VZCZCXYZ1675
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #1717/01 3542205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 202205Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1241
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0216
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0034
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0035
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001717 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR TU MK CY
SUBJECT: INFORMAL ADVISOR TO PAPANDREOU SHEDS LIGHT ON GOG INTERNAL 
DYNAMICS AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C) PolCouns and PolOff met December 3 with Paulina Lampsa, head 
of the PASOK International Secretariat, to discuss internal 
dynamics and key players in the Papandreou Administration and the 
current state of play in Cyprus and Turkey.  Lampsa discussed her 
role and that of other semi-official advisors to the government, 
while also acknowledging public concerns over the abundance of 
backchannel conversations.  Recently in Cyprus, Lampsa highlighted 
several potholes to be navigated in Cypriot internal politics and 
also raised concern about Greek economic and media opposition to a 
solution.  Turning to other regional matters, Lampsa talked about 
the need for the government to develop an overall strategy on 
Turkey and for Alternate Foreign Dimitris Droutsas to be given 
more time to 
 work the Macedonia name issue. In her estimation the 
election of Antonis Samaras as the new leader of main 
(center-right) opposition party ND will make it harder for Prime 
Minister George Papandreou to navigate a way forward on these 
issues. 
 
 
 
INFORMAL ADVISORS 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C). Paulina Lampsa, the International Secretary for PASOK and 
an informal advisor to PM Papandreou, is a regular contact of the 
political section at Embassy Athens.  She oversees Papandreou's 
international travel and work as President of Socialist 
International. She is also responsible for managing Papandreou's 
non-diplomatic networks and advising on foreign policy and 
communication strategies.  She runs a small but expanding office 
that is set apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PASOK 
party headquarters.  Lampsa held this position prior to PASOK's 
electoral win in October and says that she asked to stay on in her 
current role, rather be brought into government as a Deputy 
Minister.  Preferring to work directly for Papandreou, Lampsa did 
not want to have to report to a different Minister.  She 
"sometimes" coordinates with the MFA but otherwise acts as a direct 
informal advisor to PM Papandreou, before input is sought within 
the government. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Lampsa noted that Alex Rondos has also been acting as an 
informal advisor out of the limelight and has been taking on 
special cases and projects on behalf of the Prime Minister. 
 
Although an informal advisor herself, Lampsa acknowledged the 
potential for confusion and crossed lines, expressing concern that 
there was too much "secret diplomacy" going on within the current 
administration and that many at the working level in the MFA were 
not receiving information on sensitive issues.  In her words, 
"there is a danger in not informing government of where they are 
getting information." 
 
 
 
CYPRUS 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Lampsa described the timeline for movement in Cyprus to be 
between now and mid-February, seeing upcoming elections in the 
"TRNC" as more of a driving force for progress than December EU 
meetings to discuss Turkish EU accession.  Both the Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot leaders understand that movement is needed in 
order to demonstrate their positive leadership going into the 
election. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Qpsa recently met with Republic of Cyprus President 
Demetris Christofias and assesses that he wants to "move" on the 
issues being negotiated and is working with Greece to determine the 
best way to bring about progress.  However, several internal and 
external issues block movement.  Lampsa expressed concern that 
certain factions within both Cyprus and Greece oppose a solution 
and will actively work against resolution and reunification of the 
island.  Christofias cannot trust elements in his own coalition 
government. Lampsa described Christofias as having a "communist 
party mentality" where interlocutors have to read between the 
lines; some messages are not clear. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Lampsa also assessed that internal dynamics at play in 
Cyprus make it hard for Greece to work issues through the "right" 
channels.  As an example, Lampsa said that Cypriot President 
Christofias does not trust his Foreign Minister and therefore Greek 
messages passed through the Cypriot Foreign Ministry will not 
elicit the desired response.  However, Christofias would never 
publicly undermine FM Kyprianou and therefore messages continue to 
be communicated through foreign ministry channels. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Lampsa's assessment is that a carefully crafted media and 
communication strategy is sorely needed, in order to pave the way 
for public support for a solution.  There should be coordinated 
messages delivered by the leadership but also via influential 
columnists with the ability and legitimacy to advocate for a 
solution and explain the dangers posed if current talks fail. The 
time to move on these efforts is now. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Certain media and economic personalities in Greece are also 
opposed to a solution.  In particular, Lampsa sees the Bobolos 
media group, including newspapers Ethnos, Protothemis, Parent, 
Makedonia (in Thessaloniki) and the Mega Channel on television as 
working against the process.  On the other side, Lampsa said the 
Lambrakis media group (which includes Ta Nea, To Vima and the 
influential website INGR) and certain elements associated with 
Kathermerini are willing to support resolution of the Cyprus 
conflict.  (Comment: In our estimation, the Greek newspapers 
referenced above are not necessarily as influential as the 
newspapers in Cyprus itself. Television stations in Cyprus may be 
somewhat anti-Annan plan but are not necessarily anti-solution.) 
 
 
 
GREEK- TURKISH DIPLOMACY: NEED TO DESIGNATE A NEW POINT 
PERSON--------------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Lampsa characterized Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan as being 
less predictable than Papandreou's former Turkish interlocutor, 
Ismail Cem.  The Greek administration knows relations will be "very 
sensitive" around the time of the December EU summit, and will 
therefore proceed with caution. 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Lampsa seemed perplexed by the amount of information on 
recent Greek-Turkish interactions that Turkey was sharing publicly, 
citing Turkish officials' public comments on a letter from Turkish 
PM Erdogan to Papandreou and recent meetings with both Turkey's 
Foreign Minister and Chief EU Negotiator as examples.  In contrast, 
information seems to be tightly guarded on the Greek side; Lampsa 
claimed that the Greek MFA's Turkey desk is not necessarily in the 
loop regarding high-level discussions with the Turks.  She has 
lobbied in favor of designating a point person - with access to the 
Prime Minister's cabinet - to work on an overarching strategy for 
Greek relations with Turkey. Pavlos Apostolides has been rumored 
for the position. (Note: Currently an advisor at the Athens-based 
think tank ELIAMEP, Apostolides has held several high profile 
government positions, including Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, 
Permanent Representative to the European Union Secretary General of 
the MFA and Director of the National Intelligence Agency. End Note) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFFECT OF NEW ND LEADERSHIP ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) With the election of Samaras as the head of center-right 
opposition party New Democracy (ND), Lampsa estimates that 
Papandreou's PASOK-led government will face greater criticism and 
constraints in negotiations with Skopje and Ankara.  Samaras, who 
was the more conservative of the main candidates in the ND 
leadership race, is expected to try to woo far-right LAOS party 
members into his camp.  In turn, this could shift the ND party to 
the right. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) Lampsa also expressed concern with Samaras' choice of Panos 
Panayotopoulos as the new ND party spokesman, claiming that 
Panayiotopoulos is known for his nationalist rhetoric and may try 
to bring nationalist language into mainstream discussions.  (Note: 
Panayotopoulos was Minister of LQr under the Karamanlis Sr. 
administration and is currently a Member of Parliament.  Samaras 
appointed him as the new ND spokesman the first week of December. 
End Note)  Samaras' rumored pick for a shadow cabinet position, 
John Korantis, would also be problematic in Lampsa's view because 
of his former role as the head of the Greek National Intelligence 
Agency and the possibility that he could leak sensitive 
information. 
Speckhard