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R 170557Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
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INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 4055
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 6403
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0045

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000675 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/17/2019 
TAGS: PGOV ECON VM
SUBJECT: FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN HCMC AN UPHILL BATTLE 
 
REF: 2008 HCMC 810 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000675  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth J. Fairfax, Consul General, U.S. 
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to the officials charged with leading 
the fight against official corruption in HCMC, their work is 
stymied by multiple factors.  Because the Government 
Inspectorate (GI) lacks subpoena power or other authority to 
force cooperation, investigations of government employees can be 
effectively blocked by the employees' department or agency. 
Investigations of Communist Party members cannot even begin 
without the permission of top party leaders.  Beyond these 
specific barriers to investigating malfeasance, top 
anti-corruption officials believe that their most daunting 
challenge stems from the fact that rank and file GVN employees 
believe that their top leaders abuse their office for personal 
gain and thus conclude that corruption is an accepted practice. 
The lack of whistle blower protection is one obstacle to 
prosecutions that at least some top anti-corruption officials 
are determined to address.  Despite the bleak picture they 
paint, the openness and dedication of anti-corruption officials 
provides some cause for optimism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INSPECTORS FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (C) According to Lam Xuan Truong (protect), the Chief 
Inspector of Ho Chi Minh City, the city's (and GVN's) on-going 
campaign against official corruption will never succeed until 
Vietnam's top Party and government officials begin to lead by 
example.  Truong explained to CG that it is impossible to 
convince rank and file GVN employees to refrain from taking 
bribes, misusing funds or abusing their official positions as 
long as they see top leaders, their family members and 
supporters all getting rich.  "Corruption in Vietnam starts at 
the top," Truong stated matter of factly, "and can only be 
effectively fought by starting at the top." 
 
¶3. (C) Recalling his visit to the USA earlier this year on a 
Voluntary Visitor (VolVis) program, Truong confidently declared 
that the separation of powers is the fundamental basis for the 
USA's success as a nation.  He was not just referring to the 
classic three branches of government, but also to the 
application of the principal within government agencies at all 
levels.  Truong contrasted the independence of Inspectors 
General and other anti-corruption officials in the USA to the 
situation he and his staff face.  Unlike their counterparts in 
the USA or in the political and security branches of the MPS, 
the Government Inspectorate (GI) in Vietnam has no subpoena 
powers or other ability to force cooperation from government 
offices. While they can investigate individuals, they cannot 
enter or otherwise search their offices, computers or files 
without the expressed, written consent of the department 
involved.  Even if an employee's immediate supervisor agrees to 
a search, all it takes is one official somewhere up the chain of 
command to object in order to shut the entire investigation 
down.  While Truong can sometimes use his personal authority as 
Chief Inspector of HCMC to prevail upon city leaders to convince 
an office or department to allow an investigation to succeed, he 
added that his requests are frequently ignored.  When CG 
expressed his surprise at this lack of authority given the wide 
media coverage of cases where the MPS seized all files, 
computers and other equipment from offices, Truong pointed out 
that the GI is not the MPS.  He explained that even within the 
MPS, different divisions have different authorities.  The 
political and security police stand at one extreme and have 
absolute authority to demand or seize any record from anyone 
without a court order.  Truong describes the GI as being at the 
other end of the spectrum, with no ability whatsoever to force 
cooperation. 
 
¶4. (C) Investigating CPV members for malfeasance is even more 
difficult.  Truong explained that the GI cannot begin an 
investigation of any CPV member, no matter how junior, without 
first obtaining the permission of the Communist Party of HCMC. 
Even for the most junior party members, the decision will be 
made by the city's top Party leadership, including Party 
Secretary (and Politburo member) Le Thanh Hai and First Deputy 
Party Secretary Nguyen Van Dua.  For party members with some 
degree of seniority or for high profile cases, the Communist 
Party of HCMC will routinely refer the case to top CPV 
leadership in Hanoi for a decision.  Because the request must be 
filed BEFORE the investigation can begin, Inspectors are 
frequently left in a Catch-22 situation: the Party won't approve 
an investigation without first seeing overwhelming evidence 
against the individual but an Inspector can be disciplined or 
even jailed for conducting an investigation prior to receiving 
permission.  In practice, Truong added, the only way for a CPV 
member to be investigated is for some other CPV entity, such as 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000675  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the Fatherland Front or rival GVN entity, to request an 
investigation based upon numerous, well-documented complaints. 
Even in those cases, the Party will generally counsel its errant 
member to moderate his/her behavior rather than authorize an 
investigation.  Only CPV members who fail to respond to 
counseling or who embarrass the Party are investigated.  Even 
then, high-placed Party members will often act to shield loyal 
supporters who fall under their "umbrella."  Truong cited the 
case of the jailed former deputy director of the city's 
Department of Planning and Investment, Nguyen Ngoc Sy, as an 
example of someone whom his department requested to investigate 
but was denied. (Note: As explained reftel, Sy enjoyed very 
close personal ties to HCMC Party Secretary Le Thanh Hai. End 
Note.)  While Sy's corruption, and unexplained affluence, were 
well known for years, it was only after a Japanese court 
convicted a Japanese firm of paying bribes directly to Sy led to 
widespread international new coverage that the CPV finally 
allowed Sy to be prosecuted.  Even then, the case was given to 
the MPS's security division rather than to the Government 
Inspectorate for investigation. 
 
¶5. (C) Despite all the hurdles they face, Truong praised the 
inspectors who work for him for their dedication, stating that 
they do their best to investigate and prosecute those cases that 
they are allowed to pursue.  Truong cited the fact that his 
office racked up more than 50 convictions so far in 2009 as 
proof both of the dedication of his inspectors and the fact they 
can investigate only a tiny percentage of cases.  Even beyond 
all the bureaucratic and political roadblocks the GI of HCMC 
faces, Truong staff numbers less than 30 inspectors for a city 
with over 300,000 employees.  Truong spoke almost longingly of 
size and power of various IG offices he had visited in the USA. 
 
PARTY DOES NOT EXACTLY DISAGREE 
------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Nguyen Hong Ngoc, the Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Inspection of the Communist Party of HCMC, was less direct 
than Chief Inspector Truong but did not contradict him. 
According to Ngoc, it is the CPV's duty to its members to help 
them to realize their mistakes and improve that leads the CPV to 
block most investigations.  In what sounded like a tacit 
admission that corruption by CPV members is officially 
tolerated, Ngoc added that it is important to realize that 
official salaries of CPV cadre are often so low as to make it 
impossible to support a family, particularly in HCMC. 
 
WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTION 
------------------------- 
¶7. (C) One topic on which Truong, Ngoc and others involved in 
anti-corruption efforts all seem to agree is the need for 
Vietnam to adopt meaningful laws to protect whistle blowers. 
They are not alone.  Tran Du Lich, the head of the National 
Assembly's Economics Committee and the Deputy Chief of the 
Southern Caucus in the NA, has repeatedly raised the need for 
whistle blower protection during NA discussions, noting that 
efforts to root out waste and abuse in State-owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) are hamstrung by the fact that there is no effective 
oversight mechanism and that employees justifiably fear 
incriminating their bosses.  One big obstacle to passing whistle 
blower protection laws, both Truong and Du Lich have 
independently told CG, are fears that people motivated by 
political considerations or simple personal animosity would 
abuse whistle blower protection to lay false charges. 
 
¶8. (C) Truong went one step further, explaining that the biggest 
obstacle of all to protecting whistle blowers is the lack of 
commitment among top CPV members to really reign in corruption. 
While nearly everyone genuinely condemns direct cash bribery as 
being not only illegal but also stupid and likely to embarrass 
Vietnam and/or the CPV, Truong said that top leaders do not see 
placing relatives and supporters in lucrative positions as 
corruption, nor is steering contracts or special opportunities 
to purchase land, shares in companies, etc.  Until GVN and CPV 
can agree on what constitutes corruption, Truong sees little 
hope for progress on protecting those who report it.  Despite 
this, Truong, who is nearing mandatory retirement age, states 
that he plans to open an NGO modeled after a US-based whistle 
blower protection advocacy group in the USA in order to raise 
awareness of the importance of protecting those who come forward 
in good faith with information on real or perceived corruption. 
Unfortunately, Truong added, he feels bound to strictly adhere 
to Vietnamese anti-corruption regulations that prohibit former 
GVN officials from engaging in any private activities related to 
their former official position for five years after leaving 
government service. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶9. (C) While the picture painted by HCMC Chief Inspector Lam 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000675  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Xuan Truong is not encouraging, what is encouraging is the 
obvious dedication that he and his staff bring to what must be 
an agonizingly frustrating challenge.  Truong, who is himself a 
CPV member, bears no illusions about the challenges he -- and 
Vietnam -- face.  End Comment. 
 
¶10. (C) Note: Most of the conversations that provided the basis 
for this cable were made possible thanks to relationships that 
grew out of a very successful VolVis on Anti-Corruption programs 
in the USA that was organized by Embassy Hanoi in the spring of 
¶2009. Three members of the Government Inspectorate of HCMC were 
invited to accompany the national Government Inspectorate on 
that trip.  All three were greatly impressed, not only by the 
sophistication of anti-corruption activities in the USA but by 
the complete frankness with which USG and local officials 
discussed corruption cases, including "embarrassing" cases and 
those against very senior officials.  It was most likely the 
openness of US-based officials that led HCMC officials to speak 
so openly.  End Note. 
 
FAIRFAX