-I 
will work exclusively for the ARSO-I.  This addition, along with the 
new consular investigator discussed below, will greatly enhance the 
investigative capabilities of the ARSO-I and, by extension, the 
FPU. 
 
---------------------- 
HOST COUNTRY DOCUMENTS 
---------------------- 
 
¶48.  (U) While Nigeria has recently updated its passport design to 
incorporate a microchip in accordance with the international 
e-passport standards, the older design remains valid and in 
circulation.  It consists of a biodata page encased in plastic, 
UV-reactant features, and the passport number punched into the top 
edge of the inside pages. 
 
¶49.  (U) The new e-passport incorporates other security features in 
addition to the microchip.  It includes holographic and UV-reactant 
features and each visa page in the booklet has the passport number 
punched into the outside edge.  It is important to note that, while 
the document itself may appear more secure, the underlying process 
in order to obtain the passport remains highly flawed.  Applicants 
for a Nigerian passport must submit a national identification card 
or a birth certificate, fraudulent versions of which are easily 
obtained locally. Applicants must also submit an affidavit from a 
'guarantor' who will attest to their good character.  Attempts by 
Nigerian immigration to use biometrics collection to enhance 
passport security are hampered by the absence of a networked 
database to allow comparison between passport offices.  Even with 
the additional security features, the Nigerian passport remains 
highly susceptible to fraud. 
 
¶50. (U)  Post has found numerous cases in which the new E series 
passports have serious quality control issues, i.e. lack of laminate 
on the biodata page.  Each case is referred for verification to the 
Nigerian Immigration Service and in cases involving legitimate 
quality control problems applicants are required to obtain a new E 
series passport.  An updated dossier on E series detection points is 
available from Post on request. 
 
¶51. (U)  As a result of these continuing problems with Nigerian 
passport security, Post continues to review all passports using the 
AssureID document checker. 
 
¶52.  (U) Nigerian passport numbers are often reused.  A high number 
of legitimate Nigerian passports seen on the line have been 
previously reported lost/stolen by the Nigerian authorities.  Lagos 
sees a dozen or more of these cases on a weekly basis in NIV.  There 
are no fraud indicators, and often, applicants who have prior good 
travel on a previous passport have received one of these passports. 
Each case usually returns a Lost/Stolen PPT hit in CLASS due to the 
passport number. 
 
¶53.  (U) Nigerian civil documents have essentially no modern 
security features.  Marriage certificates vary widely in appearance 
between issuing jurisdictions.  Marriage certificates and birth 
certificates are both printed on plain paper with biographic 
information added by hand.  Such documents are quite easy to 
counterfeit, and frequently are.  In addition, controls and 
oversight in government offices are such that for sufficient payment 
a person can fraudulently obtain authentic versions of virtually any 
government document.  For example, FPU research has shown that 
authentic divorce decrees signed by a particular registrar are 
almost invariably obtained fraudulently.  In light of the prevalence 
and ease of civil document forgery in Nigeria, local documents are 
largely discounted in the visa adjudication process unless they are 
authenticated at the source and supported with ample personal 
evidence in an interview. 
 
--------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶54.  (U) The FPU has enjoyed a strong relationship with the Nigerian 
Police Department for many years, referring cases to them where 
Nigerian laws have been broken.  The Special Fraud Unit has aided in 
the arrest of applicants who have presented fraudulent documents, as 
well as tracking down the document vendors. 
 
¶55.  (SBU) The FPU has also enjoyed years of support from local 
governments, schools and marriage registries in our verifications of 
documents.  Lately, however, FPU investigators have been harassed by 
the National Population Commission to provide money for 
verifications, usually 10,000 Naira, the equivalent of about 70 U.S. 
dollars.  This is apparently a revenue collecting scheme on the part 
of the National Population Commission.  In some cases, the working 
relationship between the investigator and the official, with whom 
they have dealt before, has meant the registrar could be persuaded 
to waive the fee; many of these government officials, however, are 
becoming more hard-line on this fee, making document verification a 
costly prospect. 
 
¶56.  (U) As a result of this, Lagos now requires applicants to get 
certain documents verified themselves.  This is a new practice and 
it is not yet measured how this affects adjudication numbers.  Some 
letters of verification have themselves turned out to be 
fraudulent. 
 
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STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
¶57.  (U) The Lagos FPU consists of a Fraud Prevention Manager, two 
LES Fraud Investigators, an LES Fraud Analyst, and an ELO part-time 
fraud assistant.  This includes one newly hired full-time LES 
Consular Investigator.  The new investigator has been an invaluable 
addition, particularly in conducting split interviews for the DV 
program.  Post has recently developed an FPU Travel Plan for FY2010 
to establish a schedule for investigations to be conducted by the 
Consular Investigators.  The fraud analyst has completed the on-line 
writing lab course and will apply for the March fraud prevention 
training at FSI.  Also, Lagos welcomed a new ARSO-I at the end of 
August. The new ARSO-I will continue the training efforts of his 
predecessor, who departed post in June. 
 
¶58.  (U) From March to September, a Lagos investigator conducted a 
field investigation each month; twice an ELO investigated by proxy. 
During that time, 160 cases were investigated outside of Lagos. 
 
¶59.  (U) Despite a staffing shortage, the Lagos FPU's caseload for 
Lagos area investigations has been drastically reduced.  From March 
to September the unit closed out approximately 230 Lagos cases with 
the help of ELOs.  Post currently has about 35 Lagos cases pending 
and hopes to further reduce cases to those aged one week or less. 
Locations require a motorpool driver and vehicle, and traffic delays 
prolong trips.  Terrible road and weather conditions constantly 
challenge investigations.  Measures are now in place to prevent such 
a backlog. 
 
¶60.  (U) The unit continues to brief incoming line officers.  In 
June, FPU held a training session for the Consular Section. 
Training covered the entire spectrum of work relating to fraud 
prevention and its management.  Also, in September Lagos hosted the 
Abuja Fraud Prevention Manager and an LES from Cape Town for fraud 
training. 
 
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LIAISON and OUTREACH 
-------------------- 
 
¶61.  (SBU) Post has also made significant progress in establishing 
new working relationships with host government agencies and other 
missions in order to further our fraud prevention initiatives.  In 
May, the German Consulate hosted the local fraud group.  Meetings 
are every six months and are an especially effective vessel for 
meeting counterparts and sharing techniques to deter fraud. 
 
¶62.  (U) Post continues to pursue an aggressive policy of referring 
confirmed cases of sophisticated identity and document fraud 
(particularly TCN visas and passports) to the local detachment of 
Nigeria's Special Fraud Unit (SFU), an agency of the national police 
force.  While the SFU has been particularly responsive in 
apprehending fraudulent applicants, police have offered little 
information or evidence regarding these cases Post-arrest. 
 
¶63.  (SBU) There appears little evidence that SFU has coordinated 
these investigations in aims of finding and prosecuting the 
purveyors of the counterfeit visas and passports.  In a few cases, 
Post has reason to suspect that despite definitive evidence of 
fraud, charges were never filed, the implication being that bribes 
had been paid to resolve the matter.  SFU has made no efforts to 
raise the profile of these arrests in the media, further clouding 
the utility of arrest referrals is discouraging the use of fake 
visas and passports by the general population.  In tandem with 
Abuja's RSO and the ARSO-I in Lagos, Post continues to monitor and 
review the arrest program.  On a very positive note, Post has 
noticed a reduction in the number of applicants who present fake TCN 
visas, a fact that Post has attributed to the inception of this 
cooperation with SFU. 
 
¶64.  (SBU) Post has one example in which an applicant applied for a 
Swiss visa using a passport containing a fake visa from Equatorial 
Guinea.  The Swiss confiscated the passport and returned it to the 
MFA.  This same applicant has now applied for a US visa using the 
same confiscated passport, evidenced by the Swiss stamp in the 
passport.  The Swiss Embassy has confirmed the facts of this case. 
While this case does not involve the SFU, it raises concerns about 
the lack of seriousness with which the use of fraudulent documents 
in general is viewed by Nigerian authorities. 
 
 
BLAIR