VZCZCXRO9994
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #3196/01 3520908
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180908Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9350
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7803
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0259
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6055
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2184
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0240
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 7425
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2191

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/FO, PRM/ANE, PRM/A, EAP/MLS 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019 
TAGS: PREF PHUM TH LA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: A/S SCHWARTZ VISIT TO THAILAND 
 
REF: BANGKOK 03145 (PARTNER ON REFUGEE AFFAIRS) 
 
BANGKOK 00003196  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Schwartz: Embassy Bangkok warmly 
welcomes you to Thailand and looks forward to working with 
you on the objectives you have outlined.  Though it is the 
long-standing issue of the Lao Hmong refugee community that 
brings you here, the U.S. has many refugee and 
migrant-related equities in Thailand and your meetings 
present an opportunity for advances in these other areas as 
well.  While developments with the Hmong have not always gone 
as we would like, the issue stands against the backdrop of a 
deep and broad relationship where Royal Thai government (RTG) 
cooperation has allowed us to accomplish important 
humanitarian objectives for tens of thousands of other 
refugees (reftel). 
 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since the December 2008 installation of the 
Democrat-led coalition government of Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejajjiva, Thailand has experienced a period of relative 
political stability. Nevertheless, it remains deeply divided 
politically and socially, and struggles to break free of its 
inward focus.  PM Abhisit generally has progressive instincts 
about basic freedoms, social inequities, and foreign policy, 
but his government is not strong. Though enjoying relatively 
high approval ratings, he is beset by a fractious coalition, 
vigorous parliamentary opposition, and frequent opposition 
street protests. 
 
¶3. (C) Underlying this political tension is the future of the 
monarchy. Long-reigning King Bhumibol is Thailand's most 
revered figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional 
mandate.   He is 82 years old and in poor health, however, 
and many actors are jockeying behind the scenes to shape the 
dynamics of the eventual royal succession.  Few observers 
believe that the deep divides can be bridged before King 
Bhumibol passes and it could be years before Thailand's 
political tectonic plates have resettled.  Most observers 
believe the monarchy's role will shrink after succession. 
 
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Despite ongoing domestic discord, Thailand's strategic 
importance to the U.S. cannot be overstated. As one of only 
five U.S. treaty allies in Asia, Thailand remains crucial to 
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.  The 
U.S. mission in Thailand -- which is one of the largest in 
the world with over 2000 employees from nearly 40 different 
departments and agencies -- affords the U.S. a regional 
operating platform that would be almost impossible to 
replicate elsewhere. 
 
¶5. (C) Not only is this platform key to supporting U.S. 
military operations and other critical humanitarian and 
multilateral initiatives, but it also serves as a growing 
foothold for our expansive bilateral relationship.  In just 
the last three months alone, the U.S.-Thai partnership has 
yielded a promising new lead in the drive to develop an HIV 
vaccination and the seizure of more than 35 tons of North 
Korean weapons, two examples which serve to illustrate the 
depth and breadth of a relationship that provides 
incalculable benefits in the military, law enforcement and 
health/disease research fields. 
 
LAO HMONG 
--------- 
 
¶6. (C) The success of your meetings with the RTG will in 
large part hinge on progress made in discussions with Lao 
officials.  The RTG consistently frames the Hmong issue as an 
exclusively bilateral one between Thailand and Laos.  Given 
the contentious nature of recent Thai-Cambodian relations, as 
well as the complex nature of Thailand's relationship with 
Burma, remaining on good terms with Laos appears to be a 
priority for the RTG. Another major concern for Thailand is 
ensuring that the Hmong crisis is resolved in a way that does 
 
BANGKOK 00003196  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
not encourage further movements into Thailand. Indeed, most 
of the Lao Hmong at issue here appear to have been motivated 
by a large-scale resettlement program that through 2005 
brought around 15,000 Hmong to the U.S. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is our natural 
interlocutor, but ultimately has minimal authority over 
refugee issues.  Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya is largely 
sympathetic to refugee and other humanitarian concerns, 
though his bureaucracy does not always share his views. 
Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban oversees the refugee 
portfolio in the Prime Minister's office, and though he has 
until recently not been actively engaged with us on the 
issue, he is nevertheless an important player in the process. 
 The other key decision-makers on Lao Hmong policy are the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters (RTARF) and the Thai 
National Security Council (NSC), both of which have 
traditionally taken a hard line on refugee issues. 
 
BURMESE REFUGEES 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) There are just over 100,000 RTG- and UNHCR- 
recognized Burmese refugees in nine official camps in 
Thailand, and many of these refugees fled to Thailand more 
than 20 years ago.  Another 50,000 unregistered "new 
arrivals" also live in the camps.  The U.S. is in the midst 
of a large-scale resettlement program which so far has 
removed more than 50,000 refugees from Thailand.  Our 
wide-ranging assistance programming covers food, shelter, 
health care, and gender-based violence prevention. 
 
¶9. (SBU) But fatigue is setting in among major donors - 
though not the U.S. This has created a push to allow refugees 
to work outside the formally closed camps. In November, the 
UNHCR and a group of assistance NGOs working in the camps 
presented the RTG with a Five Year Strategic Plan (the 
"Plan").  The Plan envisions greater freedom of movement and 
self-sufficiency activities for the refugees, and in exchange 
would allow refugee assistance funding to flow into 
surrounding Thai communities, where services would be offered 
on equal terms to refugees and locals. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Plan is largely supported by the "soft" 
ministries: Public Health, Education and Labor. But this 
support is of little use.  Once again the key actor is the 
NSC, which has the primary policy goal of ensuring that 
refugees eventually return home.  The NSC views the Plan, not 
without reason, as the thin end of the wedge of permanent 
integration of Burmese refugees into Thailand.  Embassy 
Bangkok's advocacy efforts in favor of the Plan are intense 
and ongoing; your meeting with senior-level NSC personnel 
will present a prime opportunity to advance this central 
refugee policy objective. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In June 2009, fighting in Burma displaced a group 
of over 2,000 (estimates vary widely) ethnic Karen refugees 
into Thailand.  The RTG responded exceptionally well: it has 
de facto granted asylum and allowed access to assistance 
providers.  It has not, however, determined what is 
ultimately to be done with this group, currently housed in 
several temporary sites.  We are urging the RTG to find an 
appropriate facility for this group, perhaps moving them into 
a "temporary transit shelter" - as the RTG calls refugee 
camps. 
 
ROHINGYA 
-------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In January 2009, an apparent "push-back" policy was 
applied by local officials to the seasonal wave of Rohingya 
boat migrants.  This resulted in an outcry, and the RTG 
promptly quashed the policy. A total of 78 subsequently 
intercepted Rohingya migrants are being held indefinitely; 
two of them have died of illness in detention. As the 
ultimate disposition of this group remains undecided, we are 
encouraging the RTG to find an appropriate solution, 
including possibly submitting them to a Provincial Admissions 
Board (Thailand's asylum mechanism) thus making them eligible 
for resettlement abroad. 
JOHN